Infrastructure charges: Creating incentives to improve environmental performance

This FAL Bulletin analyses the potential contribution of differentiated infrastructure charges to the promotion of more environmentally sound behaviour, such as energy efficiency and technological change.

Training manual: innovative fiscal and regulatory incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy initiatives

This course will be designed for the officers within government departments who have responsibilty for guiding the country’s energy policy and energy management framework. Other stakeholders also will include private sector representatives who have interest in providing energy efficiency equipment and renewable energy solutions to the market towards advancing improvements in both energy efficiency and meeting renewable energy targets. The course will provide insight into all aspects of energy management with specific emphasis on energy efficiency as well as renewable energy. Emphasis will be placed on highlighting issues and challenges that countries face in pursuing energy efficiency and renewable energy strategies. International and regional best practices will be highlighted as a means of showcasing how various countries have overcome the barriers to advancing renewable energy targets and increasing energy efficiencies towards meeting national energy goals. The curriculum is divided into five modules and is designed to be covered over a 3-day period. The course will be designed to ensure practical application of the learning. The course also is designed to enable the Caribbean to demonstrate leadership in energy efficiency practices and the adoption of renewable energy strategies, serving as a model for other small island developing states.

Governos de gabinete e coalizões cíclicas no ultrapresidencialismo estadual: a experiência no Amazonas

OBJETIVO – O propósito de minha pesquisa é analisar os mecanismos que estruturam os governos de gabinete e as coalizões cíclicas no ultrapresidencialismo estadual do Amazonas. Em outras palavras, tenho como foco explicar a lógica do sucesso do governador, de sua coalizão legislativa e de seu gabinete na constituição de uma rede de superdominância nas arenas eleitoral, parlamentar e executiva. PERÍODO – Neste estudo de caso, analiso quatro administrações de três governadores do Amazonas: Gilberto Mestrinho (1991-1994), Amazonino Mendes (1995-1998 e 1999-2002) e Eduardo Braga (2003-2006); e quatro legislaturas da Assembleia Legislativa (ALEAM). TEORIA – Como orientação teórica, uso as contribuições da teoria da escolha pública e da análise institucional. Parto da premissa de que o governador joga tentando maximizar sua renda de utilidade dentro de uma dada estrutura institucional (permeada pela lógica do gubernatorial coattails) que incentiva a interação estratégica cooperativa e durável entre os principais jogadores (governador, deputados estaduais, secretários e cidadãos-eleitores) em múltiplas arenas decisórias. METODOLOGIA – Primeiramente, utilizo o banco de dados do Laboratório de Estudos Experimentais (LEEX) para montar um mapa da dinâmica eleitoral, partidária e parlamentar recente. Depois, trabalho com o banco de dados da Assembleia Legislativa do Amazonas para verificar a organização da produção legislativa (os projetos de lei ordinária aprovados) e a eficácia da coalizão partidário-parlamentar do governador. Finalmente, manuseio o meu próprio banco de dados sobre a rotatividade do secretariado e, por conseguinte, aplico e calculo o índice de coalescência para estimar os níveis de proporcionalidade dos governos de gabinetes ultrapresidenciais. CONCLUSÃO E RESULTADOS – Os governadores acumulam o monopólio do poder de agenda decisória do Executivo e controlam com muita eficiência a agenda do Legislativo; além do mais distribuem recursos de patronagem como incentivos seletivos para os seus aliados nos jogos em múltiplas arenas. Como consequência, cheguei à conclusão de que a formação de maiorias no contexto do ultrapresidencialismo estadual se realiza, por um lado, pelo surgimento de coalizões cíclicas de amplo apoio partidário na arena legislativa; e, por outro, pela edificação de governos de gabinete com a participação pendular de parlamentares, partidários e especialistas.

El principio constitucional de proporcionalidad en el sistema electoral autómico canario: análisis de su experiencia histórica en el autogobierno.

Programa de doctorado: La decisión jurídica: hechos y normas en la argumentación del Derecho.

Reflexiones sobre gobernanza; confianza en las instituciones públicas, densidad asociativa y participación electoral en Europa.

[ES] El presente estudio trata de forma abierta de los cambios que se están produciendo en los métodos de gobernar y en las posibilidades que ofrece la nueva gobernanza a la participación de la ciudadanía para influir en las decisiones que conciernen al territorio y su futuro. También introduce elementos relacionados con el dinamismo que han adquirido los movimientos sociales y la participación política no convencional, precisamente cuando más aumenta la desafección a la política y a los partidos políticos e igualmente se incrementan los índices de abstención electoral.

Cambios en la legislación electoral durante el sexenio (1868-1874): sus repercusiones en Canarias

[ES] El proceso de consolidación del régimen liberal a lo largo del siglo XIX plantea la necesidad de establecer un sistema de representación política. Conseguir el equilibrio del poder político, será el fin último que perseguirán los diversos modelos que se ofrecen para llevar a efecto esta representación a través del sufragio y los sistemas electorales. Modelos que varían en función de los intereses e ideologías que en esos momentos esté en juego.

Essays in policy evaluation

This dissertation consists of three empirical studies that aim at providing new evidence in the field of public policy evaluation. In particular, the first two chapters focus on the effects of the European cohesion policy, while the third chapter assesses the effectiveness of Italian labour market incentives in reducing long-term unemployment. The first study analyses the effect of EU funds on life satisfaction across European regions , under the assumption that projects financed by structural funds in the fields of employment, education, health and environment may affect the overall quality of life in recipient regions. Using regional data from the European Social Survey in 2002-2006, it resorts to a regression discontinuity design, where the discontinuity is provided by the institutional framework of the policy. The second study aims at estimating the impact of large transfers from a centralized authority to a local administration on the incidence of white collar crimes. It merges a unique dataset on crimes committed in Italian municipalities between 2007 and 2011 with information on the disbursement of EU structural funds in 2007-2013 programming period, employing an instrumental variable estimation strategy that exploits the variation in the electoral cycle at local level. The third study analyses the impact of an Italian labour market policy that allowed firms to cut their labour costs on open-ended job contracts when hiring long-term unemployed workers. It takes advantage of a unique dataset that draws information from the unemployment lists in Veneto region and it resorts to a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of the policy on the job finding rate of long-term unemployed workers.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

Zarycki studied the political map of Central Europe today on the basis of results of recent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, L8ithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. He identified first the structure of regional political cleavages, then the spatial patterns emerging in different countries. He also considered the significance and eventual regional differentiation of various possible influences on these patterns, including urbanisation, historical heritage, ethnic factors, population movements, economic differentiation, the effects of the transformation, demographic factors, education and religion. Virtually all the countries showed a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-) communist regions and secular areas with higher post-communist support. Except in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the post-communist party is dominated by the direct heirs of the former communist parties transformed into moderate left parties. The second major class of cleavages was typical of the Visegrad countries, i.e. the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan, regions and a different periphery, usually with a strong populist or anti-liberal appeal. This usually depends on the existence of a sizeable well-educated class, usually pro-market and pro-Western, and on the resolution of the conflict between post and anti-Communists. The third type of cleavage is based on ethnic factors and is clearest in Lithuania and Slovakia, where there are large ethnic minorities. Of factors influencing political behaviour, the two major ones identified were the historical heritage and urbanisation.