State Political Action Committee Financing and the 2008 Presidential Election: A Detailed Look at Mitt Romney and the Commonwealth PACs

This study looks at the historical context in which PACs developed, as well as the current legal environment in which they operate. It will also briefly discuss the legal and procedural challenges that candidates face and the ways in which PACs alleviate some of these pressures in ways that presidential committees cannot. An understanding of the strategic dilemmas which cause candidates to seek extraneous structures through which to establish campaign networks is essential to extrapolating the potential future of campaign finance strategy. Furthermore, this study provides an in-depth analysis of the state Commonwealth PACs both in terms of fundraising and spending, and discusses the central issues this state PAC strategy raises with respect to campaign finance law. The study will conclude with a look into the future of campaign financing and the role these state-level PACs may play if current rules are not revised.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

Inflationary financing of public investment and economic growth

a theoretical model is constructed in order to explain particular historical experiences in which inflation acceleration apparently helped to spur a period of economic growth. Government financed expenditures affect positively the productivity growth in this model so that the distortionary effect of inflation tax is compensated by the productive effect of public expenditures. We show that for some interval of money creation rates there is an equilibrium where money is valued and where steady state physical capital grows with inflation. It is also shown that zero inflation and growth maximization are never the optimal policies.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

Electoral institutions,cleavage structures,and the number of parties

Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

Avenues to success : electoral strategies and ambition in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

In the second consecutive election for the Brazilian Chamber ofDeputies, the majority of incumbents (75% in 1998 and again 75% in 2002) decided to run for reelection and at least 70% ofthem in both elections were successful, suggesting thus it would be incorrect to ignore static ambition as the main target of Brazilian legislators. It also raises doubts about the assertion that incumbents use their posts to pursue their post-Iegislative careers. However, this number also suggests that not alIlegislators seek reelection, indicating that it is also incorrect to assume alI of them are driven by similar motivations. In their attempts at career survival, incumbents may also run for higher offices (Senator, Governor, Vicegovernor). A minority still, may run for state leveI offices (regressive ambition).Given that static and progressive ambition are the two main types of career choice in Brazil, we focus on the factors that influence the career decision and electoral success of those who choose to run for reelection and those who choose to run for higher-level offices, i.e. senator and governor. We use data recently colIected from the 2002 elections.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

The effects of credit risk transfer on bank monitoring and firm financing

This paper examines the efects of the transfer of credit risk associated with bank loans. We are interested in (a) whether the transfer of credit risk has any impact on the intensity with which banks monitor their borrowers and (b) whether credit risk transfer infuences the amount of financing that is provided to firms in an economy. Our model first develops conditions under which bank finance is available to firrms, mainly in the spirit of Holmstrom/Tirole (1997). We then introduce projects with uncorrelated pay-offs and argue that one possible economic rationale for credit risk transfer is diversi¯cation. We analyze whether and how within this scenario the transfer of the credit risk of loans changes a bank's incentives to monitor its debtors. Finally we investigate whether and what kind of impact this may have on the amount of ¯nancing available to firms in an economy. Our results indicate that the monitoring incentives are being eroded indeed and that credit risk transfer can increase the overall amount of obtainable funds in an economy.

Exposing corrupt politicians : the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral

This paper examines whether access to information enhances political accountabil- ity. Based upon the results of Brazil's recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the e®ects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors. Comparing municipalities audited before and after the elections, we show that the audit policy reduced the incumbent's likelihood of re-election by approximately 20 percent, and was more pronounced in municipalities with radio sta- tions. These ¯ndings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process.

The Brazilian venture capital industry and its strategic role in closing the financing gap of SMEs

This discussion paper is a contribution of the Brazilian Government to the 2006 Annual Conference of the OECD High-level Conference on "Better Financing for Entrepreneurship and SMEs" to be held in Brasilia, Brazil on 27-30 March 2006. It has been prepared by The Center for Studies in Private Equity and Venture Capital of EAESP-Fundação Getúlio Vargas under the auspices of ABDI – Agência Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Industrial – an agency of the Ministry of Industrial Development and Foreign Trade, in cooperation with ABVCAP – The Brazilian Association of Private Equity and Venture Capital

Dip financing of financially distressed companies in Brazil – the conditions provided by the brazilian bankruptcy law act as real incentives for dip lenders as in chapter 11 of the American bankruptcy code?

O objeto deste trabalho é a compreensão do financiamento de empresas em crise, mais especificamente, o financiamento concedido após o pedido de recuperação judicial, como forma de permitir que a empresa saia da situação de crise e retorne à condição de normalidade. Para tanto, nos apropriando do termo cunhado pela doutrina norte-americana, para fazer referência ao aporte de recursos em empresas em dificuldade, utilizaremos o termo DIP financing ou financiamento DIP. Para uma compreensão adequada do objeto, é necessário que entendamos a origem do DIP financing nos Estados Unidos e como é a regulação norte-americana sobre a matéria atualmente. O segundo passo será avaliar a possibilidade de aplicação da mesma estrutura de aporte de recursos no Brasil. Ao estudarmos a origem desse mecanismo nos Estados Unidos, veremos os problemas que surgiram ao longo dos anos e como foram superados jurisprudencialmente e doutrinariamente para que o financiamento DIP se consolidasse como uma das formas de aporte de capital em empresas em crise, culminando no desenvolvimento de uma verdadeira indústria de crédito às empresas em dificuldade. Uma análise dos problemas enfrentados pelo sistema falimentar americano nos levará a hipótese de que, a menos que sejam afirmados mecanismos que assegurem a quem concede o financiamento após o pedido de recuperação judicial, uma super prioridade no recebimento após a recuperação judicial, será possível o desenvolvimento de um mercado de DIP financing no Brasil.

Polarización y resaca electoral en Brasil

Concluidas las exasperadas elecciones de 2014, el país pasa por un momento delicado. Por un lado, es esperado que la nueva composición del gobierno busque un tono de reconciliación posicionándose de una manera más moderada que permita el funcionamiento del modelo de gobierno de coalición aun en práctica. Por otro, ya queda evidente que será un arduo y doloroso proceso en virtud a la intensa polarización política que, a pesar de apuntar tendencias de distensión sigue un expresivo elemento en la conducción de la política brasileña

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Financing for sustainable development: visions and proposals for action from a Latin American and Caribbean perspective

Foreword Throughout the preparatory process for the World Summit on Sustainable Development and at the Summit itself, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 26 August to 4 September 2002, discussions were dominated by one central concern: the need to define and reach consensus on concrete, quantitative goals, with fixed deadlines for implementation, which were to supplement the Millennium Development Goals and facilitate progress towards an effective transition to sustainable development. Participants at the Summit explicitly affirmed the need, as a matter of urgency, to identify the financial and technical resources whereby sustainable development would become a reality and benefit directly and particularly rural and urban communities in the developing countries. The document we are now presenting is the outcome of extensive discussions held at a high-level forum during the Johannesburg Summit. Led by representatives of the Government of Mexico, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Andean Development Corporation, those discussions were based on the ECLAC/UNDP study entitled Financing for sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean: from Monterrey to Johannesburg, which considers the opportunities and challenges for improving prospects for investment and financing for sustainable development and underscores the need to establish a new balance between the market economy and public interest through joint public/private initiatives that combine market innovation, social responsibility and appropriate regulations. Other eminent persons attending the event included heads of State, such as Gustavo Noboa, then President of Ecuador; Enrique V. Iglesias, President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); José María Figueres, Managing Director of the Global Agenda of the World Economic Forum and former President of Costa Rica; and Gro Harlem Brundtland, the legendary figure who pioneered sustainable development. Valuable contributions to the discussions were made by Yolanda Kakabadse, President of the World Conservation Union; Xóchitl Gálvez Ruiz, head of the Unit for the Development of Indigenous Peoples of the Office of the President of Mexico; Cecilia López, former Minister for the Environment of Colombia; and Juan Carlos Maqueda, then Vice President of Argentina. The views emerging from the forum as set forth in this document are designed to facilitate and promote application of the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development within the framework of the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments assumed at the International Conference on Financing for Development, which was held in Monterrey, Mexico. We also aspire to continue moving forward with the adoption of measures and policies to increase investment and financing for sustainable development as well as to foster partnerships between the public and private sectors and nongovernmental organizations. We recognize, in this context, the importance of strengthening and improving public and private institutions in order to meet the operational needs associated with the effort to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and pursue the Plan of Implementation formulated in Johannesburg. We trust that this document will contribute to in-depth discussions on the application of the Plan of Implementation in the relevant forums, in particular the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. The Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development opens up new opportunities for Latin America and the Caribbean to renew and revive their own regional agenda -with emphasis on global and especially regional public goods- and to interweave it more cohesively with the global agenda in order to promote the common interests of Latin America and the Caribbean more forcefully in international development forums. The regional agenda and the global agenda cannot be separated in a contrived manner; indeed, to an increasing degree, what we are witnessing are global environmental processes which call for action at the local level. The achievement of sustainable development in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the necessary economic, social, environmental and geopolitical conditions are combined, requires a subtle balance between the market economy, the State and the citizen. Such a balance will result in the consolidation of democratic governance in the service of human development. VICENTE FOX President of Mexico JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) ELENA MARTÍNEZ Assistant Aministrator and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) ENRIQUE GARCÍA Executive President, Andean Development Corporation (ADC)""

Relevant aspects of financing for sustainable development: from Monterrey to Johannesburg

Includes bibliography