891 resultados para common-law union
Resumo:
A number of laws in Canada which uphold rights are referred to as quasi-constitutional by the courts in recognition of their special importance. Quasi-constitutional statutes are enacted through the regular legislative process, although they are being interpreted and applied in a fashion which has become remarkably similar to constitutional law, and are therefore having an important affect over other legislation. Quasi-constitutionality has surprisingly received limited scholarly attention, and very few serious attempts at explaining its significance have been made. This dissertation undertakes a comprehensive study of quasi-constitutionality which considers its theoretical basis, its interpretation and legal significance, as well as its similarities to comparable forms of law in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Part I examines the theoretical basis of quasi-constitutionality and its relationship to the Constitution. As a statutory and common law form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutionality is shown to signify an association with the Canadian Constitution and the foundational principles that underpin it. Part II proceeds to consider the special rules of interpretation applied to quasi-constitutional legislation, the basis of this interpretative approach, and the connection between the interpretation of similar provisions in quasi-constitutional legislation and the Constitution. As a statutory form of fundamental law, quasi-constitutional legislation is given a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation which significantly expands the rights which they protect. The theoretical basis of this approach is found in both the fundamental nature of the rights upheld by quasi-constitutional legislation as well as legislative intent. Part III explores how quasi-constitutional statutes affect the interpretation of regular legislation and how they are used for the purposes of judicial review. Quasi-constitutional legislation has a significant influence over regular statutes in the interpretative exercise, which in some instances results in conflicting statutes being declared inoperable. The basis of this form of judicial review is demonstrated to be rooted in statutory interpretation, and as such it provides an interesting model of rights protection and judicial review that is not conflated to constitutional and judicial supremacy.
Resumo:
Nell’epoca di profonda transizione dell’era «pos-moderna», il modello tradizionale di legalità che conferisce al Parlamento il monopolio in materia penale entra in crisi in ragione della frammentazione delle fonti del diritto - a livello nazionale e sovranazionale - nonché delle spinte di globalizzazione capaci di incidere, ormai, ben oltre il mero piano economico. A fronte della incapacità del legislatore di rispondere in termini effettivi alla urgenza di razionalizzare e riformare il sistema penale, quindi, il potere giudiziario ha assunto una funzione di sostanziale supplenza, generando inevitabili attriti con il nullum crimen e i suoi corollari. Ne deriva che il Giudice di legittimità sempre più si preoccupa di assicurare la prevedibilità dei mutamenti interpretativi, specie se in malam partem, tenendo a mente gli ultimi approdi della giurisprudenza di Strasburgo in riferimento all’art. 7 CEDU. In particolare, tanto nelle motivazioni delle decisioni quanto nei contributi dottrinali, si diffonde graduale il riferimento a istituti propri del modello di common law: la recente riforma dell’art. 618, co 1 bis, c.p.p., del resto, è stata descritta a più voci come l’avvio della diffusione nell’ordinamento interno della c.d. “cultura del precedente”. In tale frangente, diviene utile approfondire l’opportunità dell’accostamento tra il modello di common law e di civil law, conducendo uno studio comparato tra i due ordinamenti quanto all’esercizio del potere punitivo che intende esaminare l’opportunità di acquisire rimedi propri della esperienza secolare del diritto judge-made in un ordinamento governato dalla soggezione del giudice alla legge.
Resumo:
The dissertation examines the rule of law within the European Union in the theoretical framework of constitutional pluralism. The leading lines of constitutional pluralism are examined with relation to the traditional and prevailing, monistic and hierarchical conceptions on how to perceive legal orders in Europe. The theoretical part offers also historical perspective by highlighting some of the turning points for the Union constitutional legal order in the framework of European integration. The concept of rule of law is examined in legal terms and its meaning to the Union constitutional constellation as a constitutional principle and a common value is observed. The realization of the rule of law at supranational and national level is explored with a view to discover that recent developments in some of the Member States give rise to concern about the viability of the rule of law within the European Union. It is recognized that the inobservance of the rule of law at national level causes a threat to the supranational constitutional legal order. The relationship between the supranational and national legal orders is significant in this respect and therefore particularly the interaction between the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter the ECJ) and the Member States’ (constitutional/supreme) courts takes focus. It is observed that functioning dialogue between the supranational and national courts based on mutual respect and judicial deference is an important prerequisite for the realization of the rule of law within Europe. In order to afford a concrete example, a recent case C-62/14 Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag is introduced and analysed in relation to the notorious relationship between the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and the ECJ. The implications of the ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag is assessed with reference to some of the pressing issues of constitutionalism within Europe and some institutional aspects are also brought forward. Lastly, the feasibility of constitutional pluralism as a theoretical setting is measured against the legal reality of today’s Europe and its many constitutions. The hierarchical idea of one ultimate source of power, stemming from the traditional approaches to legal systems, is then assessed with relation to the requirement of the realization of the rule of law within the European Union from the supranational and national point of view.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.
Resumo:
From the Introduction. A common foreign and security policy for the European Union is an issue of the day. While most academic and many political observers believe that it would be in the interest of the Union to have a common policy, there is quite some disagreement as to how this is to be achieved and whether it should be accomplished in an assured and regular manner or whether it should come about on an ad hoc basis only when it is in the clear interest of all member states at any particular time. In other words, is a common foreign policy to be a fundamental characteristic of the Union or is it to be an occasional occurrence when advantageous and convenient, the ‘C’ in CFSP – as one observer has sarcastically commented – standing not for ‘Common’ but for ‘Convenient’?2
Resumo:
Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.
Resumo:
State compliance with EU Law is crucial to the very existence of the Union. Traditionally, it has been secured through a combination of strong "private" and of weak "centralized" enforcement. However, this arrangement is no longer perceived to be sufficient. By endowing the Union with new tools vis-à-vis its Member States - penalties, conditionality, and the like - current reforms try to complement symbolic sanctioning with real "consequences". The goal is to reinforce the authority of EU Law. In this article, we question whether the new toolbox is fit for the purpose, or whether it risks to produce adverse effects which might even go as far as upsetting the Union's constitutional template.
Resumo:
The rules on prescription in Part VIII, Chapter 18, of the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) follow the provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which, in general, have deserved favourable comments. Yet, a number of rules contained in those texts have been omitted. It is necessary to ascertain whether the CESL rules only apply to provisions on rights and claims resulting from sales or related services contracts, or whether they are also applicable to any other contractual right or claim and also to rights or claims of non-contractual origin. One of the most problematic issues concerns general prescription periods: firstly, because there are two general periods, a short one and a long one, without any specification about the claims or rights covered by each one of them; secondly, because neither period is suitable in case of non-conformity. There are also some interpretation problems due to missing, ambiguous or defective definitions. The systematic approach demands clarification too.
Resumo:
Biofuels for transport are a renewable source of energy that were once heralded as a solution to multiple problems associated with poor urban air quality, the overproduction of agricultural commodities, the energy security of the European Union (EU) and climate change. It was only after the Union had implemented an incentivizing framework of legal and political instruments for the production, trade and consumption of biofuels that the problems of weakening food security, environmental degradation and increasing greenhouse gases through land-use changes began to unfold. In other words, the difference between political aims for why biofuels are promoted and their consequences has grown – which is also recognized by the EU policy-makers. Therefore, the global networks of producing, trading and consuming biofuels may face a complete restructure if the European Commission accomplishes its pursuit to sideline crop-based biofuels after 2020. My aim with this dissertation is not only to trace the manifold evolutions of the instruments used by the Union to govern biofuels but also to reveal how this evolution has influenced the dynamics of biofuel development. Therefore, I study the ways the EU’s legal and political instruments of steering biofuels are coconstitutive with the globalized spaces of biofuel development. My analytical strategy can be outlined through three concepts. I use the term ‘assemblage’ to approach the operations of the loose entity of actors and non-human elements that are the constituents of multi-scalar and -sectorial biofuel development. ‘Topology’ refers to the spatiality of this European biofuel assemblage and its parts whose evolving relations are treated as the active constituents of space, instead of simply being located in space. I apply the concept of ‘nomosphere’ to characterize the framework of policies, laws and other instruments that the EU applies and construes while attempting to govern biofuels. Even though both the materials and methods vary in the independent articles, these three concepts characterize my analytical strategy that allows me to study law, policy and space associated with each other. The results of my examinations underscore the importance of the instruments of governance of the EU constituting and stabilizing the spaces of producing and, on the other hand, how topological ruptures in biofuel development have enforced the need to reform policies. This analysis maps the vast scope of actors that are influenced by the mechanism of EU biofuel governance and, what is more, shows how they are actively engaging in the Union’s institutional policy formulation. By examining the consequences of fast biofuel development that are spatially dislocated from the established spaces of producing, trading and consuming biofuels such as indirect land use changes, I unfold the processes not tackled by the instruments of the EU. Indeed, it is these spatially dislocated processes that have pushed the Commission construing a new type of governing biofuels: transferring the instruments of climate change mitigation to land-use policies. Although efficient in mitigating these dislocated consequences, these instruments have also created peculiar ontological scaffolding for governing biofuels. According to this mode of governance, the spatiality of biofuel development appears to be already determined and the agency that could dampen the negative consequences originating from land-use practices is treated as irrelevant.