A Case Study of China’s Commercial Pork Value Chain, August 2005

In China, with the cost of improved technology rising, surplus labor shrinking, and demand for food quality and safety increasing, it will be just a matter of time before the country’s hog production sector will be commercialized like that of developed countries. However, even if China’s cost of production converges to international levels, as shown in this case study, China may continue to retain some competitive advantage because of the labor-intensive nature of the marketing services involved in hog processing and meat distribution. The supply of variety meats offers the most promising market opportunity for foreign suppliers in China. The market may open further if the tariff rate for variety meats is reduced from 20% and harmonized with the pork muscle meat rate of 12%, and if the value-added tax of 13% is applied equally to both imported and domestic products. The fast-growing Western-style family restaurant and higher-end dining sector is another market opportunity for high-quality imported pork.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.