The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Essays on political economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms.^ The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values.^ The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.^

Essays in economic growth, political economy and institutions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^

The Political Economy of Financially Successful Independent Hip-Hop Artists

From 2000 to 2010, America’s music industry’s annual revenue went from $4 billion to $2 billion. Much of this is attributed to the internet’s ability to provide consumers with easy access to free music, and hip hop has been especially impacted by this trend. Utilizing document analysis and personal interviews, this study found that the success of independent artists has influenced the business strategies of major record companies. In response to a dramatic decrease in record sales, major labels have made more of an effort to sign their artists to 360 deals, which allow the labels to profit from every aspect of an artist’s brand or identity. While some independent artists are the main beneficiary of the profits generated from their music and personal brand, they also reify the commodity-form capitalist system by attempting to turn their music and brand into a fetishized commodity and by turning their audience into a fetishized commodity.

Stray dogs in Bucharest, and the political economy of Romanian socialism. From hunting the “enemies” of Stalinist economy, to poisoning urban parasites, and the rise of urban anarchy: 1950s-1990s.

My paper discusses three different ways in which stray dogs have been intertwined with ideologies of economic and urban development in Romania. I categorize results from archival and ethnographic research under three major time periods: early socialism, late socialism, and post-socialism. During early socialism stray dogs were seen to be damaging the soviet economy by killing species that humans could also hunt, like rabbits. During late socialism, stray dogs appeared as the enemies of the communist city, and the department of urban sanitation was given orders to poison dogs with strychnine. Finally, the increasing number of stray dogs in Bucharest after the collapse of communism was seen as a direct result of former communist demolitions, and was also taken as a sign of the collapsing state. Through such examples my paper discusses how the state and particular population groups have seen dogs as parts of an unwanted and dangerous nature, rather than a species that needs to be protected. I argue that distinctions of nature and culture have served discourses of civilization and the view of Bucharest as a model socialist, and then European city. Throughout my paper I juxtapose the treatment of stray dogs with other, more “valued” urban natures like the protection of parks, the wide-spread hobby of pigeon breeding during socialist years, the most recent debate on saving the rural area of Rosia Montana from non-environmentally friendly methods of gold extraction, and the current trend of healthy eating and living.

Essays On Political Economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms. The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values. The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.

Essays on the political economy of the dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties.

The Political Economy of Ethnic Empowerment in India

This dissertation consists of three papers, which together examine whether policies meant to address inequality, succeed in mitigating the impact of traditional institutions such as caste and enable ethnic minorities to claim their rights. Using experimental and quasi-experimental methods with data from a variety of primary and secondary sources, this dissertation analyzes whether policies meant to empower vulnerable groups in India have succeeded in doing so. The findings suggest that while legislations in the form of mandated political representation or freedom of information laws are necessary in terms of increasing the accountability of government towards citizens, they may not be sufficient in ensuring adequate and uniform delivery of public services, especially to citizens belonging to marginalized groups. Further, empowering citizens – especially those belonging to groups that have faced historic discrimination – to actively participate in civic and political life may require more active and intensive policy and programmatic interventions.

The Political Economy of Climate Adaptation and Environmental Health: The Case of Ethiopia

The environment affects our health, livelihoods, and the social and political institutions within which we interact. Indeed, nearly a quarter of the global disease burden is attributed to environmental factors, and many of these factors are exacerbated by global climate change. Thus, the central research question of this dissertation is: How do people cope with and adapt to uncertainty, complexity, and change of environmental and health conditions? Specifically, I ask how institutional factors, risk aversion, and behaviors affect environmental health outcomes. I further assess the role of social capital in climate adaptation, and specifically compare individual and collective adaptation. I then analyze how policy develops accounting for both adaptation to the effects of climate and mitigation of climate-changing emissions. In order to empirically test the relationships between these variables at multiple levels, I combine multiple methods, including semi-structured interviews, surveys, and field experiments, along with health and water quality data. This dissertation uses the case of Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, which has a large rural population and is considered very vulnerable to climate change. My fieldwork included interviews and institutional data collection at the national level, and a three-year study (2012-2014) of approximately 400 households in 20 villages in the Ethiopian Rift Valley. I evaluate the theoretical relationships between households, communities, and government in the process of adaptation to environmental stresses. Through my analyses, I demonstrate that water source choice varies by individual risk aversion and institutional context, which ultimately has implications for environmental health outcomes. I show that qualitative measures of trust predict cooperation in adaptation, consistent with social capital theory, but that measures of trust are negatively related with private adaptation by the individual. Finally, I describe how Ethiopia had some unique characteristics, significantly reinforced by international actors, that led to the development of an extensive climate policy, and yet with some challenges remaining for implementation. These results suggest a potential for adaptation through the interactions among individuals, communities, and government in the search for transformative processes when confronting environmental threats and climate change.

The political economy of industrial policy in Peru and Ecuador: 1980-2010

This dissertation focuses on industrial policy in two developing countries: Peru and Ecuador. Informed by comparative historical analysis, it explains how the Import-Substitution Industrialization policies promoted during the 1970s by military administration unravelled in the following 30 years under the guidance of Washington Consensus policies. Positioning political economy in time, the research objectives were two-fold: understanding long-term policy reform patterns, including the variables that conditioned cyclical versus path-dependent dynamics of change and; secondly, investigating the direction and leverage of state institutions supporting the manufacturing sector at the dawn, peak and consolidation of neoliberal discourse in both countries. Three interconnected causal mechanisms explain the divergence of trajectories: institutional legacies, coordination among actors and economic distribution of power. Peru’s long tradition of a minimal state contrasts with the embedded character of Ecuador long tradition of legal protectionism dating back to the Liberal Revolution. Peru’s close policy coordination among stakeholders –state technocrats and business elites- differs from Ecuador’s “winners-take-all” approach for policy-making. Peru’s economic dynamism concentrated in Lima sharply departs from Ecuador’s competitive regional economic leaderships. This dissertation paid particular attention to methodology to understand the intersection between structure and agency in policy change. Tracing primary and secondary sources, as well as key pieces of legislation, became critical to understand key turning points and long-term patterns of change. Open-ended interviews (N=58) with two stakeholder groups (business elites and bureaucrats) compounded the effort to knit motives, discourses, and interests behind this long transition. In order to understand this amount of data, this research build an index of policy intervention as a methodological contribution to assess long patterns of policy change. These findings contribute to the current literature on State-market relations and varieties of capitalism, institutional change, and policy reform.

Governing Big Data: The Political Economy of Power, Knowledge and Consumer Finance in the Digital Age

This dissertation offers a critical international political economy (IPE) analysis of the ways in which consumer information has been governed throughout the formal history of consumer finance (1840 – present). Drawing primarily on the United States, this project problematizes the notion of consumer financial big data as a ‘new era’ by tracing its roots historically from late nineteenth century through to the present. Using a qualitative case study approach, this project applies a unique theoretical framework to three instances of governance in consumer credit big data. Throughout, the historically specific means used to govern consumer credit data are rooted in dominant ideas, institutions and material factors.