Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

China's Relations with Brazil and Argentina and Implications for U.S. Security Concerns [Student's Paper Series]

This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S. leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a focus on brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted, pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and political goals. The results of this study reveal that China – avoiding intra-regional competition through a strategic diversification of sectors – has been able to secure critical resources for its population as well as promote enduring alliances in the region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S. involvement.

Out of Challenge, Opportunity: Central America's Electric Sector & Key Issues and Recommendations for Enhanced Regional Electric Integration

Taken together, the six nations of Central America count a population of roughly 40 million people and an energy market equal in size to that of Colombia, sufficient to benefit from economies of scale. The region has traditionally been a net importer of hydrocarbons, and hydroelectricity has dominated electric generation. But more recently, thermoelectric generation (diesel and fuel oil) has greatly increased as a percentage of the regional generation market. Progress has been made across the region’s electric sector, beginning with reforms in the 1990s and the 1996 signing of a regional treaty aimed at the development of a regional energy integration project – the Central American Electrical Interconnection System, or SIEPAC. A fundamental SIEPAC goal is to set up a regional electric market and a regulatory system. Indeed, after many years of development, SIEPAC is poised to open a new chapter in Central America’s electric infrastructure and market. But this new era must contend with critical issues such as the need to consolidate the regional electric market, political issues surrounding the venture, and security concerns. Moreover, local conflicts, in different degrees, have become priorities for policymakers, and these are possible barriers to completing the project. The goals of the SIEPAC project and of deepening the broader electric integration process are possible if national and regional decision makers understand that cooperative decision making will produce better results than separate national decision making. Enhanced regional understanding and cooperative decision making, combined with an effort to reorient the terminology and dialogue vis-à-vis energy efficiency in Central America, form the core recommendations of this paper.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Domestic Politics in the Dominican Republic after the Earthquake in Haiti

Despite historical tensions between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, Dominicans appear to have put aside their resentment in favor of supporting Haitians after the earthquake that devastated the neighbor nation in January 2010. Over the past several months, there has been unprecedented cooperation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, with little evidence of a negative impact on domestic politics in the Dominican Republic. In fact, the high ratings of President Leonel Fernández and the results of the May Parliamentary elections may suggest that how the Fernández administration handled the Haitian crisis did not have a negative impact on citizens’ perception. However, the issue of Haitian immigration remains very sensitive in the Dominican Republic, and has the potential to become the major concern on the domestic political front. As of June 2010, the Haitian crisis seemed to have little or no impact on Dominican politics, as the following points indicate: The May 16, 2010 Parliamentary elections increased President Fernández political party to 31 out of 32 Senate seats, and 105 out of 183 Chamber of Deputies seats; this is a total increase of 18 seats from the previous term. Polls indicate that President Fernández has a 54 percent approval rating. Polls also indicate that Haiti is not among the most pressing issues of concern to Dominican citizens. Instead, 65 percent of the population identifies drug trafficking and corruption as the greatest concerns. The immigration debate will remain the major consideration in domestic politics in the Dominican Republic; 62.4 percent of Dominicans polled think that the military should be strengthened along the DR-Haitian border.

Independent Monitoring the Cuban Economic Zone Oil Development

The extensive impact and consequences of the 2010 Deep Water Horizon oil drilling rig failure in the Gulf of Mexico, together with expanding drilling activities in the Cuban Exclusive Economic zone, have cast a spotlight on Cuban oil development. The threat of a drilling rig failure has evolved from being only hypothetical to a potential reality with the commencement of active drilling in Cuban waters. The disastrous consequences of a drilling rig failure in Cuban waters will spread over a number of vital interests of the US and of nations in the Caribbean in the general environs of Cuba. The US fishing and tourist industries will take major blows from a significant oil spill in Cuban waters. Substantial ecological damage and damage to beaches could occur for the US, Mexico, Haiti and other countries as well. The need exists for the US to have the ability to independently monitor the reality of Cuban oceanic oil development. The advantages of having an independent US early warning system providing essential real-time data on the possible failure of a drilling rig in Cuban waters are numerous. An ideal early warning system would timely inform the US that an event has occurred or is likely to occur in, essentially, real-time. Presently operating monitoring systems that could provide early warning information are satellite-based. Such systems can indicate the locations of both drilling rigs and operational drilling platforms. The system discussed/proposed in this paper relies upon low-frequency underwater sound. The proposed system can complement existing monitoring systems, which offer ocean-surface information, by providing sub-ocean surface, near-real time, information. This “integrated system” utilizes and combines (integrates) many different forms of information, some gathered through sub-ocean surface systems, and some through electromagnetic-based remote sensing (satellites, aircraft, unmanned arial vehicles), and other methods as well. Although the proposed integrated system is in the developmental stage, it is based upon well-established technologies.

A state of war: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida's attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force the US ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally, Florida's space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point for US force projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida's demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States. But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World, Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization of Florida began long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to the US strategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them in North America. The policy of "Europe First," focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler's Germany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for US victory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans' colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work.

Indigenous Movements, Democracy, and U.S. Interests in Latin America

Indigenous movements have become increasingly powerful in the last couple of decades and they are now important political actors in some South American countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Chile. The rise of indigenous movements has provoked concern among U.S. policymakers and other observers who have feared that these movements will exacerbate ethnic polarization, undermine democracy, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the region. This paper argues that concern over the rise of indigenous movements is greatly exaggerated. It maintains that the rise of indigenous movements has not brought about a market increase in ethnic polarization in the region because most indigenous organizations have been ethnically inclusive and have eschewed violence. Although the indigenous movements have at times demonstrated a lack of regard for democratic institutions and procedures, they have also helped deepen democracy in the Andean region by promoting greater political inclusion and participation and by aggressively combating ethnic discrimination and inequality. Finally, this study suggests that the indigenous population has opposed some U.S. –sponsored initiatives, such as coca eradication and market reform, for legitimate reasons. Such policies have had some negative environmental, cultural, and economic consequences for indigenous people, which U.S. policymakers should try to address. The conclusion provides some specific policy recommendations on how to go about this.