Beyond Welfare Inc., Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statements, Schedule of Findings, Eighteen Months ended June 30, 2004

Other Audit Reports

Empirical Tests of Impacts of Rationing: The Case of Poland in Transition, February 2000

This study tests the theory of rationing, examining changes in household consumption behavior during the transition to a market economy in Poland, 1987–92. A model of consumption under rationing is developed and fitted to prereform quarterly data from the Polish Household Budget Survey. Virtual prices, prices at which consumers would have voluntarily chosen the rationed levels of goods, are derived for food and housing. The prereform Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model with rationing is estimated. Estimates from the virtual AIDS yield plausible values for price and income elasticities. The AIDS model (without rationing) is also fitted to postreform quarterly household survey data for comparison and evaluation. When the two sets of results are compared, the impacts of rationing are consistent with the theory. Own-price elasticities for nonrationed goods are larger after the reform, and there is increased complementarity and decreased substitutability for the nonrationed goods. The results for Poland show a 75 percent decline in real household welfare over the transition and this welfare loss is one-third the value obtained using reported prices.

Child Welfare in Iowa - Recent Developments, 1940

A paper given by Dr. Emma McCloy Layman before the Iowa Conference on Child Development and Parent Education on May 5th, 1940.

Children in the welfare state. A social investment approach

Children occupy centre-stage in any new welfare equilibrium. Failure to support families may produce either of two undesirable scenarios. We shall see a society without children if motherhood remains incompatible with work. A new family policy needs to recognize that children are a collective asset and that the cost of having children is rising. The double challenge is to eliminate the constraints on having children in the first place, and to ensure that the children we have are ensured optimal opportunities. The simple reason why a new social contract is called for is that fertility and child quality combine both private utility and societal gains. And like no other epoch in the past, the societal gains are mounting all-the-while that families’ ability to produce these social gains is weakening.In the following 1 analyze the twin challenges of fertility and child development. I then examine which kind of policy mix will ensure both the socially desired level of fertility and investment in our children? The task is to identify a Paretian optimum that will maximize efficiency gains and social equity simultaneously.

Do welfare benefits affect womens' choices of adult care giving?

The efficacy of social care, publicly and universally provided, has been contested from two different points of view. First, advocates of targeting social policy criticized the Matthew’s effect of universal provision and; second, theories arguing in favour of heterogeneous rationalities between men and women and, even different preferences among women, predict that universal provision of services is limiting women’s choices more than home allowances. The author tests both hypotheses and concludes that, at least in the case of adult care, women’s choices are significantly affected by women’s social positions and by the availability of public services. Furthermore, targeting through means-test eligibility criteria has no significant effect on inequality but, confirming the redistributive paradox, reduces women’s options.

The Generational contract in the family : explaining regime differences in financial transfers from parents to children in Europe

The exchange of social and economic support between the generationsis one of the main pillars of both family life and welfare systems. Thedebate on how to reform the generational contract is still truncated, however, by focusing on its public dimension only, especially on pensions and health care provisions. For a full account, the transfer of resources between adult generations in the family needs to be included as well. In our previous research we have shown that intergenerationalexchange is more likely to take place but less intense in the Nordicwelfare regime than in the Continental and Southern ones. In thepresent paper we analyze the social mechanisms that create and explain this nexus between patterns of intergenerational transfers and welfare regimes. The notion that Southern European family support networksare stronger and more effective than those of Continental and Northern European countries is only partially confirmed. In Southern (and partly in Continental) countries, children are mostly supported by means of co-residence with their parents till their complete economicindependence. However, once they have left the parental home thereare fewer transfers; support tends to be restricted to children who have special needs (such as for the formation of their own family), and depends more on their parents’ resources. In the Nordic countries, in contrast, transfers are less driven by children’s needs and parentalresources.

Collective Marketing Arrangements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products: Welfare Impacts and Policy Implications, May 2006

This paper examines the incentive of atomistic agricultural producers within a specific geographical region to differentiate and collectively market products. We develop a model that allows us to analyze the market and welfare effects of the main types of real-world producer organizations, using it to derive economic insights regarding the circumstances under which these organizations will evolve, and describing implications of the results obtained in the context of an ongoing debate between the European Union and United States. As the anticipated fixed costs of development and marketing increase and the anticipated size of the market falls, it becomes essential to increase the ability of the producer organization to control supply in order to ensure the coverage of fixed costs. Whenever a collective organization allows a market (with a new product) to exist that otherwise would not have existed there is an increase in societal welfare. Counterintuitively, stronger property right protection for producer organizations may be welfare enhancing even after a differentiated product has been developed. The reason for this somewhat paradoxical result is that legislation aimed at curtailing the market power of producer organizations may induce large technological distortions.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Markups, Gaps, and the Welfare Costs of Business Fluctuations

In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted, the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.