Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective. Research Paper in Law (Cooperative Research Paper) 02/2013

For more than 10 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the question of the protection of human rights had never been in issue. The emphasis was on the creation and consolidation of the common market establishing the free movement of persons, of services, of goods and of capital. Neither the initial Treaties nor the jurisprudence of the Court made any reference to the protection of human rights in the process of the creation of the common market. It all started in 1969 in the Stauder case with this very short sentence: “Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. Forty years later, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, fundamental rights are part of primary law. The achievement has been remarkable if we consider the very beginning of the process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Court with its jurisprudence has been the driving force and the source of inspiration for this achievement.

EU immigration trends and policies: Spain and France as case studies. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 10, August 2013

From the Introduction. The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht or the Maastricht Treaty, created the European Union (EU) from the existing European Economic Community (EEC.) It was signed by the member states on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993.1 Among its many innovations was the creation of European citizenship, which would be granted to any person who was a citizen of an EU member state. Citizenship, however, is intertwined with immigration, which the Treaty also attempted to address. Policy on visas, immigration and asylum was originally placed under Pillar 3 of the EU, which dealt with Justice and Home Affairs. In 1997, however, the Amsterdam Treaty moved these policies from Pillar 3 to Pillar 1, signaling “a shift toward more supranational decision-making in this area,” as opposed to the intergovernmental method of Pillars 2 and 3.2

Lisbon Fado: The European Union under Reform

From the Introduction. To address the uncertainties surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon, this book examines several issues from various angles. Regardless of the results of the second referendum in Ireland and the pending ratifications in Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany, the European Union (EU) will not be the same after the Lisbon Treaty. If it comes into effect, Europeans will enter into a new stage in the deepening of the integration process; if it is rejected, the first decade of the 21st Century will represent a period of institutional stagnation in Europe’s integration. Nonetheless, the chapters in this book share the consensus that, despite its limitations, the Lisbon Treaty will make the EU decision making process more efficient, enhance regional democracy and strengthen its international voice.

The European Parliament’s New Role in Trade Policy: Turning power into impact. CEPS Special Report No. 89, 21 May 2014

The power of the European Parliament in EU trade policy has increased significantly with the Lisbon Treaty. Even though it had already acquired a greater informal role, the codification of its involvement enables the EP to have a stronger say in trade policy. Against the background of increased legal competences granted by the Treaty of Lisbon to the European Parliament in EU trade policy, this Policy Brief addresses two important questions. The first concerns the extent to which the EP’s power in trade policy has increased: Has the EP effectively played a bigger role since the end of 2009? The second relates to the substance of the EP’s trade policy preferences: Does the EP attempt to push EU trade relations into a more or less normative and/or protectionist direction? Its main argument is that the Lisbon Treaty not only heralds a major leap forward in legal terms, but that the current EP legislature has also managed to increase its political clout in trade policy-making. Nevertheless, a major challenge for the new EP legislature 2014-2019 will be to turn this into effective influence.

Europe, wake up! CEPS Commentary, 21 July 2014

Following the wanton downing of a civilian aircraft by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine and Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza, Karel Lannoo takes the EU to task for reverting to its usual ostrich-like behaviour in the face of threats to the security and stability of the entire continent. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, he argues that the European Union, as representative of its 28 member states, should be capable of acting far more forcefully in both of these conflicts than its individual member states, but regrettably the EU has so far remained on the sidelines.

The government Europe deserves? CEPS Commentary, 17 September 2014

Leaders of the EU’s institutions have to be political entrepreneurs if they are to leave a mark on history. Their decision-making power is limited, but they can often frame the choices and broker coalitions to push the existing boundaries of European integration. This Commentary by Daniel Gros finds that none of the EU’s top three new faces – Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk or Federica Mogherini – has a track record in this sense. In his view, the most sobering message from the whole appointment process is that the member states’ leaders will not suffer anyone who might rock the boat and push integration forward. That there will be little movement towards the “ever-closer union” envisioned in the Treaty of Rome might come as a relief for those fearing domination by Brussels (like many in the UK), but it can only dismay those who hope that, despite its sluggish economy and declining population, Europe can become a relevant global actor.

The EU-Ukraine-Russia Sanctions Triangle. CEPS Commentary, 13 October 2014

The EU and the US have been stepping up sanctions against Russia because the Kremlin has broken every basic rule of the pan-European security order enshrined in the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. The effective closure of financial markets for Russia’s big businesses now has serious bite. The Kremlin’s counter-sanctions are marginal. Russia’s actual and threatened trade sanctions against Ukraine, alongside its aggression over Crimea and east Ukraine, mean that it has cast itself in the image of an enemy for most Ukrainians. Europe’s trust of the Kremlin has sunk to its lowest level since pre-Gorbachev times. If Russia were to switch to a sincerely cooperative, long-term peace mode with Ukraine, the EU and the US would no doubt be happy to scrap the sanctions. In the absence of this, however, the logic would be for the EU and the US to sustain the most significant economic sanctions for as long as it takes, with preparedness to intensify them.

More Union in European Defence. CEPS Task Force Report, 26 February 2015

Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. This CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU, in the face of numerous emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security threats. The report is a record of the deliberations over several months between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence, who conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our common security and defence activities. And that member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. This report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in the view of the Task Force experts, further integration should amount to a European Defence Union.

Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung, Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit Michael Gehler = European integration from a historical experience, A Discussion with Michael Gehler. ZEI Discussion Paper C227, 2015

From 1995 to 1999 Monika Wulf-Mathies served as EU commissioner responsible for regional and cohesion policy. She tells us the story of the EU Commission under President Jacques Santer with regard to the historical development of the preparation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Union Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and the EU-Eastern Enlargement. She touches also controversial aspects of the Santer Commission, which led to her collective demission in 1999. According to Wulf-Mathies the increase of EU's democracy deficit is result of an erosion process of the common institutions caused by the nation states which contributed to their weakness. The democratic substance of the union suffers because of the 'summarization' of the EU decision making processes. Monika Wulf-Mathies argues in favor of the community method, which needs revitalization. She proposes European democracy enforcement and transfers of the national budget und economy policies to EU bodies. This eyewitness talk offers an actual EU analysis as well as an assessment of the Santer Commission.

Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.

Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im Alpenraum: Wechselwirkung zwischen EUSALP und EVTZ? = Transnational cooperation in the Alpine region: interaction between EUSALP and EGTC? EDAP 2/2016

The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) explicitly added - in Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) - the principle of territorial cohesion to the already existing principles of social and economic cohesion between the EU Member States. To concretely reach the objective of territorial cohesion, the EU created – on the one hand - the legal instrument of the “European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation” adopted through regulation n. 1082/2006 (EGTC). This allows cross-border cooperation between local and regional authorities. On the other hand, in 2009 a new form of European transnational cooperation has been introduced, the so called Macro Regional Strategy (MRS). This was firstly applied to the Baltic Sea Region in order to give to this cross - border geographical area a coordinated framework in specific policy fields, such as the environment and the infrastructures. Both concepts - EGTC and MRS - are based on the fundamental idea of supporting the territorial and cross - border cooperation between local, regional and national authorities and other stakeholders. Despite this common aspect, the two instruments differ profoundly in terms of form, structure and content. While the MRS is to be considered as a political integrated framework without its own financial resources, the instrument of the EGTC is based on a stable legal basis. To this extent, the alpine region - a large geographic area in the heart of Europe with a longstanding tradition in crossborder cooperation - represents an interesting practical example with regard to the implementation of these two forms of cooperation across borders. In fact, the countries and regions in the Alpine area are unified through the Alps and face, therefore, common challenges: that is why this “region” is ideally suited to be the ground for experiments regarding transnational tools and strategies.

A Sanskrit primer /

"Corrections and additions": p. [231-232]

Le traité d'Utrecht,

Mode of access: Internet.

Italy and the war;

The moral reason of our war, by G. del Vecchio.--The national ideal and the duty of Italy; by P. Fedozzi.--The political reasons of our war, by P. Bonfante.--The rights of Italy over the Alps and the Adriatic, by C. Errere.--The unredeemed provinces in the history of Italy, by P. S. Leicht.--The national struggle in the unreddemed provinces, by L. Bianchi.--Denunciation of the treaty of the Triple alliance, by P. Fedozzi.--Italy's war and Italy's wealth, by G. Arias.--Necessity and reason for the present war with Turkey, by A. Solmi.--Artes et arma, by G. Albini.

Dizionario biografico degli uomini illustri della Dalmazia /

Reprint of the 1856 ed. published by R. Lechner, Vienna.