951 resultados para The Supreme Court
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This thesis is shows the result of the research work on the inherent Powers of the High Court in criminal jurisdiction. The criminal justice system in India recognizes inherent powers only of the High Court. The Theory and Philosophy of inherent powers are concerned the Distinction between civil and Criminal laws are of very little consequence. In formulating the research programme the confusion created by the concept of inherent powers and its application by High Court form the central point. How fully the concept is understood, how correctly the power is used, and how far it has enhanced the rationale of the administration of criminal justice, what is its importance and what are the solutions for the inherent power to earn a permanent status in the province of criminal jurisprudence are the themes of this study. The precipitation of new dimensions is the yardstick to acknowledge the inherent powers of the High Court and Supreme Court. It is of instant value in criminal justice system. This study concludes innovativeness provided by the inherent powers has helped the justice administration draw inspiration from the Constitution. A jurisprudence of inherent powers has developed with the weilding of inherent powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court. It is to unravel mystery of jurisprudence caused by the operation of the concept of inherent powers this research work gives emphasis. Its significance is all the more relevant when the power is exercised in the administration of criminal justice. Application or non application of inherent powers in a given case would tell upon the maturity and perfection of the standard of justice
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On 3 April 2012, the Spanish Supreme Court issued a major ruling in favour of the Google search engine, including its ‘cache copy’ service: Sentencia n.172/2012, of 3 April 2012, Supreme Court, Civil Chamber.* The importance of this ruling lies not so much in the circumstances of the case (the Supreme Court was clearly disgusted by the claimant’s ‘maximalist’ petitum to shut down the whole operation of the search engine), but rather on the court going beyond the text of the Copyright Act into the general principles of the law and case law, and especially on the reading of the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) in a positive sense so as to include all these principles. After accepting that none of the limitations listed in the Spanish Copyright statute (TRLPI) exempted the unauthorized use of fragments of the contents of a personal website through the Google search engine and cache copy service, the Supreme Court concluded against infringement, based on the grounds that the three-step test (in Art. 40bis TRLPI) is to be read not only in a negative manner but also in a positive sense so as to take into account that intellectual property – as any other kind of property – is limited in nature and must endure any ius usus inocui (harmless uses by third parties) and must abide to the general principles of the law, such as good faith and prohibition of an abusive exercise of rights (Art. 7 Spanish Civil Code).The ruling is a major success in favour of a flexible interpretation and application of the copyright statutes, especially in the scenarios raised by new technologies and market agents, and in favour of using the three-step test as a key tool to allow for it.
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Gaines’ legal team, led by Houston, had faith in the justice system of the United States and anticipated getting a fair trial at the federal level. So far, all decisions had occurred in Missouri, a state with a segregated system.The fact that Gaines v Canada had reached the Supreme Court was promising indeed. It was rare that any case involving African-Americans would be considered by the highest court in the land. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been appointing Justices that were more willing to consider cases concerned with civil rights. On November 9, 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments in the Gaines v Canada case. The defense was unmoved by the rude treatment and made their presentation with professionalism and aplomb. Houston’s argument remained steadfast; not only was the state of Missouri’s statute concerning out-of-state tuition for blacks in violation of the 14th Amendment, but the very idea of segregation itself violated the Constitution. William Hogsett, the attorney for the University of Missouri, countered that the school was merely following state laws. The MU legal team was flustered as questions from the bench forced them to correct overstatements regarding Missouri’s “generosity to Negro students”. With crossed fingers and high hopes, the Gaines legal team rested their case and awaited the verdict. Meanwhile, Lloyd Gaines was still in Michigan. Lloyd held a W.P.A. job as a Civil Service Clerk and was in constant contact with his family and attorneys. His mood in his correspondence was hopeful and positive.
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This article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today. The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context and circumstances surrounding Brown v. Board of Education. For the Court, Brown symbolizes all that is wrong with the history of race in the United States - legal segregation, explicit racial discord, and vicious and random acts of violence. Though Roberts Court opinions suggest that some of those vestiges still exits, the bulk of its jurisprudence indicate the opposite. With Brown’s basic factual premises as its point of reference, the Court has consistently argued that the nation has made tremendous strides away from the condition of racial bigotry, intolerance, and inequity. The article accordingly argues that the Roberts Court reliance on Brown to understand racial progress is anachronistic. Especially as the nation’s focus for racial inequality turned national in scope, the same binaries in Brown that had long served to explain the history of race relations in the United States (such as Black-White, North-South, and Urban-Rural) were giving way to massive multicultural demographic and geographic transformations in the United States in the years and decades after World War II. All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny could no longer fully describe the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States. In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, the article assesses a case that more accurately symbolizes the recent history and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. This was the first Supreme Court case to confront how the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing how and in what ways race and racial discrimination was changing in the United States. Thus, understanding Keyesand the history it reflects reveals much about how and in what ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the history of race relations in the United States for the last 60 years.
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From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Title varies; Vol. for 1934 does not include rules of the Supreme Court; vols. for 1949-1975 include Administrative Review Act.
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The article discusses the present status of weblogs and examines whether legal standards applicable to traditional press and media should be applied to that specific forum. The analysis is based on two key documents: the Draft Report on the concentration and pluralism in the media in European Union (2007/2253(INI)) of the European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education presented in March 2008 and a landmark decision of the Polish Supreme Court from July 26, 2007 (IV KK 174/07) in the light of present judicial tendency in other European countries. The first of the mentioned documents calls for the “clarification of the legal status of different categories of weblog authors and publishers as well as disclosure of interests and voluntary labelling of weblogs”. It emphasizes that the “undetermined and unindicated status of authors and publishers of weblogs causes uncertainties regarding impartiality, reliability, source protection, applicability of ethical codes and the assignment of liability in the event of lawsuits”. The position of the European Parliament, expressed in the document, raises serious questions on the limits of freedom of thought and speech on the Internet and on the degree of acceptable state control. A recent Polish Supreme Court decision, which caused quite a stir in the Polish Internet community, seems to head in the very direction recommended by the EP Culture Committee. In a case of two editors of a web journal (“czasopismo internetowe”) called “Szyciepoprzemysku”, available on-line, accused of publishing a journal without the proper registration, the Polish Supreme Court stated that “journals and periodicals do not lose the character of a press release due solely to the fact that they appear in the form of an Internet transmission”, and that ‘’the publishing of press in an electronic form, available on the Internet, requires registration”. The decision was most surprising, as prior lower courts decisions declined the possibility to register Internet periodicals. The accused were acquitted in the name of the constitutional principle of the rule of law (art. 7 of the Polish Constitution) and the ensuing obligation to protect the trust of a citizen to the state (a conviction in this case would break the collateral estoppel rule), however the decision quickly awoke media frenzy and raised the fear of a need to register all websites that were regularly updated. The spokesman of the Polish Supreme Court later explained that the sentence of the Court was not intended to cause a mass registration of all Internet “periodicals” and that neither weblogs nor Internet sites, that were regularly updated, needed registration. Such an interpretation of the Polish press law did not appear clear based only on the original text of the judgment and the decision as such still raises serious practical questions. The article aims to examine the status of Internet logs as press and seeks the compromise between the concerns expressed by European authorities and the freedom of thought and speech exercised on the Internet.
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The paper provides a close lecture of the arguments and methods of legal construction, employed in the extensive individual opinions written by the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the case which authorized the same sex civil union. After tracing an outline of the legal problem and his possible solutions, we analyze the individual opinions, showing their methodological syncretism, the use of legal methods and arguments in a contradictory way as well the deficiencies in the reasoning. The Justices use legal arguments, but do not meet the requirements of rationality in the decision-making. We have a rhetorical attempt that aims to satisfy the public opinion than to offer a comprehensive and coherent solution according the normative elements of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.
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EMAp - Escola de Matemática Aplicada
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The paper provides a close lecture of the arguments and methods of legal construction, employed in the extensive individual opinions written by the Justices of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the case which authorized the same sex civil union. After tracing an outline of the legal problem and his possible solutions, we analyze the individual opinions, showing their methodological syncretism, the use of legal methods and arguments in a contradictory way as well the deficiencies in the reasoning. The Justices use legal arguments, but do not meet the requirements of rationality in the decision-making. We have a rhetorical attempt that aims to satisfy the public opinion than to offer a comprehensive and coherent solution according the normative elements of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.
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Erick Fahle Burman. a Swedish-born, Finnish-speaking labor and political activist, twice had cases argued on his behalf before the Michigan Supreme Court. In People vs. Burman, Burman, along with nine other defendants, had his conviction affirmed by the court and all ten were forced to pay a fine of $25 each for disturbing the peace. In People vs. Immonen, Burman and his co-defendant, Unto Immonen, had their convictions overturned because of improper evidence being admitted in their lower court trial. Though the conviction was overturned, the two men had already spent several months as prisoners at hard labor in Marquette State Prison located in Michigan's Upper Peninsula. Over twenty-five years separate Burman's two trips to Michigan's high court. On the first occasion, his arrest came less than five years after his arrival as an immigrant to the U. S. On the second occasion, his arrest came less than two years after his return to the state after being away for nearly two decades. On both occasions, Burman was arrested for his involvement with red flags. Though separated by decades, these cases, taken together, are important indicators of the state of Finnish-American radicalism in the years surrounding the red flag incidents and provide interesting insights into the delicacies of political suppression. Examination of these cases within the larger career of Fahle Burman points up his overlooked importance in the history of Finnish-American socialism and communism.