Sunshine Advisory, February 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, September, 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, October, 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, November, 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws by Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, December 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, July 2003

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, February 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, May 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, March 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, July 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, June 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, August 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading

Sunshine Advisory, September 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller

Sunshine Advisory, October 2004

A Bulletin on Iowa Open Meetings and Public Records Laws By Attorney General Tom Miller