999 resultados para Seal Formation


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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2014

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Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Naturwissenschaften, Dissertation, 2016

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n.s. no.68(1992)

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The skull morphometrics of adult male Antarctic fur seal, Arctocephalus gazella (Peters, 1875) and South American fur seal, A. australis (Zimmermann, 1783) were investigated using a collection of 45 and 38 skulls, respectively. Eighteen measurements were taken for each specimen. Comparative univariate and multivariate statistical analyses included standard statistics, one-way analysis of variance, principal component analysis and discriminant analysis. Individual variation was relatively high for some variables, as expressed by the coefficient of variation. Skulls of A. gazella were larger than those of A. australis for all but two variables: squamosal jugal suture and rostral length. Both species differed significantly as shown by both univariate and multivariate analyses. The discriminant function correctly classified all specimens. The standardized canonical coefficients showed that the variables which most contribute to the differentiation between species were, in decreasing order, the rostral length, palatal length, palatal width at postcanine 5 and braincase width. The present study corroborates that A. gazella and A. australis are phenotipically distinct species.

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We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.