The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Predictors of onset of cannabis and other drug use in male young adults: results from a longitudinal study.

BACKGROUND: The use of cannabis and other illegal drugs is particularly prevalent in male young adults and is associated with severe health problems. This longitudinal study explored variables associated with the onset of cannabis use and the onset of illegal drug use other than cannabis separately in male young adults, including demographics, religion and religiosity, health, social context, substance use, and personality. Furthermore, we explored how far the gateway hypothesis and the common liability to addiction model are in line with the resulting prediction models. METHODS: The data were gathered within the Cohort Study on Substance Use Risk Factors (C-SURF). Young men aged around 20 years provided demographic, social, health, substance use, and personality-related data at baseline. Onset of cannabis and other drug use were assessed at 15-months follow-up. Samples of 2,774 and 4,254 individuals who indicated at baseline that they have not used cannabis and other drugs, respectively, in their life and who provided follow-up data were used for the prediction models. Hierarchical logistic stepwise regressions were conducted, in order to identify predictors of the late onset of cannabis and other drug use separately. RESULTS: Not providing for oneself, having siblings, depressiveness, parental divorce, lower parental knowledge of peers and the whereabouts, peer pressure, very low nicotine dependence, and sensation seeking were positively associated with the onset of cannabis use. Practising religion was negatively associated with the onset of cannabis use. Onset of drug use other than cannabis showed a positive association with depressiveness, antisocial personality disorder, lower parental knowledge of peers and the whereabouts, psychiatric problems of peers, problematic cannabis use, and sensation seeking. CONCLUSIONS: Consideration of the predictor variables identified within this study may help to identify young male adults for whom preventive measures for cannabis or other drug use are most appropriate. The results provide evidence for both the gateway hypothesis and the common liability to addiction model and point to further variables like depressiveness or practising of religion that might influence the onset of drug use.

Altura de Pastejo de Braquiária e Carga Animal Limitada pelos Atributos Físicos do Solo em Sistema Integração Lavoura-Pecuária com Soja

O manejo da altura de pastejo das forrageiras pelos bovinos pode comprometer os atributos físicos do solo. O objetivo deste trabalho foi avaliar a influência da altura de pastejo de braquiária (Urochloa ruziziensis) e a carga animal média, após três anos de sistema integração lavoura-pecuária com soja, nos atributos físicos de um Latossolo Vermelho distrófico típico. O delineamento experimental foi de blocos casualizados, com três repetições. Cinco tratamentos com 10, 20, 30 e 40 cm de altura de pastejo, após 84 dias de pastejo contínuo mantidos com carga variável de bovinos, e um tratamento testemunha sem pastejo foram avaliados em parcelas experimentais de 1 ha. Em novembro de 2012, após o terceiro período de pastejo, com carga animal média de 1.262, 919, 892 e 724 kg ha-1 de peso vivo, respectivamente, para as alturas de pastejo de 10, 20, 30 e 40 cm, coletaram-se amostras indeformadas de solo nas camadas de 0-10, 10-20 e 20-30 cm, as quais foram utilizadas para determinar as curvas de retenção de água e de resistência do solo à penetração e a densidade do solo (Ds), bem como para calcular o intervalo hídrico ótimo (IHO). A menor Ds ocorreu na camada de 0-10 cm para a altura de pastejo de 31 cm da braquiária que correspondeu a 72 % da carga animal máxima. O maior IHO ocorreu na camada de 10-20 cm para a altura de pastejo de 23 cm da braquiária que correspondeu a 83 % da carga animal máxima. O manejo da altura de pastejo da braquiária foi limitado em 23 cm pela maior carga animal e melhores atributos físicos na camada de 10-20 cm do Latossolo Vermelho distrófico típico.

Predicting potential distribution of the jaguar (Panthera onca) in Mexico: identification of priority areas for conservation

Aim The jaguar, Panthera onca, is a species of global conservation concern. In Mexico, the northernmost part of its distribution range, its conservation status, is particularly critical, while its potential and actual distribution is poorly known. We propose an ensemble model (EM) of the potential distribution for the jaguar in Mexico and identify the priority areas for conservation.Location Mexico.Methods We generated our EM based on three presence-only methods (Ecological Niche Factor Analysis, Mahalanobis distance, Maxent) and considering environmental, biological and anthropogenic factors. We used this model to evaluate the efficacy of the existing Mexican protected areas (PAs), to evaluate the adequacy of the jaguar conservation units (JCUs) and to propose new areas that should be considered for conservation and management of the species in Mexico.Results Our results outline that 16% of Mexico (c. 312,000 km2) can be considered as suitable for the presence of the jaguar. Furthermore, 13% of the suitable areas are included in existing PAs and 14% are included in JCUs (Sanderson et al., 2002).Main conclusions Clearly much more should be carried out to establish a proactive conservation strategy. Based on our results, we propose here new jaguar conservation and management areas that are important for a nationwide conservation blueprint.

A global analysis of Y-chromosomal haplotype diversity for 23 STR loci.

In a worldwide collaborative effort, 19,630 Y-chromosomes were sampled from 129 different populations in 51 countries. These chromosomes were typed for 23 short-tandem repeat (STR) loci (DYS19, DYS389I, DYS389II, DYS390, DYS391, DYS392, DYS393, DYS385ab, DYS437, DYS438, DYS439, DYS448, DYS456, DYS458, DYS635, GATAH4, DYS481, DYS533, DYS549, DYS570, DYS576, and DYS643) and using the PowerPlex Y23 System (PPY23, Promega Corporation, Madison, WI). Locus-specific allelic spectra of these markers were determined and a consistently high level of allelic diversity was observed. A considerable number of null, duplicate and off-ladder alleles were revealed. Standard single-locus and haplotype-based parameters were calculated and compared between subsets of Y-STR markers established for forensic casework. The PPY23 marker set provides substantially stronger discriminatory power than other available kits but at the same time reveals the same general patterns of population structure as other marker sets. A strong correlation was observed between the number of Y-STRs included in a marker set and some of the forensic parameters under study. Interestingly a weak but consistent trend toward smaller genetic distances resulting from larger numbers of markers became apparent.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.