A Flor da Melancolia e o Ímpeto Cesariano (ou a Negação e a Afirmação da Vida) nas Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas de Machado de Assis

Esta dissertação tem por objecto a flor da melancolia e o ímpeto cesariano nas Memórias Póstumas de Brás Cubas, de Machado de Assis, noções que reflectem um confronto com a temática schopenhauriana e nietzschiana da negação e afirmação da vida. Trata-se de uma tese em Filosofia – variante Estética, que procura identificar no romance do escritor brasileiro aquilo que nele corresponde a um substrato metafísico, a uma procura pelo sentido e a uma tentativa de lidar com o sofrimento – feitas por um homem para quem Deus morreu, e que encontra numa dimensão temporal tudo o que há para encontrar. Consideramos que a despeito do pessimismo que atravessa o livro, há nele uma vitalidade que decorre grandemente do ponto de vista do narrador, do facto de as Memórias serem Póstumas. E pensamos que é no acto criador da escrita que Brás Cubas, e com ele Machado de Assis, firma o estandarte de César e abotoa a flor da melancolia, o sofrimento de que padece a Humanidade e que, no caso do personagem, surge depois da morte da mãe, no período de luto em que, pela primeira vez, há um questionamento acerca de si próprio e do seu lugar no mundo.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

The physiology of inscription : Foucault's genealogy as curative science

In ''Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Foucault suggests that genealogy is a sort of "curative science." The genealogist must be a physiologist and a pathologist as well as an historian, for his task is to decipher the marks that power relations and historical events leave on the subjugated body; "he must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength, its breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical discourse." But this claim seems to be incongruent with another major task of genealogy. After all, genealogy is supposed to show us that the things we take to be absolute are in fact discontinuous and historically situated: "Nothing in man-not even his body-is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men." If this is true, then the subjugated body can never be restored to a healthy state because it has no essential or original nature. There are no universal standards by which we can even distinguish between healthy and unhealthy bodies. So in what sense is genealogy to be a "curative science"? In my thesis, I try to elucidate the complex relationship between genealogy and the body. I argue that genealogy can be a curative science even while it "multiplies our body and sets it against itself." Ifwe place a special emphasis on the role that transgression plays in Foucault's genealogical works, then the healthy body is precisely the body that resists universal standards and classifications. If genealogy is to be a curative science, then it must restore to the subjugated body an "identity" that transgresses its own limits and that constitutes itself, paradoxically, in the very effacement of identity. In the first chapter of my thesis, I examine the body's role as "surface of the inscription of events." Power relations inscribe on and around the body an identity or subjectivity that appears to be unified and universal, but which is in fact disparate and historically situated. The "subjected" body is the sick and pathologically weak body. In Chapters 2 and 3, I describe how it is possible for the unhealthy body to become healthy by resisting the subjectivity that has been inscribed upon it. Chapter 4 explains how Foucault's later works fit into this characterization of genealogy

The seasons of Zarathustra and their correspondence to the metamorphoses of the spirit

Nietzsche employed metaphors frequently throughout his works. This is especially true in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Although this is often aesthetically pleasing, it can be very difficult for the reader to understand the nuances and interconnections with the various metaphors. This is generally considered one of the main drawbacks of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. While it is beautifully written in a style that is incomparable today, much of what it is attempting to communicate is lost on the reader. This thesis explores the connection between the metamorphoses of the spirit and the seasons in Thus'Spoke Zarathustra, with the camel spirit corresponding to autumn, the lion spirit with winter, the child spirit with spring, and finally the Overman with summer. Although the Overman is not included among the three metamorphoses of the spirit, it will be argued that the Overman is a separate metamorphosis and must not be conflated with the child spirit despite their similarities. While Thus Spoke Zarathustra will be the primary text used, Nietzsche's other works will be employed to demonstrate that this connection between the metamorphoses of the spirit and the seasons runs through much of his thought. By demonstrating how the seasons are used in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a deeper understanding of the work will be revealed. Further, this thesis will demonstrate that it is an intentional connection, and not merely coincidental or something that has been constructed and imposed upon the work. Bringing this correspondence between the metamorphoses of the spirit and the seasons to light will result in the need to rethink particular notions of Nietzsche's philosophy. The most apparent involves the Overman and the process of overcoming. Although the Overman has often been viewed as "the end" in the cycle of metamorphoses, it will be argued that this is not the case. The typical interpretation of the metamorphoses of the spirit regard it as a linear progression; however, it will be shown that the metamorphoses of the spirit is cyclical with the camel, lion, and child spirits endlessly repeating, much like the seasons.

Heidegger's tragic Greeks : the relation between presence and deinon

Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the ancients was born out of something like a crisis in the interpretation of the Greeks, which can be characterized as nothing other than the realization of the idea that the Greek philosophers put a serious question mark over existence. This idea, which had its germination in Prussia with Jakob Burckhart and his teacher, but first came to be seriously cultivated in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, was the first in depth investigation into whether the Greeks, on the one hand, questioned existence or, on the other hand, put a question mark over existence. To question existence is rather innocuous, since it amounts to little more, in the end, than a child looking up at the stars and asking what it all means. To put a question mark over existence, however, is another business entirely. For the Greeks, as the life work of Martin Heidegger amply demonstrates, the nature of Greek thinking and the objects towards which it is directed follows so absolutely from the tragic view of the human person that, in a certain sense, philosophy is Greek and could only have developed in Greece. Perhaps stating it a little less categorically, philosophy could have developed elsewhere at least to the extent that something like they way the Greeks understood life was at the forefront: presence, in other words. This thesis deals with the problem ofHeidegger's relation to the Greeks, specifically in terms of his understanding of the Greeks and presence. It is the position of this dissertation that the Greek notion of presence is, as Heidegger understands it, the homeliness of the hearth that radiates through all the things that humans concern themselves with. This is thought by Heidegger, as the Greeks did, specifically in contrast with the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the hqrnan apart from his or her concern with things. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt at exposing the relation between presence and the unhomely by situating it withing Greek existence and the meaning of the Greek Philosopher. In order to support this position, the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first two chapters deal with Heidegger's explanation of the relation between Greek notion of physics (Phusis), metaphysics (specifically in relation to an analysis of time and motion in Greek thought), and what Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein (boredom). More exactly, it deals with these issues only so far as they allow us to bring out something like the notion of 'presence' in relation to things and homelessness or restlessness in relation to the human being. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central problem of the paper is that in Heidegger's elucidation of physics and metaphysics, he conducts his analysis in such a way that he explicitly uncovers that dimension of human existence that he calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement is, in tum, similar to what the Greeks understood as the deinon, the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the human. The third and fourth chapters take as their explicit themes the problem of the Greek understanding of the assertion and the ways in which the person can comport himlherself toward things, two issues which are not separable. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central theme of the paper is that Heidegger's analysis of these two areas in Greek thought brings out precisely why the philosopher and the philosophical way of life is the highest mode of existence for the Greeks and how this is thought specifically in tenns of the uncanniness of humans. The final cijapter gives a complete elucidation of presence as the homeliness of the hearth and shows specifically how this is thought of in contradistinction to the uncanny/unhomely for the Greeks. 1I1 This last chapter also explains Martin Heidegger's reaction to the Greek's interpretation of the highest mode of existence, and what he posited as a counter-thought. The essay as a whole is an attempt to fully concertize an important dimension of Heidegger' s understanding of the Greeks, that is, the relation between presence and the deinon or Greek notion ofunhomely, which, to my la)owledge, has not been offered anywhere in commentaries on Heidegger.

(Re)Thinking bodies : Deleuze and Guattari's becoming- woman

Abstract (Re)thinking Bodies: Deleuze and Guattari 's becoming-woman seeks to explore the notion of becoming-woman, as put forth by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their collaborative 1982 text, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and as received by such prominent feminist theorists as Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz. Arguing that the fairly decisive repudiation of this concept by some feminist theorists has been based on a critical misunderstanding, this project endeavors to clarify becomingwoman by exploring various conceptions of the body put forth by Baruch de Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche and Simone de Beauvoir. These conceptions of the body are indispensible to an appreciation of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a body lived on both an immanent and transcendent plane, which, in turn, is indispensable to an appreciation of the concept of becoming (and, in particular, the concept of becoming-woman) as intended by Deleuze and Guattari.

The vocation of responsibility : a conceptual analysis of a modern idea

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P55 N48 2004

John R.A. Mayer fonds, 1963-2007

John R.A. Mayer (de Berncastle) was a professor in the Philosophy Department at Brock University from 1965 to 1997. During his career at Brock he served as Chair of the Philosophy Department and as Associate Dean of Arts and Science. In 1972 he conceived the Master of Philosophy Program, along with G.M.C. Sprung. He was also a special member of the Brock Philosophical Society, a group of Brock alumni, faculty, students and Niagara citizens, which promoted an open and free discussion of ideas.

Éthéréalisation : amorces d'une contre-histoire

Cette thèse est une enquête épistémologique qui s’interroge sur la persistance de « l’éther » dans le champ de la technologie. De façon générale, le mot « éther » évoque un modèle conceptuel de la physique pré-einsteinienne, celui d’un milieu invisible permettant la propagation de la lumière et des ondes électromagnétiques. Or, ce n’est là qu’une des figures de l’éther. Dans plusieurs mythologies et cosmogonies anciennes, le nom « éther » désignait le feu originel contenu dans les plus hautes régions célestes. Aristote nommait « éther », par exemple, le « cinquième être », ou « cinquième élément ». La chimie a aussi sa propre figure de l’éther où il donne son nom à un composé chimique, le C4H10O, qui a été utilisé comme premier anesthésiant général à la fin du XIXe siècle. L’apparition soutenue dans l’histoire de ces figures disparates de l’éther, qui a priori ne semblent pas entretenir de relation entre elles, est pour nous la marque de la persistance de l’éther. Nous défendons ici l’argument selon lequel cette persistance ne se résume pas à la constance de l’attribution d’un mot ou d’un nom à différents phénomènes dans l’histoire, mais à l’actualisation d’une même signature, éthérogène. À l’invitation d’Agamben et en nous inspirant des travaux de Nietzsche et Foucault sur l’histoire-généalogie et ceux de Derrida sur la déconstruction, notre thèse amorce une enquête historique motivée par un approfondissement d’une telle théorisation de la signature. Pour y parvenir, nous proposons de placer l’éther, ou plutôt la signature-éther, au cœur de différentes enquêtes historiques préoccupées par le problème de la technologie. En abordant sous cet angle des enjeux disparates – la légitimation des savoirs narratifs, la suspension des sens, la pseudoscience et la magie, les révolutions de l’information, l’obsession pour le sans-fil, l’économie du corps, la virtualisation de la communication, etc. –, nous proposons dans cette thèse autant d’amorces pour une histoire autre, une contre-histoire.

Un non-événement qui a pourtant eu lieu : la rencontre entre Gadamer et Derrida

La rencontre tant attendue entre Hans-Georg Gadamer et Jacques Derrida a finalement eu lieu au Goethe-Institut de Paris en 1981. Le dialogue espéré entre l'herméneutique et la déconstruction s'y est cependant à peine engagé. Selon la plupart des commentateurs, la conférence qu'y a prononcée Derrida n'était d'ailleurs même pas liée à la rencontre. Nous ne partageons pas cette opinion. Derrida a choisi de critiquer l'interprétation heideggérienne de Nietzsche, alors que Gadamer venait de faire un plaidoyer inconditionnel en sa faveur. De plus, la structure axiomatique de l'unité et de la totalité que Derrida met en question dans sa conférence est la même que celle qu'il a ailleurs attribuée à l'herméneutique. En mettant en doute la primauté de cette structure, il s'en prenait donc aux fondements de l'herméneutique telle qu'il la concevait. Enfin, sa conférence a laissé entrevoir une conception de l'interprétation dont l'absence d'horizon de vérité exclut l'herméneutique.

Cru ; suivi de Cruauté nécessaire : le devoir d'une vérité autobiographique chez Guibert, Dustan et Rémès

Situé entre entre le roman et le récit personnel, Cru. prend la forme d'un aller-retour entre fiction et autobiographie. Le texte, construit à l'aide d'une écriture syncopée et brute, présente deux personnages homosexuels à l'ère « post-sida », alors que ceux-ci tentent de comprendre ce que veut dire « être un homme » dans un contexte social où le mépris (envers les autres et soi-même) est encore présent, mais peut-être encore plus pernicieux qu'auparavant, parce que camouflé sous l'idée d'une acceptation globale. Au final, Cru. soulève la délicate question du droit à la vérité dans une démarche autobiographique et celle de l'implication de la cruauté dans un récit qui ne concerne pas que l'auteur, mais son entourage aussi. Cruauté nécessaire : le devoir d'une vérité autobiographique chez Guibert, Dustan et Rémès est un essai qui vise l'analyse de différents procédés se rattachant à l'écriture autobiographique homosexuelle des années 1990, particulièrement aux textes appartenant à la littérature du sida. Si l'autobiographie vise, dans une certaine mesure, le dévoilement de la vérité, comment ne pas parler de cruauté alors que les auteurs qui la pratiquent y vont de révélations qui ne concernent pas qu'eux? Si le processus d'écriture autobiographique se veut bénéfique, le résultat est-il purement diabolique? Il faudra d'abord, évidemment, définir ce que l'on entend par « vérité » et « cruauté » (lire « bénéfique » et « maléfique »). En ce qui concerne le Bien et le Mal, les textes de Bataille et Nietzsche contribueront à définir deux concepts qui peuvent, souvent, être relatifs. En confrontant les textes des trois auteurs français – tous séropositifs au moment de l'écriture – à différentes théories autobiographiques (Doubrovsky, Lejeune, Miraux) et identitaires (Foucault, Schecter, Butler), et à certains écrits sur le devoir et la responsabilité (Donner, Brooks), l'on tentera de démontrer que la cruauté dont Guibert, Dustan et Rémès font preuve est essentielle à l'écriture autobiographique.

Imagination et individuation dans la philosophie de Spinoza : La science intuitive comme imagination libérée

La philosophie de Spinoza cherche à concilier et réunir trois horizons philosophiques fondamentaux : l’émanation néo-platonicienne (l’expression), le mécanisme cartésien (cause efficiente), et les catégories aristotéliciennes (Substance, attribut, mode). Ce premier point est pris pour acquis. Nous expliquerons que cette tentative sera rendue possible grâce à la conception nouvelle, au 17e siècle, de l’actualité de l’infini. Nous examinerons ensuite les conséquences de cette nouvelle interprétation, qui permet de rendre l’individu transparent à lui-même sur un plan d’immanence, expressif par rapport à une éminence qui le diffuse, mais déterminé dans une substantialité fictive entre objets finis. En proposant le pouvoir de l’imagination et des prophètes comme point de départ et principe actif du conatus, nous montrerons que la distinction, chez Spinoza, demeure toujours une fiction. Pour conclure, nous serons en mesure de signaler en quoi le Zarathoustra de Nietzsche relève d’une volonté de poursuivre le travail entrepris par Spinoza.

Décliner la frontière : transit et contagion de la violence dans la fiction sacrificielle de Bernard-Marie Koltès

Ce mémoire de maîtrise traite de quatre pièces de l’auteur français Bernard-Marie Koltès. Résolument axé sur l’étude du texte écrit, il vise dans un premier temps l’analyse d’un ensemble de désajustements et d’une culture de l’équivoque dans le traitement du lieu, du temps et de l’identité. Le premier but de ces analyses est l’approfondissement de certaines avenues déjà investies par la critique (marginalité des lieux et des personnages, présence constante de la violence et de la mort, etc.), dans la recherche d’une signification globale à un ensemble de pratiques textuelles liées à la notion de limite ou de frontière. Opérant un changement de perspective, la seconde partie de l’étude s’attarde à la violence ainsi qu’aux modalités et implications de sa mise en texte dans une étude croisée de l’acte créateur et de la pratique de lecture. À partir de la théorie du sacrifice élaborée par René Girard dans La violence et le sacré, et faisant dialoguer certains textes importants d’auteurs divers (Aristote, Nietzsche, Artaud, Foucault, Derrida et Adorno), l’analyse vise à inscrire la littérarité du texte koltésien dans une entreprise plus vaste ayant à voir avec la violence, sa régulation et sa diffusion. Au carrefour des études théâtrales, de la littérature et de la philosophie, cette réflexion cherche à concevoir le théâtre de Koltès (particulièrement Roberto Zucco) comme un sacrifice rituel, afin de mieux en comprendre le rapport au réel et certaines de ses particularités du point de vue du mécanisme cathartique.

Deleuze et l'éternel retour de la différence

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

La poétique pathique de Georges Bataille et de Pierre Klossowski

L’objectif de la thèse est de montrer en quoi le roman ou la littérature incarne une forme de connaissance qui lui est propre, que Pierre Klossowski appelle la « connaissance pathétique ». Celle-ci fait appel aux passions plutôt qu’à la seule raison et repose sur des percepts et des affects bien davantage que sur des idées et sur des concepts. L’œuvre romanesque de Georges Bataille et de Pierre Klossowski me servira d’exemple et d’objet d’analyse, dans la mesure où l’écriture fictionnelle y est toujours au service d’une ‘’passion’’ philosophique, dans laquelle l’auteur entraîne ses personnages en même temps que le lecteur. Cette « connaissance pathétique » que le sujet est amené à vivre passe notamment par les mécanismes d’une écriture qui tente d’énoncer l’innommable. Cette orientation esthétique suit la voie tracée par Nietzsche, et les grandes thématiques associées à ce dernier constituent à la fois, au niveau de l’énoncé, un contenu thématique et diégétique récurrent (par exemple : dans Le Baphomet, nous sommes en présence du personnage de Friedrich l’Antéchrist) et, au niveau de l’énonciation, une stratégie narrative qui consiste à piéger le lecteur dans un système d’interprétations ambiguës, contradictoires et provocatrices qui déclenchent chez lui une activité cognitive effrénée, de nature passionnelle ou pathétique (par exemple : Le récit Les lois de l’hospitalité commence par un avertissement au lecteur, où on le met en garde contre « l’attrape concertée » que représente le récit). J’étudierai en détail, sur le plan de l’expression et du contenu, ces stratégies cognitives de la transgression et du simulacre grâce auxquelles l’auteur amène ses personnages et son lecteur à éprouver des pensées comme une forme de passion. L’analyse de la poétique pathique comme forme privilégiée de l’écriture narrative chez Pierre Klossowski et chez Georges Bataille nécessitera le recours à une analyse de l’œuvre de Nietzsche et de Sade dans un premier temps pour retracer ce qui est l’enjeu de la réception de ces œuvres par les deux auteurs français. Dans un deuxième temps, l’analyse des œuvres de Georges Bataille et de Pierre Klossowski me permettra de comprendre comment elles déclenchent chez le lecteur une expérience pathétique où la difficulté d’atteindre à une connaissance rationnelle univoque déclenche chez le destinataire du texte une activité cognitive complexe de nature proprement littéraire ou romanesque. Enfin, le corpus qui me servira d’exemple dans la description de ces phénomènes sera constitué des principales œuvres discursives de Bataille et de Klossowski (L’expérience intérieure, Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux) ainsi que de leurs œuvres romanesques (L’histoire de l’œil, Divinus Deus, L’abbé C., La vocation suspendue, Les lois de l’hospitalité et Le Baphomet).