Les cures hybrides des lésions anévrismales [Hybrid treatment of aortic aneurysms]

The hybrid treatment of aortic aneurysms is indicated in patients having the ostia of supra aortic or visceral branches taken in to the aneurysm. Indeed, these lesions are not eligible for classic endovascular treatment because the existing endoprostheses cannot provide perfusion of the side branches without inducing major endoleaks. The surgical technique consists of 2 steps: firstly, a by-pass between normal aorta and the major aortic branches involved in the aneurysm is performed to guarantee the perfusion of the organs such as brain, bowel, and after endoprosthesis deployment. Secondly, the endoprosthesis is deployed using the classical technique to isolate the aneurysm. The hybrid approach provides safe and reliable treatment of complex aortic aneurysms with mortality and morbidity rate far below the classical open surgery.

Similarities and dissimilarities between the Movement ABC-2 and the Zurich Neuromotor Assessment in children with suspected developmental coordination disorder.

An established tool for the assessment of motor performance in children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) is the Movement-ABC-2 (M-ABC-2). The Zurich Neuromotor Assessment (ZNA) is also widely used for the evaluation of children's motor performance, but has not been compared with the M-ABC-2. Fifty-one children (39 males) between 5 and 7 years of age with suspected DCD were assessed using the M-ABC-2 and the ZNA. Rank correlations between scores of different test components were calculated. The structure of the tests was explored using canonical-correlation analysis. The correlation between total scores of the two motor tests was reasonable (0.66; p<0.001). However, ZNA scores were generally lower than those of M-ABC-2, due to poor performance in the fine motor adaptive component and increased contralateral associated movements (CAM). The canonical-correlation analysis revealed that ZNA measures components like pure motor skills and CAM that are not represented in the M-ABC-2. Furthermore, there was also no equivalent for the aiming and catching items of the M-ABC-2 in ZNA. The two tests measure different motor characteristics in children with suspected DCD and, thus, can be used complementary for the diagnosis of the disorder.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Testing Spatial Autocorrelation in Weighted Networks : the Modes Permutation Test

In a weighted spatial network, as specified by an exchange matrix, the variances of the spatial values are inversely proportional to the size of the regions. Spatial values are no more exchangeable under independence, thus weakening the rationale for ordinary permutation and bootstrap tests of spatial autocorrelation. We propose an alternative permutation test for spatial autocorrelation, based upon exchangeable spatial modes, constructed as linear orthogonal combinations of spatial values. The coefficients obtain as eigenvectors of the standardised exchange matrix appearing in spectral clustering, and generalise to the weighted case the concept of spatial filtering for connectivity matrices. Also, two proposals aimed at transforming an acessibility matrix into a exchange matrix with with a priori fixed margins are presented. Two examples (inter-regional migratory flows and binary adjacency networks) illustrate the formalism, rooted in the theory of spectral decomposition for reversible Markov chains.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Sobriété volontaire : en quête de nouveaux modes de vie

Textes d'Aurélien Boutaud, Jean-Claude Galey, Sylvia Generoso, Susana Jourdan, Jacques Mirenowicz, René Nouailhat, Sylvain Piron, Cécile Renouard, Yvan Rytz et Marie-Christine Zélem.

Beyond Centre and Margin: (Self-)translation and the Ecopoetics of Space in Geetanjali Shree's "Mai"

Croisant les concepts de traduction culturelle et une approche « queer » de l'identité, notre article propose une lecture de l'utilisation de tropes végétaux ou organiques dans le roman de Geetanjali Shree, Mai, comme critique de la logique binaire du centre et de la marge qui caractérise autant l'orientalisme que le système patriarcal. Ecrit à la première personne, le roman invente un nouvel espace d'énonciation en narrant l'enfance et la jeunesse d'une jeune femme et la constitution de son identité à travers la relation complexe qu'elle entretient avec sa mère, son milieu familial issu de la classe moyenne du Nord de l'Inde, et la société indienne contemporaine aux prises avec la globalisation. Toutefois, ce cercle ou centre est en constante évolution puisque le contexte postcolonial dans lequel ces identités féminines se situent nous amène à considérer d'autres modes d'intervention (agency) qui opèrent non seulement à travers la prise de parole mais aussi à travers l'usage stratégique du silence. Fleurissant entre l'anglais et le hindi, ces identités hybrides nous poussent à revoir nos cartographies critiques et à investiguer et investir des lieux liminaux dans lesquels des subjectivités traversent les frontières et transgressent les limites imposées par l'ordre patriarcal et les cartographies imposées par les centres de pouvoir.