As espécies neotropicais da família Simuliidae Schiner, 1864 (Diptera-Nematocera): I. Simulim (Eusimulium) orbitale Lutz, 1910, Simulium (Eusimulium) pintoi n. sp. e Simulium nigrimanum MACQUART, 1837, sp. inquirendae

Os AA. iniciam com o presente trabalho uma série de publicações com o fim de rever as espécies neotropicais da família Simuliidae. Fazem a revisão bibliográfica, a redescrição do macho, fêmea, pupa, larva, e elegem os neótipos de S. (E) orbitale LUTZ, 1910. Descrevem S. (E.) pintoi n. sp. de macho, fêmea, pupa e larva; consideram S. nigrimanum MACQ., 1837 como sp. inquirendae.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Corythaica cyathicollis (Costa, 1864), aspectos sistemáticos, biológicos e econômicos (Hemiptera, Tingidae)

The present work deals with the systematic, biological and economic problems related to Corythaica cyathicollis (Costa, 1864) (Hemip., Tingidae). In the first part are presented the generic characteristics of Corythaica and is discussed the status of the specific name. The validity of C. cyathicollis, as stated by DRAKE and his collaborators, was denied by MONTE in his last works, he considered the species as C. passiflorae. Even in the modern literature no agreement has been achieved and three names are still used (cyathicollis, passiflorae and planaris) to designate the same insect. In order to resolve definitively this problem, a Neotype is designed to fill the place of the missing type of C. cyathicollis. Also in the first parte is discussed the taxonomic value of both male and female genitalia. The whole male copulator apparatus is studied and are illustrated the genital capsules of 8 species of this genus. Special mention is made of the shape of the basal plates and the proportions of the segmental membrana. The female genitalia is studied based upon the work of FELDMAN & BAILEY (1952). In the second part the biological cycle of C. cyathicollis is carefully studied. Descriptions of the egg are done and the ways of oviposition. The number of eggs laid by the female was observed to be about 350, during a period of more than 45 days. The eclosion of the neanide I is illustrated in some of its phases and the 5 larval instars are described and illustrated. Ending this part are included the lists of parasites and predators observed as well as the plant hosts. The actual geographical distribution is presented, based chiefly on HURD (1945). The economic problems concerning this species are reported in the third part of the work, and the ways of control are discussed. An experiment was carried out involving 4 insecticides: Malathion and Parathion, commonly used against this "lace bug"; Toxaphene and Dimethoate (American Cyanamid 12.880), the last one is an insecticide recently introduced in Brazil and was not previously used for these purposes, but gave the best results and it is quite able to control these insects even on crops showing highly developed infestations.