Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement

While transnational antitrust enforcement is becoming only more common, the access to foreign-based evidence remains a considerable practical challenge. This article appraises considerations and concerns surrounding confidentiality, and looks into ways of their possible accommodation. It further identifies and critically evaluates the existing mechanisms allowing for inter-agency confidential information/ evidence sharing in competition law enforcement. The article outlines the shortcomings of the current framework and points to novel unilateral approaches. In the latter regard the focus is devoted to Australia, where the competition agency is empowered to share confidential information with foreign counterparts, also without any underlying bilateral agreement and on a non-reciprocal basis. This solution shows that a pragmatic and workable approach to inter-agency evidence sharing can be achieved.

On convergence with hiccups: recent amendments to Poland's competition law

Discusses the amendments to the Polish Competition Act 2007 adopted in June 2014 which aim to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, including the introduction of: (1) civil fines for individuals; (2) a "leniency plus" programme based on the US model; (3) a settlement procedure; and (4) extended inspection powers for the Competition Authority. Assesses the likely effectiveness of the reforms.

Interspecific competition in honeybee intracellular gut parasites is asymmetric and favours the spread of an emerging infectious disease

There is increasing appreciation that hosts in natural populations are subject to infection by multiple parasite species. Yet the epidemiological and ecological processes determining the outcome of mixed infections are poorly understood. Here, we use two intracellular gut parasites (Microsporidia), one exotic and one co-evolved in the western honeybee (Apis mellifera), in an experiment in which either one or both parasites were administered either simultaneously or sequentially. We provide clear evidence of within-host competition; order of infection was an important determinant of the competitive outcome between parasites, with the first parasite significantly inhibiting the growth of the second, regardless of species. However, the strength of this ‘priority effect’ was highly asymmetric, with the exotic Nosema ceranae exhibiting stronger inhibition of Nosema apis than vice versa. Our results reveal an unusual asymmetry in parasite competition that is dependent on order of infection. When incorporated into a mathematical model of disease prevalence, we find asymmetric competition to be an important predictor of the patterns of parasite prevalence found in nature. Our findings demonstrate the wider significance of complex multi-host–multi-parasite interactions as drivers of host–pathogen community structure

Competition between memory-keeping and memory-erasing decoherence channels

We study the competing effects of simultaneous Markovian and non-Markovian decoherence mechanisms acting on a single spin. We show the existence of a threshold in the relative strength of such mechanisms above which the spin dynamics becomes fully Markovian, as revealed by the use of several non-Markovianity measures. We identify a measure-dependent nested structure of such thresholds, hinting at a causality relationship among the various non-Markovianity witnesses used in our analysis. Our considerations are then used to argue the unavoidably non-Markovian evolution of a single-electron quantum dot exposed to both intrinsic and Markovian technical noise, the latter of arbitrary strength. 

International inter-school competition to encourage children to walk to school: a mixed methods feasibility study.

Background: Active travel to school can be an important contributor to the total physical activity of children but levels have declined and more novel approaches are required to stimulate this as an habitual behaviour. The aim of this mixed methods study was to investigate the feasibility of an international walk to school competition supported by novel swipecard technology to increase children's walking to/from school. Methods: Children aged 9-13 years old participated in an international walk to school competition to win points for themselves, their school and their country over a 4-week period. Walks to and from school were recorded using swipecard technology and a bespoke website. For each point earned by participants, 1 pence (£0.01) was donated to the charity of the school's choice. The primary outcome was number of walks to/from school objectively recorded using the swipecard tracking system over the intervention period. Other measures included attitudes towards walking collected at baseline and week 4 (post-intervention). A qualitative sub-study involving focus groups with children, parents and teachers provided further insight. Results: A total of 3817 children (mean age 11.5±SD 0.7) from 12 schools in three cities (London and Reading, England and Vancouver, Canada) took part in the intervention, representing a 95% intervention participation rate. Results show a gradual decline in the average number of children walking to and from school over the 4-week period (week 1 mean 29%±SD2.5; week 2 mean 18%±SD3.6; week 3 mean 14%±SD4.0; week 4 mean 12%±SD1.1). Post intervention, 97% of children felt that walking to school helped them stay healthy, feel happy (81%) and stay alert in class (76%). These results are supported by qualitative findings from children, parents and teachers. Key areas for improvement include the need to incorporate strategies for maintenance of behaviour change into the intervention and also to adopt novel methods of data collection to increase follow-up rates. Conclusions: This mixed methods study suggests that an international walk to school competition using innovative technology can be feasibly implemented and offers a novel way of engaging schools and motivating children to walk to school.

Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Platform Competition as Network Contestability

Recent research in industrial organisation has investigated the essential place that middlemen have in the networks that make up our global economy. In this paper we attempt to understand how such middlemen compete with each other through a game theoretic analysis using novel techniques from decision-making under ambiguity.
We model a purposely abstract and reduced model of one middleman who provides a two-sided platform, mediating surplus-creating interactions between two users. The middleman evaluates uncertain outcomes under positional ambiguity, taking into account the possibility of the emergence of an alternative middleman offering intermediary services to the two users.
Surprisingly, we find many situations in which the middleman will purposely extract maximal gains from her position. Only if there is relatively low probability of devastating loss of business under competition, the middleman will adopt a more competitive attitude and extract less from her position.