Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Credit Insurance: Is it a Good Idea for You?

COBRA: Continuation of Employer Group Health Insurance, 2007

Medicare Deductible, co-insurance and premiuns form, and rescription drugs plans.

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Northeast Iowa Schools Insurance Trust for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

A 15-year post evaluation of the fire effects on ant community in an area of Amazonian forest

Fire represents an important disturbance to ant communities in areas of fire regime. Otherwise, little is known about the effects of fire on ant communities in areas of non-fire regimes, such as in the Amazonian region. We evaluated the long-term effect of fire on ant species richness in a rain forest (Bacaba Plateau) burned 15-years ago and compare our data with the data of primary unburned forest. A total of 85 ant species distributed in 21 genera and 14 tribes were collected; among them, 72 and 44 species were found on the litter and vegetation, respectively. The fire damaged forest studied supports an intermediate richness of ants when compared to a primary unburned rain forest in the same region. A comparative analysis of ant species richness showed that the Bacaba Plateau presented a different ant fauna when compared with the primary unburned forests, suggesting that fire can alter ant species composition. Although, our results cannot be conclusive on the effects of fire on ant community, they represent a pioneer data on human induced fire in tropical rain forests.

Evolution at Two Levels in Fire Ants: The Relationship between Patterns of Gene Expression and Protein Sequence Evolution.

Variation in protein sequence and gene expression each contribute to phenotypic diversity, and may be subject to similar selective pressures. Eusocial insects are particularly useful for investigating the evolutionary link between protein sequence and condition-dependent patterns of gene expression because gene expression plays a central role in determining differences between eusocial insect sexes and castes. We investigated the relationship between protein coding sequence evolution and gene expression patterns in the fire ants Solenopsis invicta, S. richteri, and their hybrids to gain greater insight into how selection jointly operates on gene expression and coding sequence. We found that genes with high expression variability within castes and sexes were frequently differentially expressed between castes and sexes, as well as between species and hybrids. These results indicate that genes showing high variation in expression in one context also tend to show high variation in expression in other contexts. Our analyses further revealed that variation in both intra- and interspecific gene expression was positively associated with rate of protein sequence evolution in Solenopsis. This suggests that selective constraints on a gene operate both at the level of protein sequence and at the level of gene expression regulation. Overall, our study provides one of the strongest demonstrations that selective constraints mediate both protein sequence evolution and gene expression variability across different biological contexts and timescales.

Full insurance, asymmetric information and genetic testing

This paper extends previous resuls on optimal insurance trading in the presence of a stock market that allows continuous asset trading and substantial personal heterogeneity, and applies those results in a context of asymmetric informationwith references to the role of genetic testing in insurance markets.We find a novel and surprising result under symmetric information:agents may optimally prefer to purchase full insurance despitethe presence of unfairly priced insurance contracts, and other assets which are correlated with insurance.Asymmetric information has a Hirschleifer-type effect whichcan be solved by suspending insurance trading. Nevertheless,agents can attain their first best allocations, which suggeststhat the practice of restricting insurance not to be contingenton genetic tests can be efficient.

Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical taxation under incomplete markets

We construct and calibrate a general equilibrium business cycle model with unemployment and precautionary saving. We compute the cost of business cycles and locate the optimum in a set of simple cyclical fiscal policies. Our economy exhibits productivity shocks, giving firms an incentive to hire more when productivity is high. However, business cycles make workers' income riskier, both by increasing the unconditional probability of unusuallylong unemployment spells, and by making wages more variable, and therefore they decrease social welfare by around one-fourth or one-third of 1% of consumption. Optimal fiscal policy offsets the cycle, holding unemployment benefits constant but varying the tax rate procyclically to smooth hiring. By running a deficit of 4% to 5% of output in recessions, the government eliminates half the variation in the unemployment rate, most of the variation in workers'aggregate consumption, and most of the welfare cost of business cycles.

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.

The genome of the fire ant Solenopsis invicta.

Ants have evolved very complex societies and are key ecosystem members. Some ants, such as the fire ant Solenopsis invicta, are also major pests. Here, we present a draft genome of S. invicta, assembled from Roche 454 and Illumina sequencing reads obtained from a focal haploid male and his brothers. We used comparative genomic methods to obtain insight into the unique features of the S. invicta genome. For example, we found that this genome harbors four adjacent copies of vitellogenin. A phylogenetic analysis revealed that an ancestral vitellogenin gene first underwent a duplication that was followed by possibly independent duplications of each of the daughter vitellogenins. The vitellogenin genes have undergone subfunctionalization with queen- and worker-specific expression, possibly reflecting differential selection acting on the queen and worker castes. Additionally, we identified more than 400 putative olfactory receptors of which at least 297 are intact. This represents the largest repertoire reported so far in insects. S. invicta also harbors an expansion of a specific family of lipid-processing genes, two putative orthologs to the transformer/feminizer sex differentiation gene, a functional DNA methylation system, and a single putative telomerase ortholog. EST data indicate that this S. invicta telomerase ortholog has at least four spliceforms that differ in their use of two sets of mutually exclusive exons. Some of these and other unique aspects of the fire ant genome are likely linked to the complex social behavior of this species.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Implications of dynamic trading for insurance markets

We study the interaction between insurance and capital markets within singlebut general framework.We show that capital markets greatly enhance the risksharing capacity of insurance markets and the scope of risks that areinsurable because efficiency does not depend on the number of agents atrisk, nor on risks being independent, nor on the preferences and endowmentsof agents at risk being the same. We show that agents share risks by buyingfull coverage for their individual risks and provide insurance capitalthrough stock markets.We show that aggregate risk enters private insuranceas positive loading on insurance prices and despite that agents will buyfull coverage. The loading is determined by the risk premium of investorsin the stock market and hence does not depend on the agent s willingnessto pay. Agents provide insurance capital by trading an equally weightedportfolio of insurance company shares and riskless asset. We are able toconstruct agents optimal trading strategies explicitly and for verygeneral preferences.