Memória longa em dados intradiários: um estudo sobre projeções baseadas na ordem fracionária de integração dos Retornos de Ações e Índices de ações

Mandelbrot (1971) demonstrou a importância de considerar dependências de longo prazo na precificação de ativos - o método tradicional para mensurá-las, encontrado em Hurst (1951), faz uso da estatística R/S. Paralelamente a isso, Box e Jenkins (1976; edição original de 1970) apresentaram sua famosa metodologia para determinação da ordem dos parâmetros de modelos desenvolvidos no contexto de processos com memória de curto prazo, conhecidos por ARIMA (acrônimo do inglês Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average). Estimulados pela percepção de que um modelo que pretenda representar fielmente o processo gerador de dados deva explicar tanto a dinâmica de curto prazo quanto a de longo prazo, Granger e Joyeux (1980) e Hosking (1981) introduziram os modelos ARFIMA (de onde o F adicionado vem de Fractionally), uma generalização da classe ARIMA, nos quais a dependência de longo prazo estimada é relacionada ao valor do parâmetro de integração. Pode-se dizer que a partir de então processos com alto grau de persistência passaram a atrair cada vez mais o interesse de pesquisadores, o que resultou no desenvolvimento de outros métodos para estimá-la, porém sem que algum tenha se sobressaído claramente – e é neste ponto que o presente trabalho se insere. Por meio de simulações, buscou-se: (1) classificar diversos estimadores quanto a sua precisão, o que nos obrigou a; (2) determinar parametrizações razoáveis desses, entendidas aqui como aquelas que minimizam o viés, o erro quadrático médio e o desvio-padrão. Após rever a literatura sobre o tema, abordar estes pontos se mostrou necessário para o objetivo principal: elaborar estratégias de negociação baseadas em projeções feitas a partir da caracterização de dependências em dados intradiários, minuto a minuto, de ações e índices de ações. Foram analisadas as séries de retornos da ação Petrobras PN e do Índice Bovespa, com dados de 01/04/2013 a 31/03/2014. Os softwares usados foram o S-Plus e o R.

The forward and the equity premium puzzles: two symptoms of the same illness?

The Forward Premium Puzzle (FPP) is how the empirical observation of a negative relation between future changes in the spot rates and the forward premium is known. Modeling this forward bias as a risk premium and under weak assumptions on the behavior of the pricing kernel, we characterize the potential bias that is present in the regressions where the FPP is observed and we identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that the pricing kernel has to satisfy to account for the predictability of exchange rate movements. Next, we estimate the pricing kernel applying two methods: i) one, du.e to Araújo et aI. (2005), that exploits the fact that the pricing kernel is a serial correlation common feature of asset prices, and ii) a traditional principal component analysis used as a procedure 1;0 generate a statistical factor modeI. Then, using on the sample and out of the sample exercises, we are able to show that the same kernel that explains the Equity Premi um Puzzle (EPP) accounts for the FPP in all our data sets. This suggests that the quest for an economic mo deI that generates a pricing kernel which solves the EPP may double its prize by simultaneously accounting for the FPP.

Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Electoral control in the presence of gridlocks

This article presents a game-theoretic partisan model of voting and political bargaining. In a two-period setup, voters ¯rst elect an executive incumbent and the legislators from a pool of candidates belonging to di®erent parties. Once elected, the executive and the legislature bargain over a budget. Party origin and a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world, in°uence the bargaining cost, such that political gridlocks may occur. At the end of the ¯rst period voters observe the outcome of bargaining but do not observe the true estate of the world, and decide whether or not to reelect the same parties for the Executive and the Legislature. The model con¯rms the very recent literature by showing that voters tend to have more °exible reelection criteria when they believe the true state of the world is likely to be unfavorable. On the other hand, when voters believe the true state of the world is likely to be favorable, they become more demanding in order to reelect the incumbents. In particular, there will be government shutdown with positive probability in equilibrium. Gridlocks occur due to the imperfect information of voters and they constitute indeed an information revelation mechanism that improves electoral control in the second period.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Endogenous supply of fiat money

We address whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a plan of action, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that such equilibrium is no longer possible when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that there is no monetary equilibrium where overissue happens only infrequently. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained in the presence of commitment.

Inflation persistence and flexible prices

The inability of rational expectation models with money supply rules to deliver inflation persistence following a transitory deviation of money growth from trend is due to the rapid adjustment of the price level to expected events. The observation of persistent inflation in macroeconomic data leads many economists to believe that prices adjust sluggishly and/or expectations must not be rational. Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend. In the vector autocorrelation function both inflation and output are highly persistent and there are significant positive dynamic cross-correlations relating inflation and output. This paper shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using a Taylor rule can account for these patterns. There are no sticky prices and no liquidity effects. Agents decisions in a period are taken only after all shocks are observed. The monetary policy rule transforms output persistence into inflation persistence and creates positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.

Sovereign debt with adverse selection : a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model to quantitatively study sovereign debt with contingent services and country risk spreads such that the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher interest rates in the future. For a wide range of parameters, the only equilibrium of the model is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states, unless defaulting incurs additional costs. Due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default in order to reduce reputation loss. Although equilibria with no default imply in greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in the highly indebted and volatile countries.

Welfare and growth effects of alternative fiscal rules for infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the interplay between fiscal rules, public investment and growth in Brazil. It is investigated if it would make sense to raise public investment and, if so, under which fiscal rule it is best to do it — whether through tax financing, debt financing, or a reduction of public consumption. We construct and simulate a competitive general equilibrium model, calibrated to Brazilian economy, in which public capital is a component of the production function and public consumption directly affects individuals’ well-being. After assessing the impacts of alternative fiscal rules, the paper concludes that the most desirable financing scheme is the reduction of public consumption, which dominates the others in terms of output and welfare gains. The model replicates the observed growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy when we increase taxes and reduce public capital formation to the levels observed after 1980 and shows that the growth impact of the expansion of tax collection in Brazil was much larger than that of public investment compression.

Mobility, information, and bequest : the other side of the equal division puzzle

There is substantial empirical evidence that parental bequests to their children are typically equal in the US – a regularity inconsistent with the predictions of standard optimizing bequest models. The prior explanation for this puzzle is parents’ desire to signal equal affection given children’s incomplete information of parental preferences. However, parents also have incomplete information regarding children and the implications of this side of the information set have not previously been considered. Using a strategic bequest framework we show that when parents have sufficient uncertainty regarding children’s returns to relocation a separating equilibrium in which parents reward attentive heirs with larger bequests is precluded. We argue that such uncertainty is consistent with conditions in the contemporary US.