James Wilson, gagnant [d'une] série [du] 10000 m [Jeux olympiques d'Anvers, le 19/8/20] : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60641

27-8-20, Circuit de la Sarthe, Thomas sur Silver Hawk V : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60761

[28-8-20, Colombes, James] Hatton (anglais), Wilson (anglais) : [photographie de presse] / [Agence Rol]

Référence bibliographique : Rol, 60804

Lois anglaises des 9 aout 1870, 6 juillet 1871 et 6 août 1872 modifiant la législation des Compagnies d'assurances sur la vie

[Loi. 1870-08-09]

A Catalogue of... paintings, drawings... sold... november the 3rd 1812

[Vente (Art). 1812-11-03. Oxford, Grande-Bretagne]

The Falkland Islands War of 1982: a legal, diplomatic and strategic evaluation

The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was fought over competing claims to sovereignty over a group of islands off the east coast of South America. The dispute was between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina claims the islands under rights to Spanish succession, the fact that they lie off the Argentine coast line and that in 1833 Great Britain took the islands illegally and by force. The United Kingdom claims the islands primarily through prescription--the fact that they have governed the islands in a peaceful, continuous and public manner since 1833. The British also hold that the population living on the islands, roughly eighteen hundred British descendants, should be able to decide their own future. The United Kingdom also lays claim to the islands through rights of discovery and settlement, although this claim has always been challenged by Spain who until 1811 governed the islands. Both claims have legal support, and the final decision if there will ever be one is difficult to predict. Sadly today the ultimate test of sovereignty does not come through international law but remains in the idea that "He is sovereign who can defend his sovereignty." The years preceding the Argentine invasion of 1982 witnessed many diplomatic exchanges between The United Kingdom and Argentina over the future of the islands. During this time the British sent signals to Argentina that ii implied a decline in British resolve to hold the islands and demonstrated that military action did more to further the talks along than did actual negotiations. The Argentine military junta read these signals and decided that they could take the islands in a quick military invasion and that the United Kingdom would consider the act as a fait accompli and would not protest the invasion. The British in response to this claimed that they never signaled to Argentina that a military solution was acceptable to them and launched a Royal Navy task force to liberate the islands. Both governments responded to an international crisis with means that were designed both to resolve the international crisis and increase the domestic popularity of the government. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing an all-time low in popularity for post-War Prime Ministers while Argentine President General Galtieri needed to gain mass popular support so he could remain a viable President after he was scheduled to lose command of the army and a seat on the military junta that ran the country. The military war for the Falklands is indicative of the nature of modern warfare between Third World countries. It shows that the gap in military capabilities between Third and First World countries is narrowing significantly. Modern warfare between a First and Third World country is no longer a 'walk over' for the First World country.

The law of the sea: the United States, Canada and the deep seabed

The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was fought over competing claims to sovereignty over a group of islands off the east coast of South America. The dispute was between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina claims the islands under rights to Spanish succession, the fact that they lie off the Argentine coast line and that in 1833 Great Britain took the islands illegally and by force. The United Kingdom claims the islands primarily through prescription--the fact that they have governed the islands in a peaceful, continuous and public manner since 1833. The British also hold that the population living on the islands, roughly eighteen hundred British descendants, should be able to decide their own future. The United Kingdom also lays claim to the islands through rights of discovery and settlement, although this claim has always been challenged by Spain who until 1811 governed the islands. Both claims have legal support, and the final decision if there will ever be one is difficult to predict. Sadly today the ultimate test of sovereignty does not come through international law but remains in the idea that "He is sovereign who can defend his sovereignty." The years preceding the Argentine invasion of 1982 witnessed many diplomatic exchanges between The United Kingdom and Argentina over the future of the islands. During this time the British sent signals to Argentina that ii implied a decline in British resolve to hold the islands and demonstrated that military action did more to further the talks along than did actual negotiations. The Argentine military junta read these signals and decided that they could take the islands in a quick military invasion and that the United Kingdom would consider the act as a fait accompli and would not protest the invasion. The British in response to this claimed that they never signaled to Argentina that a military solution was acceptable to them and launched a Royal Navy task force to liberate the islands. Both governments responded to an international crisis with means that were designed both to resolve the international crisis and increase the domestic popularity of the government. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing an all-time low in popularity for post-War Prime Ministers while Argentine President General Galtieri needed to gain mass popular support so he could remain a viable President after he was scheduled to lose command of the army and a seat on the military junta that ran the country. The military war for the Falklands is indicative of the nature of modern warfare between Third World countries. It shows that the gap in military capabilities between Third and First World countries is narrowing significantly. Modern warfare between a First and Third World country is no longer a 'walk over' for the First World country.

Daniel Shannon fonds, 1816-1822

Lt. Daniel Shannon fl. 1777-1822, was the only son of Susan Drake, granddaughter of Rev. Thomas Drake, eldest brother of Sir Francis Drake, and Captain Daniel Shannon of the Royal Navy. He married Elizabeth Garvey, daughter of Alexander Garvey and Catharine Borden of New Jersey. Lt. Shannon was a Regular in the British Army and on February 12, 1777 he joined the Royal Standard, 5th New Jersey Volunteers. After being arrested and sentenced to hang for spying he was pardoned through the efforts of his mother Susan Drake Shannon who pleaded his case with the Governor. He served under General Cornwallis at the surrender in Virginia in 1781. In 1783 he moved to New Brunswick, Canada where he was reduced to a half-pay ensign in the 2nd Regiment of the Lincoln Militia. He was granted 500 acres of land on the St. Johns River, and on April 1, 1786 his daughter Catharine was born there. The family returned to the United States, residing in Pennsylvania, for a short time. In 1800 Lt. Shannon, with his mother and family, returned to Canada and settled in Stamford Township where he bought 200 acres of land on the Niagara River near the whirlpool. He later served in the Secret Service during the War of 1812 and was stationed at a lookout point on the Niagara River below the falls. In 1806 Shannon’s daughter, Catharine, married Thomas Lundy, fourth son of William Lundy of Stamford Township.

Recreational Development and the Lake Erie Shore Photographs,1967

John N. Jackson was born and raised in London England. He served in the Royal Navy, acquired a B.A. and a Ph.D, conducted research for a city planning office and lectured at the University of Manchester. He joined Brock University’s faculty in 1965 as a Professor of Applied Geography. Since his retirement in 1991 he has been Professor Emeritus to Brock. Throughout his time in academia Jackson has focused his research on the history of the modern city, both throughout Europe and Canada. Jackson has also completed specific research on the Niagara Peninsula; including industrial geography, recreation along the Lake Erie shore, St. Catharines early history, the Welland Canals, railway development, comparisons across the Niagara River. While living in the Niagara region Jackson has become involved in many community events. He has been the Director for the Bruce Trail Association, President of the Welland Canals Foundation, and been involved in local historical groups throughout the Niagara region.

Commemorative Medals of the War of 1812, 1963

In the original set, there were 10 medals with inventory numbers 1740-1749. This included Tecumseh, Chief of the Shawnees and construction in 1812 of Fort Prescott in Upper Niagara. These are not included in this collection. The Franklin Mint purchased the Wellings Mint in 1973.

L'utilisation des cellules souches embryonnaires à des fins thérapeutiques

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.) Option recherche"

Egon Bahr, l'Ostpolitik et la place de l'Allemagne dans un nouvel ordre européen, 1945-1975

Cette thèse porte sur les conceptions d’Egon Bahr dans le domaine de la politique à l’Est (Ostpolitik) de la République fédérale d’Allemagne (RFA) entre 1945 et 1975. L’analyse se concentre sur le lien entre l’Ostpolitik et l’idée que Bahr se fait de la place et du rôle de l’Allemagne en Europe. Plus précisément, cette étude veut cerner les buts poursuivis par Bahr dans le cadre de la politique orientale. La première partie traite du développement conceptuel de l’Ostpolitik (1945-1969), tandis que la seconde examine sa mise en application entre l’élection de Willy Brandt comme chancelier de la RFA et la conclusion des accords d’Helsinki (1969-1975). Les principales sources utilisées sont les écrits de Bahr ainsi que des documents inédits se trouvant dans divers centres d’archives non seulement en Allemagne, mais aussi aux États-Unis, en France et en Grande-Bretagne. Pour Bahr, l’Ostpolitik ne saurait se résumer à l’élimination des obstacles qui gênent la diplomatie ouest-allemande durant la guerre froide. Bahr poursuit plutôt un projet nationaliste ambitieux dans le contexte des relations avec le bloc soviétique : créer les conditions d’une redéfinition de la place de l’Allemagne en Europe. Pour lui, l’Ostpolitik constitue un instrument idéal pour faire de l’Allemagne la puissance prépondérante dans un nouvel ordre de paix européen. Trois éléments complémentaires participent à l’accomplissement de cette vision : 1) la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité continentales; 2) la réunification allemande et 3) l’émancipation de la politique étrangère (ouest-)allemande. Cette thèse éclaire la pensée politique de Bahr et contribue à une meilleure compréhension de la signification de l’Ostpolitik dans le contexte plus large de la politique étrangère de la RFA. Les conceptions de Bahr sont uniques dans l’Allemagne de la guerre froide parce qu’elles sont centrées sur les notions de puissance, d’intérêt national et de « normalité ». En même temps, Bahr comprend que la coopération doit toujours rester l’instrument diplomatique privilégié des Allemands vu leur position géographique centrale. À travers le prisme des conceptions de son « architecte », l’Ostpolitik apparaît comme un véritable effort de réconciliation entre la paix en Europe et l’affirmation de l’influence allemande sur la scène internationale.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

La Guerre civile espagnole : l'influence du Québec sur les politiques du gouvernement fédéral

La politique extérieure canadienne en regard de la Guerre civile espagnole fut adoptée en juillet 1937. Le gouvernement canadien adopta une politique de neutralité analogue à celle pilotée par la Grande-Bretagne à travers le Comité de non-intevention. Il promulgua un embargo sur l’exportation d’armes de toutes sortes sur le territoire espagnol, et ce, aux deux belligérants. De plus, avec la Loi sur l’enrôlement à l’étranger, Ottawa criminalisa l’engagement volontaire sur toutes ses formes, plus particulièrement le Bataillon Mackenzie – Papineau, ramification canadienne des Brigades Internationales. Au Québec, cette guerre fut fortement ressentie. Les élites traditionnelles et le clergé catholique anathématisent le Front Populaire espagnol en l’assimilant au communisme soviétique, et se solidarisent avec leurs coreligionnaires espagnols. Selon Ernest Lapointe, bras droit de Mackenzie King au Québec, Ottawa doit tenir compte du courant conservateur chez les Québécois francophones afin de prévenir une crise domestique pouvant avoir des conséquences sur l’unité nationale. Mais la politique étrangère du Canada à l’égard du gouvernement républicain espagnol n’a que partiellement été influencée par la réaction clérico-nationaliste au Québec. Elle est bien davantage le résultat de l’alignement du Canada sur la politique étrangère britannique.

La pensée navale et le débat sur la torpille en Angleterre au cours de la décennie 1880

L’évolution du débat sur la pensée navale en Angleterre de la décennie 1880, suivant la fin d’une période d’intenses changements technologiques dans les marines de guerre est marquée par le déclin d’un mode de réflexion matériel et l’ascension, à partir des années 1885 et 1886, de l’école historique de John Knox Laughton. Selon la méthode matérielle, populaire au cours de la période de transformation technique, la guerre sur mer est entièrement tributaire du Progrès, tandis que, pour les tenants de la méthode historique, des principes et des leçons immuables la régissent. À travers l’évolution de ce débat, on constate l’introduction, par la Jeune École française, d’une perspective matérialiste et de la stratégie navale comme objet de réflexion, et son exploitation par l’école historique anglaise. L’émergence de la stratégie comme sujet de débat coïncide donc avec le triomphe de l’école historique. Croyant que la torpille allait démocratiser la puissance navale en empêchant le belligérant le plus puissant d’user de sa maîtrise des mers, la Jeune École connut un succès fulgurant qui déborda des côtes françaises et atteint l’Angleterre. Néanmoins, les matérialistes anglais, demeurant beaucoup plus modérés que les français, furent finalement marginalisés par une école historique utilisant les exagérations de la Jeune École, dont les insuffisances sont apparues lors des manœuvres de l’été 1886, pour disqualifier entièrement la méthode matérielle. Étudiant les débats du Royal United Service Institution Journal, ce mémoire démontre l’existence, en Angleterre, au cours de la décennie 1880, d’un débat polarisé au contraire d’une historiographie ne montrant que l’ascension des précurseurs de Mahan et de l’école historique.