909 resultados para Finite Operator
Resumo:
The space and time discretization inherent to all FDTD schemesintroduce non-physical dispersion errors, i.e. deviations ofthe speed of sound from the theoretical value predicted bythe governing Euler differential equations. A generalmethodologyfor computing this dispersion error via straightforwardnumerical simulations of the FDTD schemes is presented.The method is shown to provide remarkable accuraciesof the order of 1/1000 in a wide variety of twodimensionalfinite difference schemes.
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The pseudo-spectral time-domain (PSTD) method is an alternative time-marching method to classicalleapfrog finite difference schemes in the simulation of wave-like propagating phenomena. It is basedon the fundamentals of the Fourier transform to compute the spatial derivatives of hyperbolic differential equations. Therefore, it results in an isotropic operator that can be implemented in an efficient way for room acoustics simulations. However, one of the first issues to be solved consists on modeling wallabsorption. Unfortunately, there are no references in the technical literature concerning to that problem. In this paper, assuming real and constant locally reacting impedances, several proposals to overcome this problem are presented, validated and compared to analytical solutions in different scenarios.
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The Pseudo-Spectral Time Domain (PSTD) method is an alternative time-marching method to classical leapfrog finite difference schemes inthe simulation of wave-like propagating phenomena. It is based on the fundamentals of the Fourier transform to compute the spatial derivativesof hyperbolic differential equations. Therefore, it results in an isotropic operator that can be implemented in an efficient way for room acousticssimulations. However, one of the first issues to be solved consists on modeling wall absorption. Unfortunately, there are no references in thetechnical literature concerning to that problem. In this paper, assuming real and constant locally reacting impedances, several proposals toovercome this problem are presented, validated and compared to analytical solutions in different scenarios.
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We introduce several exact nonparametric tests for finite sample multivariatelinear regressions, and compare their powers. This fills an important gap inthe literature where the only known nonparametric tests are either asymptotic,or assume one covariate only.
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Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.
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We will call a game a reachable (pure strategy) equilibria game if startingfrom any strategy by any player, by a sequence of best-response moves weare able to reach a (pure strategy) equilibrium. We give a characterizationof all finite strategy space duopolies with reachable equilibria. Wedescribe some applications of the sufficient conditions of the characterization.
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This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.
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A `next' operator, s, is built on the set R1=(0,1]-{ 1-1/e} defining a partial order that, with the help of the axiom of choice, can be extended to a total order in R1. Besides, the orbits {sn(a)}nare all dense in R1 and are constituted by elements of the samearithmetical character: if a is an algebraic irrational of degreek all the elements in a's orbit are algebraic of degree k; if a istranscendental, all are transcendental. Moreover, the asymptoticdistribution function of the sequence formed by the elements in anyof the half-orbits is a continuous, strictly increasing, singularfunction very similar to the well-known Minkowski's ?(×) function.
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Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when theempirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behaviorstrategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behaviorstrategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization ofempirical equivalence. The central idea is to relate a game's informationstructure to the conditional independencies in the empirical distributionsit generates. We present a new analytical device, the influence opportunitydiagram of a game, describe how such a diagram is constructed for a givenextensive-form game, and demonstrate that it provides a complete summaryof the information needed to test empirical equivalence between two games.
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Many dynamic revenue management models divide the sale period into a finite number of periods T and assume, invoking a fine-enough grid of time, that each period sees at most one booking request. These Poisson-type assumptions restrict the variability of the demand in the model, but researchers and practitioners were willing to overlook this for the benefit of tractability of the models. In this paper, we criticize this model from another angle. Estimating the discrete finite-period model poses problems of indeterminacy and non-robustness: Arbitrarily fixing T leads to arbitrary control values and on the other hand estimating T from data adds an additional layer of indeterminacy. To counter this, we first propose an alternate finite-population model that avoids this problem of fixing T and allows a wider range of demand distributions, while retaining the useful marginal-value properties of the finite-period model. The finite-population model still requires jointly estimating market size and the parameters of the customer purchase model without observing no-purchases. Estimation of market-size when no-purchases are unobservable has rarely been attempted in the marketing or revenue management literature. Indeed, we point out that it is akin to the classical statistical problem of estimating the parameters of a binomial distribution with unknown population size and success probability, and hence likely to be challenging. However, when the purchase probabilities are given by a functional form such as a multinomial-logit model, we propose an estimation heuristic that exploits the specification of the functional form, the variety of the offer sets in a typical RM setting, and qualitative knowledge of arrival rates. Finally we perform simulations to show that the estimator is very promising in obtaining unbiased estimates of population size and the model parameters.
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In this paper, an extension of the multi-scale finite-volume (MSFV) method is devised, which allows to Simulate flow and transport in reservoirs with complex well configurations. The new framework fits nicely into the data Structure of the original MSFV method,and has the important property that large patches covering the whole well are not required. For each well. an additional degree of freedom is introduced. While the treatment of pressure-constraint wells is trivial (the well-bore reference pressure is explicitly specified), additional equations have to be solved to obtain the unknown well-bore pressure of rate-constraint wells. Numerical Simulations of test cases with multiple complex wells demonstrate the ability of the new algorithm to capture the interference between the various wells and the reservoir accurately. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The rules and regulations for owning and operating a motorcycle in Iowa
Impact of partial-thickness tears on supraspinatus tendon strain based on a finite element analysis.
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[spa] Se presenta el operador OWA generalizado inducido (IGOWA). Es un nuevo operador de agregación que generaliza al operador OWA a través de utilizar las principales características de dos operadores muy conocidos como son el operador OWA generalizado y el operador OWA inducido. Entonces, este operador utiliza medias generalizadas y variables de ordenación inducidas en el proceso de reordenación. Con esta formulación, se obtiene una amplia gama de operadores de agregación que incluye a todos los casos particulares de los operadores IOWA y GOWA, y otros casos particulares. A continuación, se realiza una generalización mayor al operador IGOWA a través de utilizar medias cuasi-aritméticas. Finalmente, también se desarrolla un ejemplo numérico del nuevo modelo en un problema de toma de decisiones financieras.