Le opere di urbanizzazione a scomputo degli oneri

Le considerazioni sviluppate in questo scritto si pongono come obiettivo quello di fare chiarezza sul delicato tema delle opere di urbanizzazione a scomputo. La normativa concernente la realizzazione delle opere pubbliche a scomputo totale o parziale degli oneri di urbanizzazione è stata oggetto di svariate modifiche e interpretazioni giurisprudenziali, che si sono susseguite dopo l'importante pronuncia della Corte di Giustizia Europea. E' con questa sentenza che i Giudici del Kirchberg introducono un particolare obbligo procedurale a carico dei privati: nel caso in cui singole opere superino i valori di rilevanza europea, esse devono essere affidate, applicando le procedure di gara previste dalla direttiva 37/93/CEE. Va precisato che sino a quel momento l'affidamento diretto delle opere al privato costituiva nell'ottica del Legislatore lo strumento per realizzare le infrastrutture necessarie per consentire gli insediamenti edilizi che la pubblica amministrazione spesso non era in grado di effettuare. In questo panorama legislativo la sentenza della Corte di Giustizia, appare del tutto dirompente. Infatti, introducendo il principio secondo cui anche la realizzazione diretta delle opere di urbanizzazione da parte del privato deve sottostare alle regole delle procedure europee in materia di appalti, mette inevitabilmente a confronto due normative, quella degli appalti pubblici e quella dell'urbanistica, che sino a quel momento erano riuscite a viaggiare in modo parallelo, senza dar luogo a reciproche sovrapposizioni. Il Legislatore nazionale ha, con molta fatica, recepito il principio comunitario ed è stato negli anni quasi costretto, attraverso una serie di modifiche legislative, ad ampliarne la portata. La presente ricerca, dopo aver analizzato i vari correttivi apportati al Codice degli appalti pubblici vuole, quindi, verificare se l'attuale quadro normativo rappresenti un vero punto di equilibrio tra le contrapposte esigenze di pianificazione del territorio e di rispetto dei principi comunitari di concorrenza nella scelta del contraente.

L'equilibrio istituzionale nell'Unione europea

Il lavoro intende dimostrare che lo sviluppo giurisprudenziale del principio di equilibrio istituzionale, il rapporto tra detto principio e il principio di leale cooperazione, il riconoscimento istituzionale e giurisprudenziale dell’importanza della scelta della base giuridica nella tutela dell’equilibrio istituzionale hanno concorso a determinare la dinamicità dell’evoluzione dell’assetto interistituzionale della Comunità e dell’Unione. Focalizzata l’attenzione sulle nuove basi giuridiche introdotte dal Trattato di Lisbona, sono stati definiti gli assetti del nuovo equilibrio istituzionale analizzando, da un lato, il nuovo quadro istituzionale definito dal titolo III del Trattato sull’Unione europea e, in particolare la “costituzionalizzazione” del principio orizzontale di leale cooperazione. In conclusione, si rileva che con l´entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona le dimensioni politica e giuridica dell’equilibrio istituzionale sono state interessate da due mutamenti di ampia portata. In primo luogo, il completamento del processo di revisione dei trattati apertosi con la dichiarazione di Laeken ha definito un nuovo quadro istituzionale, che si è riflesso in rinnovati meccanismi di funzionamento dell’architettura istituzionale. In secondo luogo, la risposta dell’Unione alla crisi economica e finanziaria ha messo al centro dell’agenda il suo bilancio, la programmazione pluriennale e l’Unione economica. Nel primo caso un’analisi dell’articolo 295 TFUE ha costituito la base di una riflessione sulle modalità di codificazione delle relazioni istituzionali attraverso accordi e sul rapporto tra questi ultimi e il titolo III TUE. Si è rilevata, in particolare, un’incongruenza tra gli obblighi di leale cooperazione orizzontale sanciti dall’articolo 13(2) TUE e gli strumenti finalizzati alla loro istituzionalizzazione. Nel secondo caso, invece, è stato evidenziato come il preminente ruolo del Consiglio europeo, al quale il Trattato di Lisbona ha riconosciuto lo status d'istituzione, abbia modificato gli equilibri, determinando un ritorno del ricorso all’integrazione differenziata rispetto a politiche disciplinate dai Trattati.

Il giudice tributario come giudice europeo

Questo lavoro, tramite un'analisi attenta ed accurata dello sviluppo delle pronunce della Corte di Giustizia in materia tributaria, ha lo scopo di mettere in evidenza i canoni interpretativi utilizzati dalla Corte, tenendo presente gli effetti che tali pronunce hanno prodotto nei singoli stati ed in particolare sul ruolo del giudice tributario come giudice europeo. Assistiamo infatti oggi ad una vera e propria europeizzazione della produzione giuridica in grado di aprire nuovi spiragli alla tutela del cittadino anche nei confronti dell'amministrazione finanziaria. L'interazione, per molti aspetti problematica, tra gli organi di giustizia tributaria dei singoli ordinamenti ed il giudice comunitario sono diventate vera e propria fucina di un diritto tributario europeo, nell'ambito del quale a svolgere un ruolo di estrema rilevanza è il giudice interno. Le sentenze del giudice tributario nazionale infatti rappresentano lo strumento più efficace di chiarificazione del diritto comunitario. Il presente lavoro si propone quindi di esaminare nel dettaglio il rapporto complementare e funzionalista che si estrinseca nella peculiare funzione attribuita al giudice tributario nazionale che gli fa assumere le vesti di "giudice europeo" nonché la funzione attribuita alla Corte di Giustizia che assume i caratteri sempre più marcati di "giudice tributario sovranazionale". Partendo dalla disamina delle figure dei giudici tributari di Germania, Francia ed Italia, si passerà poi ad evidenziare i ruoli che hanno avuto le Corti nazionali nell'applicazione del diritto comunitario, evidenziando come nei vari casi le sentenze si sono affiancate alla preminenza gerarchica della norma europea.

El principio de neutralidad interna en el IVA

La tesis estudia el principio de neutralidad en su vertiente interna y su aplicación efectiva en el IVA. Se centra en los principales aspectos de la configuración jurídica del impuesto: derecho de deducción, exenciones y tipos reducidos. Se realiza en primer lugar una aproximación teórica al principio desde un punto de vista jurídico y también económico. Una vez construido el principio se acomete una comparación de las distintas clases de impuestos indirectos que pueden establecerse y se analiza su cumplimiento del principio de neutralidad fiscal. El énfasis es mayor en los impuestos en cascada, impuestos monofásicos minoristas y en el IVA. El objetivo de la tesis es, por tanto, concretar el contenido del principio, desarrollar sus implicaciones económicas principales y analizar el grado de cumplimiento real de la Directiva IVA. Desde el punto de vista del derecho de deducción y de las exenciones el estudio se apoya en el análisis de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, donde se profundizará en cuestiones como la utilización de bienes de uso mixto, la consideración de costes como directos o generales y las formas de ejercicio del exceso de deducción (devolución y compensación). Además, la tesis muestra las principales excepciones al principio de neutralidad establecidas en la Directiva IVA: prohibiciones al derecho de deducción, exenciones y tipos reducidos. En esta parte también se apoyará el estudio en la jurisprudencia del TJUE, que ha construido en gran medida los criterios de interpretación de estas excepciones. En conclusión, el objetivo de la tesis es medir si la directiva IVA cumple con el principio de neutralidad fiscal, para lo que deberá haberse especificado primero su significado concreto y se habrá debido diferenciar entre sus dos dimensiones: interna y externa.

Il divieto d'abuso del diritto nell'esperienza tributaria europea e tedesca

La tematica dell’abuso del diritto in campo fiscale ha conosciuto, negli ultimi anni, una diffusione particolarmente rilevante. Questo lavoro, dopo una necessaria premessa introduttiva alla problematica, affronta l’abuso del diritto in campo tributario tramite l’analisi degli strumenti classici dell’ermenutica, constatando come si arrivi ad un intreccio tra lo strumento della clausola generale anti-abuso e il principio di divieto d’abuso del diritto sviluppatosi a livello europeo, concretizzazione del più ampio principio dell’effettività del diritto dell’Unione Europea. L’analisi prende a modello, da un lato, la clausola generale anti-abuso tedesca, adottata già nel primo dopoguerra, e le sue diverse modifiche legislative occorse negli anni, e dall’altro, il principio europeo di divieto d’abuso del diritto. L’esame congiunto rivela un cortocircuito interpretativo, posto che il principio europeo espone gli stessi concetti della clausola nazionale tedesca pre riforma, la quale, in seguito, alle sentenze Halifax e Cadbury Schweppes, ha subito un’importante modifica, cosicchè la clausola generale abbisogna ora del princìpio europeo per essere interpretata. La tesi evidenzia, inoltre, come tale circuito sia aggravato anche da tensioni interne alle stesse Istituzioni europee, posto che, nonostante l’esistenza di un principio di elaborazione giurisprudenziale, gli Stati Membri sono stati invitati ad introdurre una clausola generale anti-abuso, la cui formulazione rimanda al principio di divieto d’abuso del diritto elaborato dalla Corte di Giustizia.

La tutela dei lavoratori a tempo determinato in Italia, Francia e Spagna, con spunti per un'analisi comparata

L’attività di ricerca è focalizzata sull’analisi delle normative in materia di contratto di lavoro a termine in Italia, Francia e Spagna. Si tratta di Stati che, al pari del nostro, fanno un grandissimo uso di tale fattispecie, divenuta nei fatti il principale canale di ingresso nel mondo del lavoro, con percentuali complessive di rapporti a tempo determinato anche superiori a quelle italiane. Il confronto con due Paesi a noi vicini da un punto di vista giuridico, culturale e sociale è servito allo scopo di valutare la razionalità e l’opportunità delle profonde modifiche apportate alla disciplina generale da parte del decreto-legge n. 34/2014 (c.d. Decreto Poletti) ed ancora prima dalla riforma del sistema risarcitorio ad opera della legge n. 183/2010. Per ciascun ordinamento sono prese in considerazione le regole finalizzate alla tutela dei diritti dei lavoratori a termine, nonché gli orientamenti giurisprudenziali che hanno contribuito, specie in materia di non discriminazione, ad implementare il livello di protezione della posizione dei lavoratori stessi. Specifica attenzione viene dedicata, inoltre, alla disciplina del pubblico impiego, settore in cui si riscontra spesso un uso distorto delle assunzioni a tempo determinato, come testimoniano le vicende degli agents contractuels francesi e dei lavoratori c.d. indefinidos no fijos de plantilla. La conclusione della tesi è affidata allo studio del contenzioso originato dai tre Stati avanti alla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea, al fine di isolare eventuali momenti di sintesi delle differenze delle rispettive regolamentazioni. L’elemento aggregante che affiora dai dicta del supremo organo di giustizia comunitario è il principio di stabilità dell’impiego, la cui portata generale e trasversale può essere utile al fine di orientare l’attività produttiva e interpretativa delle norme nazionali nella direzione di un’implementazione delle tutele spettanti ai prestatori di lavoro a termine.

Gibt es ein Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht?

Der Beitrag schildert an Beispielen aus der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH), wie sich ausgehend von der Regel, dass jeder Mitgliedstaat das Gemeinschaftsrecht nach eigenem nationalstaatlichen Verwaltungsrecht vollzieht (sog. Vollzugskompetenz der Mitgliedstaaten) in den letzten Jahren gleichwohl Ansätze eines gemeinsamen Europäischen Verwaltungsrechts entwickelt haben. Hierbei werden zunächst die Wirkungsweisen des Effektivitätsgebotes und des Diskriminierungsverbotes erläutert, die als Grund legende Prinzipen dem nationalen Verwaltungsvollzug zugrunde liegen müssen. Daneben erläutert der Beitrag als weitere systematische Grundstrukturen, die für eine gleichmäßige Anwendung des Verwaltungsrechts in allen Mitgliedstaaten kennzeichnend sind, exemplarisch den Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit, den Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes und den Grundsatz der Rechtssicherheit. Im Fazit konstatiert der Verfasser eine durch den EuGH forcierte Rechtsfortbildung, die sich deutlich in Richtung auf ein sich ständig verdichtendes Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht weiterentwickelt.

Software als Schutzgegenstand des Europäischen Urheberrechts

After 20 years of silence, two recent references from the Czech Republic (Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace, Case C-393/09) and from the English High Court (SAS Institute, Case C-406/10) touch upon several questions that are fundamental for the extent of copyright protection for software under the Computer Program Directive 91/25 (now 2009/24) and the Information Society Directive 2001/29. In Case C-393/09, the European Court of Justice held that “the object of the protection conferred by that directive is the expression in any form of a computer program which permits reproduction in different computer languages, such as the source code and the object code.” As “any form of expression of a computer program must be protected from the moment when its reproduction would engender the reproduction of the computer program itself, thus enabling the computer to perform its task,” a graphical user interface (GUI) is not protected under the Computer Program Directive, as it does “not enable the reproduction of that computer program, but merely constitutes one element of that program by means of which users make use of the features of that program.” While the definition of computer program and the exclusion of GUIs mirror earlier jurisprudence in the Member States and therefore do not come as a surprise, the main significance of Case C-393/09 lies in its interpretation of the Information Society Directive. In confirming that a GUI “can, as a work, be protected by copyright if it is its author’s own intellectual creation,” the ECJ continues the Europeanization of the definition of “work” which began in Infopaq (Case C-5/08). Moreover, the Court elaborated this concept further by excluding expressions from copyright protection which are dictated by their technical function. Even more importantly, the ECJ held that a television broadcasting of a GUI does not constitute a communication to the public, as the individuals cannot have access to the “essential element characterising the interface,” i.e., the interaction with the user. The exclusion of elements dictated by technical functions from copyright protection and the interpretation of the right of communication to the public with reference to the “essential element characterising” the work may be seen as welcome limitations of copyright protection in the interest of a free public domain which were not yet apparent in Infopaq. While Case C-393/09 has given a first definition of the computer program, the pending reference in Case C-406/10 is likely to clarify the scope of protection against nonliteral copying, namely in how far the protection extends beyond the text of the source code to the design of a computer program and where the limits of protection lie as regards the functionality of a program and mere “principles and ideas.” In light of the travaux préparatoires, it is submitted that the ECJ is also likely to grant protection for the design of a computer program, while excluding both the functionality and underlying principles and ideas from protection under the European copyright directives.

Oblivion, Erasure and Forgetting in the Digital Age

In light of the recent European Court of Justice ruling (ECJ C-131/12, Google Spain v Spanish Data Protection Agency),the “right to be forgotten” has once again gained worldwide media attention. Already in 2012, whenthe European Commission proposed aright to be forgotten,this proposal received broad public interest and was debated intensively. Under certain conditions, individuals should thereby be able todelete personal data concerning them. More recently – in light of the European Parliament’s approval of the LIBE Committee’samendments onMarch 14, 2014 – the concept seems tobe close to its final form.Although it remains, for the most part,unchanged from the previously circulated drafts, it has beenre-labelled as a“right of erasure”. This article argues that, despite its catchy terminology, the right to be forgotten can be understood as a generic term, bringing together existing legal provisions: the substantial right of oblivion and the rather procedural right to erasure derived from data protection. Hereinafter, the article presents an analysis of selected national legal frameworks and corresponding case law, accounting for data protection, privacy, and general tort law as well as defamation law. This comparative analysis grasps the practical challenges which the attempt to strengthen individual control and informational self-determination faces. Consequently, it is argued that narrowing the focus on the data protection law amendments neglects the elaborate balancing of conflicting interests in European legal tradition. It is shown thatthe attemptto implement oblivion, erasure and forgetting in the digital age is a complex undertaking.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for services. Research Papers in Law, 6/2007

Introduction. The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ is not that little. In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory instrument (conclusion: para. 3).

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011

The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its Solange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history.

Flashlight Europe N°5–June 2015. OMT is Monetary Policy and Not Economic Policy

In January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court submitted several questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg and asked for a preliminary ruling. The questions had arisen within the framework of the OMT case, and the issue was whether or not the OMT (“outright monetary transactions”) programme announced by Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank (ECB), is in compliance with the law of the European Union. The OMT programme (which has be-come well-known because Draghi said “what-ever it takes to preserve the euro” when he unveiled it) plays an important role in the stabilization of the euro area. It means that the European System of Central Banks will be empowered to engage in unlimited buying of government bonds issued by certain Member States if and as long as these Member States are simultaneously taking part in a European rescue or reform programme (under the EFSF ot the ESM). Hitherto the OMT has not been implemented. Nonetheless a suit contesting its legality was filed with the Federal Constitutional Court. The European Court of Justice now had to decide whether or not the activities of the ECB were in compliance with European law. How-ever, the ECJ had to take into account the prior assessment of the Federal Constitutional Court. In its submission the Federal Constitutional Court made it quite clear that it was of the opinion that there has been a violation of European law. But at the same time it did not exclude the possibility that the ECJ set up legal conditions for OMT in order to avoid a violation of European law.