A Critique of Authenticity and Recognition

While forms of ethics based upon authenticity and recognition are holding sway in contemporary philosophical debates (Ferrara, Honneth, Fraser, etc.), many of the implications of both processes – conceptual, moral, political – are still insufficiently reflected upon. The talk will offer a “critique” (in the Kantian sense) of both, based upon an analysis of the “semiotics” of authenticity and the resulting perpetuation of a regime of authority of experts, as well as commenting upon the striking absence of the realm of literature and the arts from this debate, except in some references to a rather abstract notion of Aesthetics. It will also critically revaluate the concept of agency implicit in an ethics of authenticity and recognition.

New Sites, New Challenges? Ethical and Methodological Questions in the Context of Research on Migration Exclusion

The challenges of research ethics and methodologies have been reflected on extensively, but – aside from the context of feminist methodologies – less so in relation to research on particular migration sites such as in transit, detention centres, at the borders or within migration administration. First attempts in this direction have been made (Düvell et al. 2010, Fresia et al. 2005, Riedner 2014, van Liempt/Bilger2009), however, more reflection and theorization is needed, considering the contested nature of these temporal and volatile sites. In this workshop, we thus aim at examining methodological as well as ethical questions that arise during field work: We attempt to reflect the power relations involved in the research process, the ethics of research design, the dissemination of research results, the question of gaining access to and – whenever necessary – staying in contact with our research subjects. How can we negotiate informed consent with subjects whose life is currently marked by transit and insecurity concerning their own future, and who are in an uncertain situation in which substantial information (legal, social, cultural etc.) is likely to be missing? How do we deal with the dilemma of possibly contributing to knowledge production that might facilitate removals and deportations in the future, considering that the reception of the results is not in the hands of the researchers? How do we deal with the anticipated as well as unexpected impacts of our research on social and political practice? Regarding fieldwork in state institutions, how do we negotiate the multiple loyalties we often find ourselves faced with as social researchers, both with the excluded migrants and with the authorities implementing the exclusions – two groupings considered to be opposite to each other (Lavanchy 2013)? Which different roles do researchers need to take on? The aim of our workshop is first and foremost to exchange experiences on fieldwork with others doing qualitative research on related topics and to consider its possible implications – including affective dimensions – for all participants involved in the research process: the migrants, the security staff of detention centres, its social workers, border police and bureaucrats and, last but not least, the researchers themselves. Furthermore, we generally wish to reflect upon the question of how best to conduct research in this contested field, applying an interdisciplinary perspective.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 640 - "Simmel and Freudian Philosophy", "Authoritarianism and the Family Today" und "The Chances of Democracy in Germany" (p. IX 18.1-3-IX 19a)

"Simmel and Freudian Philosophy" (GS 5, S. 396-405); 1. Nachruf, verlesen beim Memorial Meeting for Ernst Simmel; datiert: 13.12.1947; veröffentlicht in: International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 29. Jahrgang, 1948, S. 110-113; 2. Abschrift aus Werken und Briefen Siegmund Freuds; Typoskript, 9 Blatt; 3. Freeman, Burriel: 1 Brief mit Unterschirft an Max Horkheimer, Chicago, 10.06.1949; 1 Brief von Max Horkheimer, Los Angeles, 15.06.1949, 2 Blatt; "Authoritarianism and the Family Today" (GS 5, S. 377-395); 1. Aufsatz, datiert 1947, veröffentlicht in: Ruth Nanda Anshen (editor), "The Family: Its Function and Distiny", New York 1949. a) Typsokript, 20 Blatt b) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt c) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 20 Blatt d)-f) deutsche Fassung mit dem Titel "Autorität und Familie", übersetzt vom Institut für Sozialforschung, 1960; veröffentlicht in : "Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Festschrift für Theodor Litt", Düsseldorft, 1960 d) Typoskript, 20 Blatt e) Typoskript, 20 Blatt f) Korrekturfahnen aus der Litt- Festschrift, mit dem Titel "Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart"; 6 Blatt; 2. Schönbach, Peter: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Max Horkheier, ohne Ort, 23.06.1960; 1 Blatt; 3. Schönbach, Peter: 1 Brief mit Unterschrift an Friedrich Pollock, ohne Ort, 22.06.1960; 1 Blatt; "The Chances of Democracy in Germany" (GS 12, S. 184-194); 1947 [?] a) Typoskript, 10 Blatt b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 11 Blatt c) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen ,11 Blatt;

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Death Threat Letters: Allegories of American Authorship in the Age of Terrorism

This dissertation examines novels that use terrorism to allegorize the threatened position of the literary author in contemporary culture. Allegory is a term that has been differently understood over time, but which has consistently been used by writers to articulate and construct their roles as authors. In the novels I look at, the terrorist challenge to authorship results in multiple deployments of allegory, each differently illustrating the way that allegory is used and authorship constructed in the contemporary American novel. Don DeLillo’s Mao II (1991), first puts terrorists and authors in an oppositional pairing. The terrorist’s ability to traffic in spectacle is presented as indicative of the author’s fading importance in contemporary culture and it is one way that terrorism allegorizes threats to authorship. In Philip Roth’s Operation Shylock (1993), the allegorical pairing is between the text of the novel and outside texts – newspaper reports, legal cases, etc. – that the novel references and adapts in order to bolster its own narrative authority. Richard Powers’s Plowing the Dark (1999) pairs the story of an imprisoned hostage, craving a single book, with employees of a tech firm who are creating interactive, virtual reality artworks. Focusing on the reader’s experience, Powers’s novel posits a form of authorship that the reader can take into consideration, but which does not seek to control the experience of the text. Finally, I look at two of Paul Auster’s twenty-first century novels, Travels in the Scriptorium (2007) and Man in the Dark (2008), to suggest that the relationship between representations of authors and terrorists changed after 9/11. Auster’s author-figures forward an ethics of authorship whereby novels can use narrative to buffer readers against the portrayal of violent acts in a culture that is suffused with traumatizing imagery.

Spinoza; a handbook to the Ethics,

Half-title: Ethics of Spinoza.

Present day tracts on the non-Christian philosophies of the age,

W. G. Blaikie: Christianity and secularism compared in their influence and effects.--N. Porter: Agnosticism.--W. F. Wilkinson: Modern materialism.--J. Iverach: The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer examined.--J. R. Thomson: Modern pessimism.--J. R.Thomson: Utilitarianism.--J. R. Thomson: Auguste Comte.--J. Iverach: The ethics of evolution examined.

Ethics interpretations /

Mode of access: Internet.

The works of John Ruskin.

v. 1-4. Modern painters.-v.5-6. The stones of Venice.-v.7. Seven lamps of architecture. Lectures on architecture and painting. The study of architecture. Poetry of architecture.-v.8. Two paths ... on art. Lectures on art. Political economy of art. Pre-Raphaelitism. Notes on the construction of sheepfolds. King of the golden river.-v.9. Elements of drawing. Elements of perspective. Aratra pentelici.-v.10. Ariadne Florentina. Fors clavigera.-v.11. Sesame and lilies. Ethics of the dust. Crown of wild olive. Queen of the air.-v.12. Time and tide. Unto this last. Munera pulveris. Eagle's nest.

Mass and class; a survey of social divisions,

Preface.--The lesson from history.--Classes and the class struggle.--Classes and class functions.--Class ethics.--Ethics of the producers.--Ethics of the traders.--The reign of graft.--The failure of the trading class.--Index.

Investigating the dilemmas of ethical social research

The author’s work with a university ethics committee and field research in Pacific New Caledonia is used as a basis to problematise the biomedical research models used by universities in Australia for assessing social research as ethical. The article explores how culturally specific Western emotional bases for ethical decisions are often unexamined. It expresses concerns about gaps in biomedical models by linking the author’s description of field interactions with research participants to debates about the creation of knowledge.

Supreme Emergencies and the protection of non-combatants in war

Is it ever justifiable to target non-combatants deliberately? This article assesses Michael Walzer's claim that the deliberate targeting of non-combatants may be justifiable during 'supreme emergencies', a view that has received some support but that has elicited little debate. It argues that the supreme emergencies exception to the prohibition on targeting non-combatants is problematic for at least four reasons. First, its utilitarianism contradicts Walzer's wider ethics of war based on a conception of human rights. Second, the exception may undermine the principle of non-combatant immunity. Third, it is based on a historical fallacy. Finally, it is predicated on a strategic fallacy-the idea that killing noncombatants can win wars. The case for rejecting the exception, however, has been opposed by those who persuasively argue that it is wrong to tie leaders' hands when they confront supreme emergencies. The final part of the article addresses this question and suggests that the principle of proportionality may give political leaders room for manoeuvre in supreme emergencies without permitting them deliberately to target non-combatants.

The ethics pyramid: Making ethics unavoidable in the public relations process

To move from the realm of good intent to verifiable practice, ethics needs to be approached in the same way as any other desired outcome of the public relations process: that is, operationalized and evaluated at each stage of a public relations campaign. A pyramid model—the "ethics pyramid" —is useful for incorporating ethical reflection and evaluation processes into the standard structure of a typical public relations plan. Practitioners can use it to integrate and manage ethical intent, means, and ends, by setting ethics objectives, considering the ethics of each campaign tactic, and reporting whether ethical outcomes have been attained.

Governmentality and 'fearless speech': framing the education of asylum seeker and refugee children in Australia

This paper considers the educational provision for, and general treatment of, refugee and asylum seeker children in Australia, using a framework of governmentality. The paper describes the regimes of practices which govern refugees and asylum seekers in Australia, including mandatory detention and a complex set of visa categorisations, and considers their consequences for the educational provision for children. It addresses three questions: How is it possible that the rights of children have been rendered invisible in and by a democratic state? How are repressive and even violent practices normalised in a liberal state, so that ordinary citizens show so little concern about them? And what should our response be as educators and intellectuals? In conclusion, it explores Foucault's notions of ethics and fearless speech (parrhesia) as a basis for an ethics of engagement in education.