The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

The debates on citizenship in Morocco. Social movements and constitutional reform. EUSpring Working Paper No. 4, 11 August 2015

Introduction. The current debates on citizenship in Morocco are taking place in a political context marked by the events of the Arab Spring. How are political, social, legal, and identity-related dimensions of citizenship formulated in the context of a monarchy that has a long continuity in Moroccan history?

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

The Silent Reform of Swiss Federalism: The New Constitutional Articles on Education

This article examines the decision-making process leading to the new constitutional articles on education in Switzerland. It analyzes how actors from both state levels (Confederation and cantons) could reach consensus in a process that was prone to a "joint-decision trap". To that end, we hypothesize which factors may be conducive to a "problem-solving" style of policy-making in a compulsory negotiation system. Rich empirical material from various sources supports our theoretical arguments: We show that shared beliefs and a common frame of reference, the procedural separation between constitutional and distributional issues, neutral brokers, and informal structures were all beneficial to the success of the reform project.

O direito ao próprio direito: modelos latino-americanos de autonomia política indígena

O objetivo deste trabalho é saber se o direito indigenista, como denominarei o direito estatal que diz respeito aos povos indígenas, reconhece a legitimidade do direito indígena, como denominarei o direito produzido pelos povos indígenas, nas experiências colombiana, boliviana e brasileira. A escolha da Bolívia se justifica pelo fato de as Constituições recentes deste país e do Equador serem consideradas um novo marco do constitucionalismo pluralista ao refundarem suas ordens buscando superar a ausência indígena constituinte. Já a Colômbia se destaca entre os países que, sob a influência recente do Convênio 169, incorporaram expressamente o pluralismo jurídico em suas Constituições. A jurisprudência produzida pela Corte Constitucional do país a respeito do direito indígena é considerada exemplar e inspiradora dos desenvolvimentos mais recentes na Bolívia. O trabalho está voltado para dois aspectos do tema: a autonomia jurisdicional, ou a capacidade para julgar conflitos conforme as normas e procedimentos próprios, e os mecanismos de controle de tais decisões. A metodologia do trabalho abrange revisão bibliográfica, seleção e análise documental de decisões judiciais e textos legais. Argumento que a acomodação de autonomias políticas e ordens jurídicas de diferentes culturas depende da criação de meta-instituições e metarregras que solucionem conflitos e promovam a coordenação entre os direitos, permitindo que os grupos se relacionem de maneira equitativa, controlem a dinâmica de suas identidades culturais e se sintam parte de uma mesma comunidade política. A prática das instituições brasileiras, no entanto, está muito mais voltada a aplicar o direito estatal aos índios do que a exercer controle sobre o direito indígena, o que indica que o paradigma da assimilação prevalece sobre eventuais concepções multiculturais de Estado e sociedade, ainda que o direito legislado apresente regras que reconhecem o pluralismo jurídico. Em outras palavras, as instituições estatais enxergam os indígenas como pessoas que percorrem o caminho da incapacidade jurídica à capacidade plena à medida em que se familiarizam com a cultura dominante, e não como pessoas que podem transitar entre diferentes ordens jurídicas. Por outro lado, a experiência recente de países latino-americanos que se abriram ao pluralismo jurídico mostra um caminho difícil e repleto de questões em aberto. As que mais se destacam são a possibilidade de violações de direitos humanos por autoridades indígenas e a tensão entre centralização política e autonomia política. Em relação ao primeiro caso, o aspecto crucial é saber quem deve julgar as violações e sob quais critérios, além de evitar decisões culturalmente enviesadas. Já o segundo caso depende da superação de traços autoritários relacionados ao governo central e da predominância das estruturas estatais já consolidadas, tanto no nível central quanto no nível local, sobre as instituições mantidas pelos povos indígenas. Ainda há um descompasso entre o discurso constitucional de igualdade entre as ordens jurídicas e a prática de subordinação das ordens indígenas às instâncias estatais.

Memorandum on the impact of the First Amendment to the Constitution upon Federal aid to education : Memorandum on the Constitutional authority of the Congress to enact S. 1021. Federal programs under which institutions with religious affiliation receive Federal funds through grants or loans.

Documents prepared by the Department's legal staff in response to the request of Senator Morse, Chairman, Subcommittee on Education, committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Constitutional reason of state : the survival of the constitutional order /

Includes bibliographical references and index.