807 resultados para Competitive price
Resumo:
For the development of laboratory experiments on the competitive interacitons between freshwater snail populations, special snail rooms were set up in the main building of the Research Center "Aggeu Magalhães". In the current paper, the first of a series on this subject, the general methodology of the laboratory work is described in detail. Using indoor cement channels in which a uniform seminatural environment was created, interactions of freshwater snail populations can be studied with minimal interference of the usual variables. Controlled indoor environmental techniques, as described in the current paper, may also be utilized in different types of experiments in malacology, and represent a substantial technical advance in malacological work.
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Experiments reported in the current paper, carried out under semi-field conditions created in the laboratory, have shown that b. straminea has competitive superiority when compared with B. glabrata. The former species has shown higher capabilities of both dispersal and vagility. In addition, B. straminea was able to compete sucessfully with B. glabrata.
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Biomphalaria glabrata and B. straminea were submitted to an out-door laboratory experiment for testing their comparative ability to resist desiccation. Results have shown that B. straminea is significantly higher resistant than B. glabrata. After five months under such distressing condition the survival ratios were: B. glabrata 8.1 per cent and B. straminea 18.4 per cent.
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We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
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The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a result product variety is far below the efficient level.
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Abiotic factors are considered strong drivers of species distribution and assemblages. Yet these spatial patterns are also influenced by biotic interactions. Accounting for competitors or facilitators may improve both the fit and the predictive power of species distribution models (SDMs). We investigated the influence of a dominant species, Empetrum nigrum ssp. hermaphroditum, on the distribution of 34 subordinate species in the tundra of northern Norway. We related SDM parameters of those subordinate species to their functional traits and their co-occurrence patterns with E. hermaphroditum across three spatial scales. By combining both approaches, we sought to understand whether these species may be limited by competitive interactions and/or benefit from habitat conditions created by the dominant species. The model fit and predictive power increased for most species when the frequency of occurrence of E. hermaphroditum was included in the SDMs as a predictor. The largest increase was found for species that 1) co-occur most of the time with E. hermaphroditum, both at large (i.e. 750 m) and small spatial scale (i.e. 2 m) or co-occur with E. hermaphroditum at large scale but not at small scale and 2) have particularly low or high leaf dry matter content (LDMC). Species that do not co-occur with E. hermaphroditum at the smallest scale are generally palatable herbaceous species with low LDMC, thus showing a weak ability to tolerate resource depletion that is directly or indirectly induced by E. hermaphroditum. Species with high LDMC, showing a better aptitude to face resource depletion and grazing, are often found in the proximity of E. hermaphroditum. Our results are consistent with previous findings that both competition and facilitation structure plant distribution and assemblages in the Arctic tundra. The functional and co-occurrence approaches used were complementary and provided a deeper understanding of the observed patterns by refinement of the pool of potential direct and indirect ecological effects of E. hermaphroditum on the distribution of subordinate species. Our correlative study would benefit being complemented by experimental approaches.
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Data on the interaction between populations of closely related species of Biomphalaria, B. glabrata and B. straminea, are presented in the current paper. Laboratory and field observations and experiments have shown that B. straminea has competitive advantages over B. glabrata.
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This article provides a fresh methodological and empirical approach for assessing price level convergence and its relation to purchasing power parity (PPP) using annual price data for seventeen US cities. We suggest a new procedure that can handle a wide range of PPP concepts in the presence of multiple structural breaks using all possible pairs of real exchange rates. To deal with cross-sectional dependence, we use both cross-sectional demeaned data and a parametric bootstrap approach. In general, we find more evidence for stationarity when the parity restriction is not imposed, while imposing parity restriction provides leads toward the rejection of the panel stationar- ity. Our results can be embedded on the view of the Balassa-Samuelson approach, but where the slope of the time trend is allowed to change in the long-run. The median half-life point estimate are found to be lower than the consensus view regardless of the parity restriction.
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Mazocraeoides georgei price, 1936 and mazocraeoides opisthonema Hargis, 1955 are reported for the first time in Brazil in Brevoortia aurea (Spix, 1829) and in Harengula clupeola (Cuvier, 1829) respectively, clupeid fishes from the littoral of Rio de janeiro State, which represent new host records. Mazocraeoides olentangiensis Sroufe, 1958 and mazocraeoides hargisi Price, 1961 are considered new synonyms for Mazocraeoides georgei.
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Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).
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In recent years there has been extensive debate in the energy economics and policy literature on the likely impacts of improvements in energy efficiency. This debate has focussed on the notion of rebound effects. Rebound effects occur when improvements in energy efficiency actually stimulate the direct and indirect demand for energy in production and/or consumption. This phenomenon occurs through the impact of the increased efficiency on the effective, or implicit, price of energy. If demand is stimulated in this way, the anticipated reduction in energy use, and the consequent environmental benefits, will be partially or possibly even more than wholly (in the case of ‘backfire’ effects) offset. A recent report published by the UK House of Lords identifies rebound effects as a plausible explanation as to why recent improvements in energy efficiency in the UK have not translated to reductions in energy demand at the macroeconomic level, but calls for empirical investigation of the factors that govern the extent of such effects. Undoubtedly the single most important conclusion of recent analysis in the UK, led by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) is that the extent of rebound and backfire effects is always and everywhere an empirical issue. It is simply not possible to determine the degree of rebound and backfire from theoretical considerations alone, notwithstanding the claims of some contributors to the debate. In particular, theoretical analysis cannot rule out backfire. Nor, strictly, can theoretical considerations alone rule out the other limiting case, of zero rebound, that a narrow engineering approach would imply. In this paper we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to investigate the conditions under which rebound effects may occur in the Scottish regional and UK national economies. Previous work has suggested that rebound effects will occur even where key elasticities of substitution in production are set close to zero. Here, we carry out a systematic sensitivity analysis, where we gradually introduce relative price sensitivity into the system, focusing in particular on elasticities of substitution in production and trade parameters, in order to determine conditions under which rebound effects become a likely outcome. We find that, while there is positive pressure for rebound effects even where (direct and indirect) demand for energy is very price inelastic, this may be partially or wholly offset by negative income and disinvestment effects, which also occur in response to falling energy prices.
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Much of the literature on optimal monetary policy uses models in which the degree of nominal price flexibility is exogenous. There are, however, good reasons to suppose that the degree of price flexibility adjusts endogenously to changes in monetary conditions. This paper extends the standard New Keynesian model to incorporate an endogenous degree of price flexibility. The model shows that endogenising the degree of price flexibility tends to shift optimal monetary policy towards complete inflation stabilisation, even when shocks take the form of cost-push disturbances. This contrasts with the standard result obtained in models with exogenous price flexibility, which show that optimal monetary policy should allow some degree of inflation volatility in order to stabilise the welfarerelevant output gap.
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We consider entry of additional firms into the market for a single commodity in which both sellers and buyers are permitted to interact strategically. We show that the market is quasi-competitive, in that the inclusion of an additional seller lowers the price and increases the volume of trade, as expected. However, whilst buyers benefit from this change under reasonable conditions on preferences, we cannot conclude that sellers are always made worse off in the face of more intense competition, contrary to the conventional wisdom. We characterize the conditions under which entry by new sellers may raise the equilibrium profit of existing sellers, which will depend in an intuitive way on the elasticity of a strategic analog of demand and the market share of existing sellers, and encompass completely standard economic environments.
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In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games
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The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships remains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.