U.S. Farm Policy and the Variability of Commodity Prices and Farm Revenues, February 2000

A dynamic, three-commodity rational-expectations storage model is used to compare the impact of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 with a freemarket policy and with the agricultural policies that preceded the FAIR Act. Results support the hypothesis that the changes made when FAIR was enacted did not lead to permanent significant increases in the volatility of farm prices or revenues. An important finding is that the main economic impacts of the Pre-FAIR scenario, relative to the free-market regime were to transfer income to farmers and to substitute government storage for private storage in a way that did little to support prices or to stabilize farm incomes.

How Much “Safety” Is Available under the U.S. Proposal to the WTO?, November 2005

Critics of the U.S. proposal to the World Trade Organization (WTO) made in October 2005 are correct when they argue that adoption of the proposal would significantly reduce available support under the current farm program structure. Using historical prices and yields from 1980 to 2004, we estimate that loan rates would have to drop by 9 percent and target prices would have to drop by 10 percent in order to meet the proposed aggregate Amber Box and Blue Box limits. While this finding should cheer those who think that reform of U.S. farm programs is long overdue, it alarms those who want to maintain a strong safety net for U.S. agriculture. The dilemma of needing to reform farm programs while maintaining a strong safety net could be resolved by redesigning programs so that they target revenue rather than price. Building on a base of 70 percent Green Box income insurance, a program that provides a crop-specific revenue guarantee equal to 98 percent of the product of the current effective target price and expected county yield would fit into the proposed aggregate Amber and Blue Box limits. Payments would be triggered whenever the product of the season-average price and county average yield fell below this 98 percent revenue guarantee. Adding the proposed crop-specific constraints lowers the coverage level to 95 percent. Moving from programs that target price to ones that target revenue would eliminate the rationale for ad hoc disaster payments. Program payments would automatically arrive whenever significant crop losses or economic losses caused by low prices occurred. Also, much of the need for the complicated mechanism (the Standard Reinsurance Agreement) that transfers most risk of the U.S. crop insurance to the federal government would be eliminated because the federal government would directly assume the risk through farm programs. Changing the focus of federal farm programs from price targeting to revenue targeting would not be easy. Farmers have long relied on price supports and the knowledge that crop losses are often adequately covered by heavily subsidized crop insurance or by ad hoc disaster payments. Farmers and their leaders would only be willing to support a change to revenue targeting if they see that the current system is untenable in an era of tight federal budgets and WTO limits.

Carte générale de la Turquie d'Europe à la droite du danube ou des beglerbegliks de Roum Jli, Bosna et Morée : dressée d'après les meilleurs observations astronomiques, itinéraires, cartes particulières, & reconnaissances existantes jusqu'à ce jour / par F. Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, ... ; K. Wimberger graviert ; die Gebürge gravirt v. I. Päringer ; In Stein gravirt von A. Falger u:L. Zertahelly in München ; beschrieben und die Gebirge gravirt v. L. Zertahelly

Échelle(s) : [1:1 337 000 environ], Lieues de France, de 25 au degré, 30 [= 9,8 cm]

Übersichts-Charte des Kriegs-Schauplatzes in der europäischen u. asiatischen Türkey / gestochen von A. Hammer

Échelle(s) : [1:2 921 000 environ], Teutsche Meilen, 60 [= 7,3 cm]

Explotació vitivinícola El Quintà S.L.U.

El nostre treball consisteix en assessorar a un jove enginyer agrònom, que vol crear una empresa vinícola a Hostalets d’en Bas, situat a la comarca de la Garrotxa. La masia on vol dur a terme el projecte és al Mas Tarrés. La nostra finalitat és estudiar la viabilitat econòmica de l’empresa anomenada El Quintà. Aquesta produirà vi negre per a la seva comercialitzacióen un sector del mercat.L’objectiu que busca el nostre client amb la creació d’aquesta empresa és aconseguir elaborar un vi negre, de la varietat Cabernet Sauvignon, que formi part del conjunt de productes típics de la comarca de la Garrotxa, coneguts amb el nom de “Cuina Volcànica”.D’aquesta manera vol arribar a satisfer les necessitats dels diferents consumidors.Com a assessores ens hem adonat que el projecte inicial no era viable. Per aquest motiu hem proposat al nostre client una sèrie de millores per intentar que el seu projecte empresarial tingui futur. Quines han estat aquestes millores? Hem aconseguit que el projecte tingui sortida? Per respondre aquests interrogants hem calculat tots els costos necessaris als que s’enfrontarà el client, tant en el projecte original com en el projecte amb les millores, tot comparant els resultats comptables obtinguts.Per acabar, ¿Quant costa produir una ampolla de vi? Aquesta és una bona pregunta que ens hem fet, per saber si el preu del vi produït, amb les seves característiques particulars, podria competir amb la resta de vins existents al mercat.

U.S. Universities’ Net Returns from Patenting and Licensing: A Quantile Regression Analysis, September 2006

In line with the rights and incentives provided by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, U.S. universities have increased their involvement in patenting and licensing activities through their own technology transfer offices. Only a few U.S. universities are obtaining large returns, however, whereas others are continuing with these activities despite negligible or negative returns. We assess the U.S. universities’ potential to generate returns from licensing activities by modeling and estimating quantiles of the distribution of net licensing returns conditional on some of their structural characteristics. We find limited prospects for public universities without a medical school everywhere in their distribution. Other groups of universities (private, and public with a medical school) can expect significant but still fairly modest returns only beyond the 0.9th quantile. These findings call into question the appropriateness of the revenue-generating motive for the aggressive rate of patenting and licensing by U.S. universities.