Folio from a Qur'an Manuscript

11 47/64 in.x 8 47/64 in.; ink, opaque watercolor and gold on paper

Bahram Gur and the Indian Princess in the Dark Palace on Saturday", Folio 23v from a Haft Paikar (Seven Portraits) of the Khamsa (Quintet) of Nizam

Manuscript, Islamic, Timurid; 8 1/2 in.x 4 39/64 in. (image); ink, opaque watercolor and gold on paper

Khusrau Seated on his Throne", Folio from a Khamsa (Quintet) of Nizam

Shaikh Zada; 1 ft. 41/64 in.x 8 21/32 in.; opaque watercolor, gold and ink on paper

Funeral Procession", Folio 35r from a Mantiq al-tair (Language of the Birds

1 ft. 7 1/4 in.x 1 ft. 2 1/4 in.; opaque watercolor, silver, and gold on paper on paper

Foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations for 2007 : hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, second session /

Shipping list no.: 2006-0243-P (pt. 1A), 2006-0276-P (pt. 1B), 2006-0329-P (pt. 2), 2006-0315-P (pt. 3), 2007-0101-P (pt. 4).

Shades of CORDS in the Kush : the false hope of "unity of effort" in American counterinsurgency /

"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--P. iii.

A collection of treaties, engagements, and sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries.

V.1. United Provinces, Oudh, Bengal, Central Provinces.-- v.5. Central Indian Agency.--v.6. Bombay presidency.-- v.8. Baroda, Punjab.-- v.11. Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Jammu, Kashmir, Eastern Turkistan, Afghanistan.-- v.13. Turkish Arabia, Aden, South Coast of Arabia, Somaliland, R. Shoa, Zanzibar

Stupa 2, excavated artifact, The Bimaran Reliquary

Bimaran, Darunta, Afghanistan; 2 9/16 in.x 2 19/32 in.; gold with garnets

Stupa 2, excavated artifact, The Bimaran Reliquary

Bimaran, Darunta, Afghanistan; 2 9/16 in.x 2 19/32 in.; repoussé, gold and garnets

Treaties and other international agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949.

v. 1. Multilateral, 1776-1917.--v. 2. Multilateral, 1918-1930.--v. 3. Multilateral, 1931-1945.--v. 4. Multilateral, 1946-1949.--v. 5. Afghanistan-Burma.--v. 6. Canada-Czechoslovakia.--v. 7. Denmark-France.--v. 8. Germany-Iran.--v. 9. Iraq-Muscat.--v. 10. Nepal-Peru.--v. 11. Philippines-United Arab Republic.--v. 12. United Kingdom--Zanzibar.--v. 13. General index.

Tracing Hybrid Collectives of Illness, War, and Medicine in Twentieth- and Twenty-First Century Narratives of Illness

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Australia's relationship with the United States: The case for greater independence

A number of recent events-especially attempts to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement and Australia's participation in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq(1)-have thrown Australia's relationship with the United States into sharp relief. While this relationship has historically enjoyed strong bilateral endorsement, such uncritical support is beginning to unravel. At the very least, the relationship is being subjected to a renewed, more critical scrutiny. This paper argues that a dispassionate analysis of the relationship is appropriate and overdue. Not only are the benefits that accrue to 'Australia' from the relationship debateable, even when judged within the limited calculus of the 'national interest', but Australia's uncritical support for US foreign policy is also helping to entrench potentially damaging aspects of American foreign policy and somewhat ironically-undermining the legitimacy of its pre-eminent 'hegemonic' position.

American hegemony: the view from Australia

Australia and the United States have been extremely close allies since World War II. The engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have continued this tradition. Yet even before the bombings in Bali and the confrontation with Iraq, an important debate about the costs and benefits of the relationship with the United States was underway in Australia. At a number of levels—economic, political, and even strategic—increasing numbers of Australians were critically reassessing the relationship and questioning the supposed benefits. Recent events have accelerated this process and thrown the relationship into even starker relief. This paper argues that the increasingly unilateral nature of American economic and strategic policy is imposing major costs on even its most loyal allies, a situation that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of, and support for, U.S. hegemony.

Responsibility to protect or Trojan Horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq

What does the world's engagement with the unfolding crisis in Darfur tell us about the impact of the Iraq war on the norm of humanitarian intervention? Is a global consensus about a "responsibility to protect" more or less likely? There are at least three potential answers to these questions. Some argue that the merging of strategic interests and humanitarian goods amplified by the intervention in Afghanistan makes it more likely that the world's most powerful states will act to prevent or halt humanitarian crises. Others insist that the widespread perception that the United States and its allies "abused" humanitarian justifications to legitimate its invasion of Iraq has set back efforts to build a global consensus about humanitarian action. A third group argues that the "responsibility to protect" inhibits the potential for abuse and, as a result, consensus is likely to strengthen post-Iraq for precisely this reason. Through a detailed study of the international engagement with Darfur, I suggest that the latter two arguments have merit but need to be adjusted. I argue that the humanitarian intervention norm has changed in two subtle ways. First, while the strength of the norm itself has not changed, the credibility of the United States and U.K. as "norm carriers" has been significantly undermined. Second, while the "responsibility to protect" has been invoked to support international activism, it has also re-legitimated anti-interventionist arguments.