Selection methods regulate evolution of cooperation in digital evolution.

A key, yet often neglected, component of digital evolution and evolutionary models is the 'selection method' which assigns fitness (number of offspring) to individuals based on their performance scores (efficiency in performing tasks). Here, we study with formal analysis and numerical experiments the evolution of cooperation under the five most common selection methods (proportionate, rank, truncation-proportionate, truncation-uniform and tournament). We consider related individuals engaging in a Prisoner's Dilemma game where individuals can either cooperate or defect. A cooperator pays a cost, whereas its partner receives a benefit, which affect their performance scores. These performance scores are translated into fitness by one of the five selection methods. We show that cooperation is positively associated with the relatedness between individuals under all selection methods. By contrast, the change in the performance benefit of cooperation affects the populations' average level of cooperation only under the proportionate methods. We also demonstrate that the truncation and tournament methods may introduce negative frequency-dependence and lead to the evolution of polymorphic populations. Using the example of the evolution of cooperation, we show that the choice of selection method, though it is often marginalized, can considerably affect the evolutionary dynamics.

Healthcare utilization of elderly persons hospitalized after a noninjurious fall in a Swiss academic medical center.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the risk of hospital readmission, nursing home admission, and death, as well as health services utilization over a 6-month follow-up, in community-dwelling elderly persons hospitalized after a noninjurious fall. DESIGN: Prospective cohort study with 6-month follow-up. SETTING: Swiss academic medical center. PARTICIPANTS: Six hundred ninety persons aged 75 and older hospitalized through the emergency department. MEASUREMENTS: Data on demographics and medical, physical, social, and mental status were collected upon admission. Follow-up data were collected from the state centralized billing system (hospital and nursing home admission) and proxies (death). RESULTS: Seventy patients (10%) were hospitalized after a noninjurious fall. Fallers had shorter hospital stays (median 4 vs 8 days, P<.001) and were more frequently discharged to rehabilitation or respite care than nonfallers. During follow-up, fallers were more likely to be institutionalized (adjusted hazard ratio=1.82, 95% confidence interval=1.03-3.19, P=.04) independent of comorbidity and functional and mental status. Overall institutional costs (averaged per day of follow-up) were similar for both groups ($138.5 vs $148.7, P=.66), but fallers had lower hospital costs and significantly higher rehabilitation and long-term care costs ($55.5 vs $24.1, P<.001), even after adjustment for comorbidity, living situation, and functional and cognitive status. CONCLUSION: Elderly patients hospitalized after a noninjurious fall were twice as likely to be institutionalized as those admitted for other medical conditions and had higher intermediate and long-term care services utilization during follow-up, independent of functional and health status. These results provide direction for interventions needed to delay or prevent institutionalization and reduce subsequent costs.

Cooperation between the transcription factors p63 and IRF6 is essential to prevent cleft palate in mice.

Cleft palate is a common congenital disorder that affects up to 1 in 2,500 live human births and results in considerable morbidity to affected individuals and their families. The etiology of cleft palate is complex, with both genetic and environmental factors implicated. Mutations in the transcription factor-encoding genes p63 and interferon regulatory factor 6 (IRF6) have individually been identified as causes of cleft palate; however, a relationship between the key transcription factors p63 and IRF6 has not been determined. Here, we used both mouse models and human primary keratinocytes from patients with cleft palate to demonstrate that IRF6 and p63 interact epistatically during development of the secondary palate. Mice simultaneously carrying a heterozygous deletion of p63 and the Irf6 knockin mutation R84C, which causes cleft palate in humans, displayed ectodermal abnormalities that led to cleft palate. Furthermore, we showed that p63 transactivated IRF6 by binding to an upstream enhancer element; genetic variation within this enhancer element is associated with increased susceptibility to cleft lip. Our findings therefore identify p63 as a key regulatory molecule during palate development and provide a mechanism for the cooperative role of p63 and IRF6 in orofacial development in mice and humans.

Patients satisfaction in an academic walk-in centre: a new model of residents training achieved by family doctors.

BACKGROUND: Walk-in centres may improve access to healthcare for some patients, due to their convenient location and extensive opening hours, with no need for an appointment. Herein, we describe and assess a new model of walk-in centre, characterised by care provided by residents and supervision achieved by experienced family doctors. The main aim of the study was to assess patients' satisfaction about the care they received from residents and their supervision by family doctors. The secondary aim was to describe walk-in patients' demographic characteristics and to identify potential associations with satisfaction. METHODS: The study was conducted in the walk-in centre of Lausanne. Patients who consulted between 11th and 31st April were automatically included and received a questionnaire in French. We used a five-point Likert scale, ranging from "not at all satisfied" to "very satisfied", converted from values of 1 to 5. We focused on the satisfaction regarding residents' care and supervision by a family doctor. The former was divided in three categories: "Skills", "Treatment" and "Behaviour". A mean satisfaction score was calculated for each category and a multivariable logistic model was applied in order to identify associations with patients' demographics. RESULTS: The overall response rate was 47% [184/395]. Walk-in patients were more likely to be women (62%), young (median age 31), with a high education level (40% of University degree or equivalent). Patients were "very satisfied" with residents' care, with a median satisfaction score between 4.5 and 5, for each category. Over 90% of patients were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" that a family doctor was involved in the consultation. Age showed the greatest association with satisfaction. CONCLUSION: Patients were highly satisfied with care provided by residents and with the involvement of a family doctor in the consultation. Older age showed the greatest positive association with satisfaction with a positive impact. The high level satisfaction reported by walk-in patients supports this new model of walk-in centre.

A characterization of a new value and an existing value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation

En aquest treball presentem dues caracteritzacions de dos valors diferents en el marc dels jocs coalicionals amb cooperació restringida. Les restriccions són introduïdes com una seqüència finita de particions del conjunt del jugadors, de manera que cada una d'elles eés més grollera que l'anterior, formant així una estructura amb diferents nivells d'unions a priori.

Eusociality and cooperation.

The evolution of eusociality, here defined as the emergence of societies with reproductive division of labour and cooperative brood care, was first seen as a challenge to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Why should individuals permanently forgo direct reproduction to help other individuals to reproduce? Kin selection, the indirect transmission of genes through relatives, is the key process explaining the evolution of permanently nonreproductive helpers. However, in some taxa helpers delay reproduction until a breeding opportunity becomes available. Overall, eusociality evolved when ecological conditions promote stable associations of related individuals that benefit from jointly exploiting and defending common resources. High levels of cooperation and robust mechanisms of division of labour are found in many animal societies. However, conflicts among individuals are still frequent when group members that are not genetically identical compete over reproduction or resource allocation.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Academic Court Schoolbased Lisison Statewide Date, 2006

Prepared by the Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning, Iowa Department of Human Rights

2006-2007 Academic Year Juvenile Court Schoolbased Liaison Statewide Data

Prepared by the Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning, Iowa Department of Human Rights

Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.