Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

What Is a Commody? Two Axiomatic Anwers

We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

Rank Regressions, Wage Distributions and the Gender Gap.

In this paper, we model the interactions between the distribution of male and female wages under the assumption that any change in the wage distribution of women must be offset by an opposite change in the wage distribution of men.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

The Wage Rate and the Profit Rate in the Price of Production Equation: a New Solution to an Old Problem

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.

Tests of Conditional Asset Pricing Models in the Brazilian Stock Market

In this paper, we test a version of the conditional CAPM with respect to a local market portfolio, proxied by the Brazilian stock index during the 1976-1992 period. We also test a conditional APT model by using the difference between the 30-day rate (Cdb) and the overnight rate as a second factor in addition to the market portfolio in order to capture the large inflation risk present during this period. The conditional CAPM and APT models are estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and tested on a set of size portfolios created from a total of 25 securities exchanged on the Brazilian markets. The inclusion of this second factor proves to be crucial for the appropriate pricing of the portfolios.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Sector-Specific Training and Mobility in Germany

This article studies mobility patterns of German workers in light of a model of sector-specific human capital. Furthermore, I employ and describe little-used data on continuous on-the-job training occurring after apprenticeships. Results are presented describing the incidence and duration of continuous training. Continuous training is quite common, despite the high incidence of apprenticeships which precedes this part of a worker's career. Most previous studies have only distinguished between firm-specific and general human capital, usually concluding that training was general. Inconsistent with those conclusions, I show that German men are more likely to find a job within the same sector if they have received continuous training in that sector. These results are similar to those obtained for young U.S. workers, and suggest that sector-specific capital is an important feature of very different labor markets. In addition, they suggest that the observed effect of training on mobility is sensible to the state of the business cycle, indicating a more complex interaction between supply and demand that most theoretical models allow for.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

Sector-Specific on-the-Job Training: Evidence from U.S. Data.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we re-examine the effect of formal on-the-job training on mobility patterns of young American workers. By employing parametric duration models, we evaluate the economic impact of training on productive time with an employer. Confirming previous studies, we find a positive and statistically significant impact of formal on-the-job training on tenure with the employer providing the training. However, the expected net duration of the time spent in the training program is generally not significantly increased. We proceed to document and analyze intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral mobility patterns in order to infer whether training provides firm-specific, industry-specific, or general human capital. The econometric analysis rejects a sequential model of job separation in favor of a competing risks specification. We find significant evidence for the industry-specificity of training. The probability of sectoral mobility upon job separation decreases with training received in the current industry, whether with the last employer or previous employers, and employment attachment increases with on-the-job training. These results are robust to a number of variations on the base model.

Distortionary Taxation and Labor Supply: Evidence from Canada.

This paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework. The long-term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using Canadian data between 1966 and 1993. While the cointegrating predictions of the model without taxation are rejected, the ones of the model with labor taxation are not. Persistent labor tax rate increases appear to play an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked.

Maximal-Element Rationalizability

We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary do-mains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier litera-ture, this is not the case for maximal-element rationalizability, except when it coincides with greatest-element rationalizability because of properties imposed on the rationalizing relation. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for maximal-element rationaliz-ability by itself, and for maximal-element rationalizability in conjunction with additional properties of a rationalizing relation such as re exivity, completeness, P-acyclicity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and transitivity.