The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Políticas integradas de protecção e promoção da saúde e segurança do trabalho nas empresas portuguesas

RESUMO - Foi construída uma tipologia com cinco grupos principais de políticas, programas e actividades: A (Higiene & Segurança no Trabalho/Melhoria do ambiente físico de trabalho); B (Avaliação de saúde/Vigilância médica/Prestação de cuidados de saúde); C (Prevenção de comportamentos de risco/ Promoção de estilos de vida saudáveis); D (Intervenções a nível organizacional/Melhoria do ambiente psicossocial de trabalho); E (Actividades e programas sociais e de bem-estar). Foi concebido e desenhado, para ser autoadministrado, um questionário sobre Política de Saúde no Local de Trabalho. Foram efectuados dois mailings, e um follow-up telefónico. O trabalho de campo decorreu entre a Primavera de 1997 e o Verão de 1998. A amostra (n = 259) é considerada representativa das duas mil maiores empresas do país. Uma em cada quatro era uma multinacional. A taxa de sindicalização rondava os 30% da população trabalhadora, mas apenas 16% dos respondentes assinalou a existência de representantes dos trabalhadores eleitos para a S&ST (abreviadamente, Saúde & Segurança do Trabalho). É o sistema de gestão integrado de S&ST, e não o tamanho da empresa ou outra característica sociodemográfica ou técnicoorganizacional, que permite predizer a existência de empresas, mais activas e inovadoras no domínio da protecção e promoção da saúde no trabalho.

Instrumentos de políticas públicas do turismo: uma análise empírica dos municípios portugueses

Tese de Doutoramento em Ciências da Administração

Políticas, processos e atores de privatização da educação em Portugal: apontamentos

Procurou-se contribuir para esboçar uma problemática de pesquisa em torno da privatização em educação, no quadro das relações entre o Estado e os domínios público e privado e tomando como horizonte a construção do direito fundamental à educação e do bem-estar social, situados no Portugal democrático. Argumentou-se que o Estado e as políticas públicas têm, nestes 40 anos, desempenhado um papel central naqueles processos. Durante muito tempo, com fases e combinações distintas, pode observar-se uma espécie de duplicidade na ação estatal, com o acento tónico ora na expansão e consolidação do sistema público, ora no apoio e sustentação de atores e dinâmicas de ampliação do espaço e da influência privados, às vezes assumindo simultaneamente uma e outra orientação em setores diferenciados. Sugere-se, no entanto, que, desde 2011, no quadro de políticas regressivas austeritárias de ajustamento estrutural, com origem na União Europeia, se assistiu a uma rutura em favor de um projeto societal neoliberal radical que, a ser bem sucedido, procura instituir um sistema educativo pobre para pobres e alterar o estatuto e o papel do direito à educação e do sistema público que constitucionalmente o realiza.

Construção de uma cultura de projeto numa comunidade de aprendizagem através do projeto curricular integrado

Dissertação de mestrado em Estudos da Criança (área de especialização em Integração Curricular e Inovação Educativa)

Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen sowie Aspekte und Bestrebungen ihrer Eingliederung/Integration im Kreis Salzwedel 1945 bis 1948/49

Flight and displacement, Research about displaced people, Displaced people in Saxony- Anhalt and in the district of Salzwedel, Arrival and reception, Integration into social life, Administrative activities, Housing, Integration into the labour market, Social welfare activities

Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

The Politics of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentina

The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.

A General model of bilateral migration agreements

Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ.

Communication for Public Goods

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with di¤erent preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. provision of public health service; carbon emissions policy; pace of lectures in a classroom) that is consumed by all of them. Communication in such circumstances suffers from the agents' incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences relative to the average of the other agents, since the decision maker's reaction to each agent's message is weaker than in one-to-one communication. As the number of agents becomes larger the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. "yes" or "no") is shown to be a robust mode of communication when the main source of informational distortion is exaggeration.

Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

Second-Order Approximation to the Rotemberg Model around a Distorted Steady State

Less is known about social welfare objectives when it is costly to change prices, as in Rotemberg (1982), compared with Calvo-type models. We derive a quadratic approximate welfare function around a distorted steady state for the costly price adjustment model. We highlight the similarities and differences to the Calvo setup. Both models imply inflation and output stabilization goals. It is explained why the degree of distortion in the economy influences inflation aversion in the Rotemberg framework in a way that differs from the Calvo setup.

Handling the endogeneity of income to health using a field experiment in Taiwan

This paper uses an exogenous increase in income for a specific sub-group in Taiwan to explore the extent to which higher income leads to higher levels of health and wellbeing. In 1995, the Taiwanese government implemented the Senior Farmer Welfare Benefit Interim Regulation (SFWBIR) which was a pure cash injection, approximately US$110 (£70) per month in 1996, to senior farmers. A Difference-in-differences (DiD) approach is used on survey data from the Taiwanese Health and Living Status of Elderly in 1989 and 1996 to evaluate the short term effect of the SFWBIR on self-assessed health, depression, and life satisfaction. Senior manufacturing workers are employed as a comparison group for the senior farmers in the natural experiment because their demographic backgrounds are similar. This paper provides evidence that the increase in income from the SFWBIR significantly improved the mental health of senior farmers by reducing the scale of depression (CES-D) by 1.718, however, it had no significant short term impact on self-assessed health or life satisfaction.

(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.