Property rights of landholders in non-captive wildlife and prospects for conservation

In order to reduce the rate of human-induced biodiversity loss of wild species, it has become increasingly important to stem this loss on private and tribal lands and to find effective policies to do this. Some writers believe that granting landholders commercial property rights in wildlife might be effective in dealing with this matter and result in the sustainable use of wildlife. This paper explores this view using economic theory. In doing so, it takes into account the total economic valuation concept. While granting of commercial property rights is found to be effective for conserving some species, it is predicted to be a complete failure as a means of conserving other species. In addition, particular attention is given to the economics of the utilisation and conservation of non-captive fugitive (or mobile) wildlife. The economic theory involved is contrasted and compared with that for the exploitation of open-access resources.

Notes on market failure and the Paretian (Kaldor-Hicks) relevance and irrelevance of unfavourable externalities

The following are notes that have been distributed by me over the last few years to students in Environmental Economics at The University of Queensland. They give particular attention to whether externalities are Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks relevant from a policy point of view. Externalities are Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto irrelevant if no change is possible for which gainers could compensate losers. Both absolute and marginal externalities may be Kaldor-Hicks relevant. Infra-marginal negative externalities are often, but not always, Kaldor-Hicks irrelevant. There are at least two cases where such externalities can be relevant. First, the absolute impact of the negative externality may be so great that the source of the externality should be eliminated. Secondly, if the externality arises from production, its nature may depend on the type of production technique adopted. Although for the technique adopted, an infra-marginal negative externality occurs. That is Paretian irrelevant given that choice of this technique is the only available possibility, alternative techniques may actually be available in practice. Some of these may generate even smaller total external effects and be socially preferable. Both cases are outlined and illustrated in these notes. The analysis reveals the dangers of relying on marginalism for deciding on environmental policy. Total (external) effects are often of great social and economic importance and appropriate social choices cannot be made on the basis of marginalism alone.

Economic Incentives to Conserve Wildlife on Private Lands: Analysis and Policy

Some believe that provision of private property rights in wildlife on private land can provide a powerful economic incentive for nature conservation because it enables property owners to market such wildlife or its attributes. If such marketing is profitable, private landholders will conserve the wildlife concerned and its required habitat. But land is not always most profitably used for exploitation of wildlife, and many economic values of wildlife (such as non-use economic values) cannot be marketed. The mobility of some wildlife (their fugitive nature) adds to the limitations of the private property approach. While some species may be conserved by this approach, it is suboptimal as a single policy approach to nature conservation. Nevertheless, it is being experimented with in the Northern Territory of Australia where landholders have the possibility of harvesting on their properties a quota of eggs and chicks of red-tailed black cockatoos for commercial sale. This scheme is expected to provide an incentive to private landholders to retain hollow trees essential for the nesting of these birds. Aspects of this approach are analysed using this case, and related ones, from Northern Australia. It is noted that the private property rights approach adopted in southern Africa is unlikely to be equally successful everywhere. The long-term survival of some species depends on their ability to use private lands without severe harassment, either for their migration or to supplement their available resources, for example, the Asian elephant in Sri Lanka. Nature conservation on private land is often a useful, if not essential, supplement to conservation on public lands. Community and public incentives for such conservation are outlined.

Testing for Market Power in Multiple-Input, Multiple-Output Industries: The Australian Grains and Oilseeds Industries

Recent empirical studies have found significant evidence of departures from competition in the input side of the Australian bread, breakfast cereal and margarine end-product markets. For example, Griffith (2000) found that firms in some parts of the processing and marketing sector exerted market power when purchasing grains and oilseeds from farmers. As noted at the time, this result accorded well with the views of previous regulatory authorities (p.358). In the mid-1990s, the Prices Surveillence Authority (PSA 1994) determined that the markets for products contained in the Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes were "not effectively competitive" (p.14). The PSA consequently maintained price surveillence on the major firms in this product group. The Griffith result is also consistent with the large number of legal judgements against firms in this sector over the past decade for price fixing or other types of non-competitive behaviour. For example, bread manufacturer George Weston was fined twice during 2000 for non-competitive conduct and the ACCC has also recently pursued and won cases against retailer Safeway in grains and oilseeds product lines.

Economic incentives for global conservation of wildlife: New international policy directions

Growing economic globalisation by extending the operation of markets is a two-edged sword as far as nature conservation is concerned. In some circumstances, it threatens the conservation of nature and in other cases, it provides economic incentives that foster the conservation of biodiversity. This article shows how global policy directions have altered in that regard. Initially the World Conservation Union (IUCN) favoured bans on trade in endangered species. This view was enshrined in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Subsequently, with the upsurge of support for market-based economic liberalism, IUCN recognised that economic and market incentives, if linked to appropriate property rights, could foster biodiversity conservation. This is reflected in the International Convention on Biological Diversity. While there is conflict between this convention and CITES, its extent has been exaggerated. As explained, in certain cases, trade restrictions of the type adopted in CITES are appropriate for nature conservation whereas the market-oriented policy of the Convention on Biological Diversity can be effective in some different situations. Whether or not the extension of markets in wildlife and wildlife products and growing economic globalisation favours nature conservation varies according to the circumstances.

Resource entitlements of indigenous minorities, their poverty and conservation of nature: Status of Australian Aborigines, comparisons with India's tribals, theory and changing policies globally

Considers the relevance of A.K. Sen’s theory of entitlements to the situation facing indigenous tribal people, its relationship to institutionalism, and to theories of property rights. Changing world views about the resource entitlements that should be given to local communities are outlined concentrating on the views expressed by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). These changing views have relevance for the resource entitlements of indigenous tribal communities and are reflected in differences in the policy approaches inherent in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the more recent Convention on Biological Diversity. The latter embodies the view that provision of greater resource entitlements to local communities can provide economic incentives for nature conservation. There is a case for Indigenous Australians to be given greater rights to market the natural produce from their lands. Despite progress with land rights, they are not entitled to market much of the natural produce from their land. The socioeconomic status of Australian Aborigines is outlined. Their standard of living and their life expectancy are low by world standards and in comparison to other Australians. This is partly a result of historical events that have restricted their rights. These events are outlined briefly. Views differ about the appropriate development paths for Indigenous Australians and these are assessed. Concern on environmental and economic grounds is expressed about the view that the economic development of Australian Aboriginal communities would be accelerated by replacing their communal land titles by private land titles and encouraging Western-style agriculture and commercial development of their lands. Some comparisons are also made with the situation of India’s Tribals.