Estudo de mercado: transportes e logística

Relatório de Estágio

Effects of hotel characteristics on room rates in Porto: a hedonic price approach

According to the hedonic price method, a price of a good is related with the characteristics or the services it provides. Within this framework, the aim of this study it is to examine the effect on room rates of different characteristics of hotels in and around the city of Porto, such as star category, size, room and service quality, hotel facilities and location. It was estimated a hedonic price function, using data for 51 hotels. The results enable to identify the attributes that are important to consumers and hoteliers and to which extent. This information can be used by hotel managers to define a price strategy and helpful in new investment decisions.

Demand Response Programs Definition Using Demand Price Elasticity to Define Consumers Aggregation for an Improved Remuneration Structure

The positioning of the consumers in the power systems operation has been changed in the recent years, namely due to the implementation of competitive electricity markets. Demand response is an opportunity for the consumers’ participation in electricity markets. Smart grids can give an important support for the integration of demand response. The methodology proposed in the present paper aims to create an improved demand response program definition and remuneration scheme for aggregated resources. The consumers are aggregated in a certain number of clusters, each one corresponding to a distinct demand response program, according to the economic impact of the resulting remuneration tariff. The knowledge about the consumers is obtained from its demand price elasticity values. The illustrative case study included in the paper is based on a 218 consumers’ scenario.

Multi-agent Simulation of Bilateral Contracting in Competitive Electricity Markets

Traditional vertically integrated power utilities around the world have evolved from monopoly structures to open markets that promote competition among suppliers and provide consumers with a choice of services. Market forces drive the price of electricity and reduce the net cost through increased competition. Electricity can be traded in both organized markets or using forward bilateral contracts. This article focuses on bilateral contracts and describes some important features of an agent-based system for bilateral trading in competitive markets. Special attention is devoted to the negotiation process, demand response in bilateral contracting, and risk management. The article also presents a case study on forward bilateral contracting: a retailer agent and a customer agent negotiate a 24h-rate tariff.

Does a Tougher Competition Policy Reduce or Promote Investment?

The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because of the reduced ability to have a return on investment. This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a cost- reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in the cost- reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model welfare unambiguously increases due to a tougher competition polic

The impact of pharmaceutical policy measures: a structural-break approach

Pharmaceutical spending in many other countries has had a steep increase in the last decade. The Portuguese Government has adopted several measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure growth, ranging from increased co-payments to price decreases determined administratively. Promotion of generic consumption has also ranked high in political priorities. We assess the overall impact of the several policy measures on total pharmaceutical spending, using monthly data over the period January 1995 – August 2008. Endogenous structural breaks (time-series) methods were employed. Our findings suggest that policy measures aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure have been, in general, unsuccessful. Two breaks were identified. Both coincide with administratively determined price decreases. Measures aimed at increasing competition in the market had no visible effect on the dynamics of Government spending in pharmaceutical products. In particular, the introduction of reference pricing had only a transitory effect of less than one year, with historical growth resuming quickly. The consequence of it is a transfer of financial burden from the Government to the patients, with no apparent effect on the dynamics of pharmaceutical spending. This strongly suggests that pharmaceutical companies have been able to adjust to policy measures, in order to sustain their sales. It remains a challenge for the future to identify firms’ strategies that supported continued growth of sales, despite the several policy measures adop

TOXOCARIASIS: SEROLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS BY INDIRECT ANTIBODY COMPETITION ELISA

Toxocariasis is caused by infection of man by Toxocara canis and Toxocara cati larvae, the common roundworm of dogs and cats. Because larvae are difficult to detect in tissues, diagnosis is mostly based on serology. Non specific reactions are observed mainly due to cross-reactivity with Ascaris sp antigens. This investigation aimed at developing and evaluating an indirect antibody competition ELISA (IACE) employing a specific rabbit IgG anti-Toxocara canis excretory-secretory antigens as the competition antibody, in order to improve indirect ELISA specificity performed for toxocariasis diagnosis. For that, the rabbit IgG was previously absorbed by Ascaris suum adult antigens. Sensitivity and specificity of IACE were first evaluated in 28 serum samples of mice experimentally infected with T. canis embryonated eggs. Adopting cut-off value established in this population before infection, sensitivity and specificity were 100% after 20 days post-inoculation. For human population IACE was evaluated using sera from 440 patients with clinical signs of toxocariasis and the cut-off value was established with 60 serum samples from apparently healthy individuals. Using as reference test the indirect ELISA performed by Adolfo Lutz Institute, sensitivity was 60.2%, specificity was 98% and concordance was 77.3%. Repeatability of IACE was evaluated by the inter-reactions variation coefficient (2.4%).

European Union emissions trading scheme impact on the Spanish electricity price during phase II and phase III implementation

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a cornerstone of the European Union's policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. The purpose of the present work is to evaluate the influence of CO2 opportunity cost on the Spanish wholesale electricity price. Our sample includes all Phase II of the EU ETS and the first year of Phase III implementation, from January 2008 to December 2013. A vector error correction model (VECM) is applied to estimate not only long-run equilibrium relations, but also short-run interactions between the electricity price and the fuel (natural gas and coal) and carbon prices. The four commodities prices are modeled as joint endogenous variables with air temperature and renewable energy as exogenous variables. We found a long-run relationship (cointegration) between electricity price, carbon price, and fuel prices. By estimating the dynamic pass-through of carbon price into electricity price for different periods of our sample, it is possible to observe the weakening of the link between carbon and electricity prices as a result from the collapse on CO2 prices, therefore compromising the efficacy of the system to reach proposed environmental goals. This conclusion is in line with the need to shape new policies within the framework of the EU ETS that prevent excessive low prices for carbon over extended periods of time.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Uncertainty on a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation

The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival’s production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that this game has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We do ex-ante and ex-post analyses of firms’ profits and market prices. We prove that the expected profit of each firm increases with the variance of its production costs. We also show that the expected price of each good increases with both expected production costs, being the effect of the expected production costs of the rival dominated by the effect of the own expected production costs.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.

Unemployment, technological revolution and competition from developing countries

Unemployment is probably the most important social problem of our times in the rich industrial world. There are 35 million people unemployed in OECD countries(about 8,5%): the situation however differs between the USA and Europe. In this paper we will discuss the reasons for suche a difference.

Competition policy costs to firms

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics