Perfecting Imperfect Duties via Institutionalization

Onora O’Neill’s thesis that, in a world like ours, institutionalization is a necessary condition for the existence of typical universal welfare rights—the “institutionalization thesis” for short—has often been criticized. I believe that most of these criticisms fail to appreciate that the institutionalization thesis is based on her “classical” understanding of rights, which stresses the essential duty-implying character of rights. By and large, O’Neill’s thesis stands and falls with the classical theory of rights. My suggestion is, therefore, that what is really at issue between O’Neill and at least some of her critics is the proper understanding of the concept of a right.

Voting Power and Probability

Voting power is commonly measured using a probability. But what kind of probability is this? Is it a degree of belief or an objective chance or some other sort of probability? The aim of this paper is to answer this question. The answer depends on the use to which a measure of voting power is put. Some objectivist interpretations of probabilities are appropriate when we employ such a measure for descriptive purposes. By contrast, when voting power is used to normatively assess voting rules, the probabilities are best understood as classical probabilities, which count possibilities. This is so because, from a normative stance, voting power is most plausibly taken to concern rights and thus possibilities. The classical interpretation also underwrites the use of the Bernoulli model upon which the Penrose/Banzhaf measure is based.

Partiality, Agent-Relative Reasons, and the Individuals View

The paper offers a critical discussion of Simon Keller’s individuals view concerning the grounds of special obligations. It is argued that the view offers a misleading account of agent-relative reasons, which leads to problems with the arguments Keller offers for his view – the Kantian, consequentialist, particularistic argument. Furthermore, it argues that Keller’s argument from phenomenology suffers from not distinguishing between reasons for partiality and reasons from partiality. At best, it can be applied to reasons from partiality – reasons that agents have in virtue of standing in a relationship of partiality with some other person. Thus, the argument does not support the individuals view, as it is compatible with the other approaches Keller discusses. The paper suggests a modified relationship view to ground reasons of partiality.

Second-Personal Reasons and Special Obligations

The paper discusses the second-personal account of moral obligation as put forward by Stephen Darwall. It argues that on such an account, an important part of our moral practice cannot be explained, namely special obligations that are grounded in special relationships between persons. After highlighting the problem, the paper discusses several strategies to accommodate such special obligations that are implicit in some of Darwall’s texts, most importantly a disentanglement strategy and a reductionist strategy. It argues that neither one of these strategies is entirely convincing. The last part of the papers sketches a novel account of how to accommodate special obligations in a second-personal framework: According to this suggestion, special obligations might be due to the fact that relationships change the normative authority that persons have over each other.