The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Ecology and evolution of multigenomic arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi.

Arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) form extremely important mutualistic symbioses with most plants. Their role in nutrient acquisition, plant community structure, plant diversity, and ecosystem productivity and function has been demonstrated in recent years. New findings on the genetics and biology of AMF also give us a new picture of how these fungi exist in ecosystems. In this article, I bring together some recent findings that indicate that AMF have evolved to contain multiple genomes, that they connect plants together by a hyphal network, and that these different genomes may potentially move around in this network. These findings show the need for more intensive studies on AMF population biology and genetics in order to understand how they have evolved with plants, to better understand their ecological role, and for applying AMF in environmental management programs and in agriculture. A number of key features of AMF population biology have been identified for future studies and most of these concern the need to understand drift, selection, and genetic exchange in multigenomic organisms, a task that has not previously presented itself to evolutionary biologists.

Permanent Genetic Resources added to Molecular Ecology Resources Database 1 August 2010-30 September 2010

This article documents the addition of 229 microsatellite marker loci to the Molecular Ecology Resources Database. Loci were developed for the following species: Acacia auriculiformis x Acacia mangium hybrid, Alabama argillacea, Anoplopoma fimbria, Aplochiton zebra, Brevicoryne brassicae, Bruguiera gymnorhiza, Bucorvus leadbeateri, Delphacodes detecta, Tumidagena minuta, Dictyostelium giganteum, Echinogammarus berilloni, Epimedium sagittatum, Fraxinus excelsior, Labeo chrysophekadion, Oncorhynchus clarki lewisi, Paratrechina longicornis, Phaeocystis antarctica, Pinus roxburghii and Potamilus capax. These loci were cross-tested on the following species: Acacia peregrinalis, Acacia crassicarpa, Bruguiera cylindrica, Delphacodes detecta, Tumidagena minuta, Dictyostelium macrocephalum, Dictyostelium discoideum, Dictyostelium purpureum, Dictyostelium mucoroides, Dictyostelium rosarium, Polysphondylium pallidum, Epimedium brevicornum, Epimedium koreanum, Epimedium pubescens, Epimedium wushanese and Fraxinus angustifolia.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

Nutritional ecology of blowflies (Diptera, Calliphoridae): estimates of critical larval weight for pupation on two different

Under natural environmental conditions, blowflies utilize discrete and ephemeral feeding resources such as decaying carcasses. Competition for food on such feeding substrates is usually very severe, and only the individuals that are capable of attaining the critical larval weight for pupation will be able to survive. This critical weight is hitherto unknown for several blowfly species; therefore, the current work is aimed at obtaining such a critical value for four blowfly species of the genera Chrysomya and Lucilia, deploying two types of feeding substrate, namely, artificial diet and macerated bovine meat. On the whole, the critical weights ranged from 30 to 35 mg. The lowest larval weight which permitted pupation was 30.0 mg for Chrysomya megacephala reared on macerated bovine meat. This species was also the best adapted to pupation at low larval weights in relation to the maximum larval weight for males. Regarding the pupation of females, the best-adapted individual was a C. albiceps specimen exhibiting a critical weight that was equal to 39.20 % of the maximum value obtained. Concerning all the species and diet types, the female individuals exhibited the lowest critical weights that produced viable pupae, probably representing an evolutionary strategy that favoured the survival of females, responsible for the egg formation, contributing to the establishment of future generations. Regarding the loss (in percentage) of adult biomass in relation to the third instar larvae, the females of C. megacephala lost less weight than males in both feeding substrates. On the other hand, such a loss of weight occurred in males of C. albiceps and L. cuprina.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Behavioral ecology of Heteragrion consors Hagen (Odonata, Megapodagrionidae): a shade-seek Atlantic forest damselfly

Behavioral ecology of Heteragrion consors Hagen (Odonata: Megapodagrionidae): a shade-seek Atlantic forest damselfly. The intensity of the inter and intra-sexual selection can affect male behavioral traits as territorial fidelity and aggressiveness allowing the existence of different strategies. However, its differential success could be affected by environmental - as the diel variation in temperature - and physiological constrains - as the variation in thermoregulatory abilities. In this context, we present a behavioral analysis of Heteragrion consors (Zygoptera, Megapodagrionidae) trying to characterize its mating system, diel activity pattern, temporal budget, territoriality and reproductive biology. These data were obtained based on field observations using the focal individual method and mark-recapture techniques in 120 m of a shaded Atlantic Forest stream in Brazil. The males of this species were territorial, varying in its local fidelity, while the females appear sporadically. Males were perched in the majority of the time, but were also observed in cleaning movements, longitudinal abdominal flexion, wing flexion and sperm transfer during perch. The males presented a perched thermoregulatory behavior related to an exothermic regulation. Foraging and agonistic interactions were rare, but dominate the other behavioral activities. Abdominal movements associated to long lasting copula pointed to the existence of sperm competition in this species. Males performed contact post-copulatory guarding of the females. These observations pointed to a non-resource mating system for this species.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.