Recent brazilian experience on farmer reaction and crop response to fertilizer use

(1) In the period 1965/77 fertilizer consumption in Brazil increased nearly fifteen foild from circa 200,000 tons of N + P2O5 + K2O to 3 million tons. During the fifteen years extending from 1950 to 1964 usage of the primary macronutrients was raised by a factor of 2 only. (2) Several explanations are given for the remarkable increase, namely: an experimental background which supplied data for recommendations of rates, time and type of application; a convenient governmental policy for minimum prices and rural credit; capacity of the industry to meet the demand of the fertilizer market; an adequate mechanism for the diffusion of the practice of fertilizer use to the farmer. (3) The extension work, which has caused a permanent change in the aptitude towards fertilization, was carried out in the traditional way by salesmen supported by a technical staff, as well as by agronomists of the official services. (4) Two new programs were started and conducted in a rather short time, both putting emphasis on the relatively new technology of fertilizer use. (5) The first program, conducted in the Southern part of the country, extended lab and green house work supplemented by a few field trials to small land owners - the so called "operação tatú" (operation armadillo). (6) The seconde program, covering a larger problem area in the Northeast and in Central Brazil, began directly in field as thousands of demonstrations and simple experiments with the participation of local people whose involvement was essential for the success of the initiative; in this case the official extension services, both foreign and national sources of funds, and universities did participate under the leadership of the Brazilian Association for the Diffusion of Fertilizers (ANDA). (7) It is felt that the Brazilian experience gained thereof could be useful to other countries under similar conditions.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation.

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long argued that excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence of moves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward induction provides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. We conduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data the incumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forward induction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicate that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, a theoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Asymmetries in the capacity-inflation trade-off

This paper analyzes the joint dynamics of two key macroeconomic variables for the conduct of monetary policy: inflation and the aggregate capacity utilization rate. An econometric procedure useful for estimating dynamic rational expectation models with unobserved components is developed and applied in this context. The method combines the flexibility of the unobserved components approach, based on the Kalman recursion, with the power of the general method of moments estimation procedure. A 'hyb id' Phillips curve relating inflation to the capacity utilization gap and incorporating forward and backward looking components is estimated. The results show that such a relationship in non-linear: the slope of the Phillips curve depends significantly on the magnitude of the capacity gap. These findings provide support for studying the implications of asymmetricmonetary policy rules.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Lipschitz harmonic capacity and Bilipschitz images of cantor sets

For bilipschitz images of Cantor sets in Rd we estimate the Lipschitz harmonic capacity and show this capacity is invariant under bilipschitz homeomorphisms.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

The retained capacity of Lutzomya longipalpis (Lutz & Neiva) to transmit Leishmania chagasi (Cunha & Chagas) after eight years (64 generations in a closed laboratory colony

A closed Lutzomyia longipalpis colony, from Ceará has been used to transmit Leishmania chagasi isolated from a fox in Pará state. The last time this colony was successfully used in similar transmission experiments was eight years (64 generations) ago indicating that this colony of Lu. longipalpis has fully maintained its vectorial capacity in spite of such a long period of maintainance in the laboratory.