Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants

An analysis is carried out in a sample of 738 industrial plants of the determining factors in the use of internal promotion of blue-collar workers to middle managers and skilled technicians as against their external recruitment. The use of internal promotion is positively correlated with variables indicative of the efforts made by plants to measure employees' skills, and to a lesser extent, with the level of specificity of investments in human capital made by blue-collar workers. Contrary to what was expected, variables related with the use and efficiency of other incentive systems have no significant influence on the increased or decreased use of internal promotion. These results are initial evidence that internal promotions are used to protect and favour specific investments, especially those made by firms in order to discover their workers' skills.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Creating the Gorizia-Goriska euroregion: an European cross-border administrative model for integrated socio-economic development in the upper adriatic. Crossborder co-operation as a tool for trans-national integration and conflict resolution

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

A general construction of internal sheaves in algebraic set theory

We present a solution to the problem of defining a counterpart in Algebraic Set Theory of the construction of internal sheaves in Topos Theory. Our approach is general in that we consider sheaves as determined by Lawvere-Tierney coverages, rather than by Grothen-dieck coverages, and assume only a weakening of the axioms for small maps originally introduced by Joyal and Moerdijk, thus subsuming the existing topos-theoretic results.

Qualités psychométriques de la version française de la TAS-20 et prévalence de l'alexithymie chez 264 adolescents tout-venant [The 20-item Toronto alexithymia scale: structural validity, internal consistency and prevalence of alexithymia in a Swiss adolescent sample]

L'objectif de cette étude est d'examiner la structure factorielle et la consistance interne de la TAS-20 sur un échantillon d'adolescents (n = 264), ainsi que de décrire la distribution des caractéristiques alexithymiques dans cet échantillon. La structure à trois facteurs de la TAS-20 a été confirmée par notre analyse factorielle confirmatoire. La consistance interne, mesurée à l'aide d'alpha de Cronbach, est acceptable pour le premier facteur (difficulté à identifier les sentiments (DIF)), bonne pour le second (difficulté à verbaliser les sentiments (DDF)), mais en revanche, faible pour le troisième facteur (pensées orientées vers l'extérieur (EOT)). Les résultats d'une Anova mettent en évidence une tendance linéaire indiquant que plus l'âge augmente plus le niveau d'alexithymie (score total TAS-20), la difficulté à identifier les sentiments et les pensées orientées vers l'extérieur diminuent. En ce qui concerne la prévalence de l'alexithymie, on remarque en effet que 38,5 % des adolescents de moins de 16 ans sont considérés comme alexithymiques, contre 30,1 % des 16-17 ans et 22 % des plus de 17 ans. Notre étude indique donc que la TAS-20 est un instrument adéquat pour évaluer l'alexithymie à l'adolescence, tout en suggérant quelques précautions étant donné l'aspect développemental de cette période.

Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflictual settings. The first of these by Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) labeled the ‘information rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The second labeled the ‘bargaining rationale’ borrowing from Hamlin and Jennings (2007) agrees with the conventional wisdom that doves are more likely to secure peace, but post-conflict there are good reasons for hawks to be rationally selected. The third found in Jennings and Roelfsema (2008) is labeled the social psychological rationale. This captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity, so can apply to group choices which do not impinge upon bargaining power. As in the bargaining rationale, dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the expressive rationale is discussed which predicts that regardless of the underlying structure of the game (informational, bargaining, psychological) the large group nature of decision-making by making individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions which may be invariant with the mode of group interaction, be it conflictual or peaceful. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of the literature on the topic and contributes with original research. We first revise models of mechanism design and sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this optimism, we move to the analysis of the recent literature that considers the existence of limited confrontations that allow bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a bargaining instrument. The paper closes with a discussion on the related empirical literature, the challenges that it faces and some potential avenues for further research.