The oligarchic democracy: The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics. OSW Study 42/2012

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term. This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

The eurozone in bad need of a psychiatrist. EuropEos Commentary No. 6, 9 December 2010

Stefano Micossi, Director General of Assonime and member of the CEPS Board of Directors, observes in a new EuropEos Commentary that there is something surreal to the unfolding financial crisis of the eurozone, as the leaders grudgingly do what is needed to prevent disaster just minutes before it’s too late, and then in the next minute revert to the same behaviour that had brought them against the wall in the first place. He cites rising sovereign spreads within the area as the visible result of this strategy: they signal investors’ expectation that the future can only bring more of the same, a series of ever-larger sovereign debt crises, under Damocles’ sword that at some stage Germany, the paymaster of last resort, will close its purse and let Armageddon start.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

Transfer of interest on U.S. investment in the Panama Canal (GAO/AFMD-85-63).

Includes letter of April 8, 1985 from William R. Gianelli, Chairman, Board of Directors, Panama Canal Commission, to Frederick D. Wolf, Director, Accounting and Financial Management Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C. (p. 12-17).

The history of the Norman conquest of England : its causes and its results /

v. 1. The preliminary history to the election of Eadward the Confessor. 1877.--v. 2. The reign of Eadward the Confessor. 1877.--v. 3. The reign of Harold and the interregnum. 1875.--v. 4. The reign of William the Conqueror. 1876.--v. 5. The effects of the Norman conquest. 1876.--v. 6. Index volume. 1879.

A history of our own times from the accession of Queen Victoria to the Berlin congress.

Vol. 2 has title: A history of our own times from the accession of Queen Victoria to the general election of 1880.

A history of our own times ...

I-II. From the accession of Queen Victoria to the general election of 1880.--III. From 1880 to the diamond jubilee.--IV-V. From the diamond jubilee, 1897, to the accession of King Edward VII.

The land war in Ireland: being a personal narrative of events, in continuation of "A secret history of the English occupation of Egypt,"

I. Gladstone declares for home rule.--II. "Under protection of the league."--III. The general election of 1886.--IV. Vatican politics.--V. Cairo in 1887.--VI. Failure of the Wolff convention.--VII. The Persico mission.--VIII. Balfour chief secretary.--IX. My arrest at Woodford.--X. In gaol.--XI. The papal rescript.--XII. The Parnell Tragedy. A postscript.--Appendices: A. The canon of Aughrim. B. Mr. Blunt to Mr. John Morley. C. Mr. Blunt to the Marquess of Salisbury. D. Mr. Blunt to Mr. Evelyn, M. P. E. Mr. Blunt to Mr. John Morley.--Index.

A list of bibliographies of special subjects.

Mode of access: Internet.

A catalogue of French economic documents from the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

contains 1471 pieces." - Pref.

Rules of the American Education Society.

Printed brown paper covers.

Supplementary papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Rome. v. 1-2 ...

Papers of the school were ordinarily published in the American Journal of Archaeology, 2d. ser.; supplementary volumes wre authorized when material for publication either exceeded the space available in the journal, or when it was of such a nature as to make a different mode of publication advisable. (cf. v. 1, Prefatory note) The present volumes form the only collection of papers issued separately by the school in Rome. (Lists of the papers published in other journals, 1898-1907, may be found in the Supplementary papers, v. 1-2, Prefatory note) From 1909-12, the reports, etc., of the school were published in the Bulletin of the Archaeological Institute of America. On January 1, 1913, the American School of Classical Studies in Rome became a part of the American Academy in Rome.

Nomination of Robert N. Clement [microform] : hearing before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session ....

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.