Prévention de la violence commise par les spectateurs lors de manifestations sportives : étude des mesures préventives et de la responsabilité de l'organisateur à la lumière du droit comparé, du droit suisse et du droit associatif

Introduction 1. Généralités : Le sport occupe une place importante dans notre société, de manière active par la pratique d'une ou de plusieurs activités sportives, ou de manière passive, au travers de la presse, de la radio et de la télévision. Le sport est ainsi un acte de participation, d'appartenance, de revendication et d'intégration à la société en général ou à un groupe. Il stimule l'imagination et permet de rêver aux héros sportifs. Enfin, non seulement il améliore la santé de ceux qui le pratique, mais il a une dimension éducative et joue un rôle social, culturel et récréatif. Toutefois, le sport est également un spectacle qui provoque des passions et engendre des émotions de la part des supporters, dont certains s'exaltent pour leur équipe fétiche. Il arrive que ce supportérisme soit à tel point exacerbé qu'il mène à des dérives pouvant aboutir à des actes de violence dans et en dehors des stades, ceci tant avant, pendant qu'après le match. A titre d'exemple tragique, les téléspectateurs garderont longtemps en mémoire les scènes auxquelles ils ont assisté le 29 mai 1985, en direct, lorsque, avant le début de la rencontre, des hooligans anglais ont attaqué des supporters italiens dans les gradins du bloc Z du stade du Heysel à Bruxelles, lors de la finale de la Coupe d'Europe des champions, opposant le FC Liverpool à la Juventus de Turin; 39 personnes en sont mortes et 600 ont été blessées. La Suisse, longtemps épargnée par le phénomène, en regard de la situation qui a prévalu dans d'autres Etats européens, ne peut échapper, depuis quelques années, au triste constat selon lequel les stades constituent désormais des environnements propices à des actions de violence, de racisme et, plus rarement, d'extrémisme. Le cas le plus révélateur a eu lieu le 13 mai 2006, lorsque des fauteurs de trouble ont envahi le terrain du Parc Saint-Jacques de Bâle après le coup de sifflet final du match de championnat opposant le FC Bâle au FC Zurich, match dont l'enjeu était la première place du classement du championnat de Super League, pour attaquer à coups de pied et à coups de poing des joueurs, des accompagnants et des personnes chargées de la sécurité. Les affrontements ont continué dans la rue jusque tard dans la soirée. Il s'en est suivi une centaine de blessés et des dégâts d'un demi million de francs. De tels débordements mettent en danger la sécurité du public, des équipes et des arbitres. Il s'agit de tout mettre en oeuvre afin que les spectateurs qui assistent à une manifestation sportive puissent prendre du plaisir aux performances des sportifs sans devoir craindre pour leur sécurité. De même, les acteurs sur le terrain doivent pouvoir exercer leur sport sans craindre un envahissement de l'aire de jeu. Ainsi, les Etats et les associations sportives ont élaboré des textes juridiques afin d'éviter des débordements ou tout autre événement qui pourraient mettre en danger des personnes ou des biens matériels lors de manifestations sportives. Sous l'angle du droit étatique helvétique, cela s'est traduit, notamment en vue du déroulement en Suisse du Championnat d'Europe de football de l'UEFA en 2008 (EURO 2008) et du Championnat du monde de hockey sur glace en 2009, par l'adoption de mesures préventives permettant de lutter contre les actes de violence lors de manifestations sportives, introduites dans la Loi fédérale du 21 mars 1997 instituant des mesures visant au maintien de la sûreté intérieure (LMSI). Elles se concrétisent par l'inscription d'individus ayant commis des actes de violence dans une banque de données nationale, ainsi que par le recours au périmètre d'exclusion, à l'interdiction de sortie du territoire, à l'obligation de s'annoncer à la police et, en dernier ressort, à la garde à vue; enfin, il est également possible de saisir, séquestrer ou confisquer du matériel de propagande5. La mise en place de telles mesures relève de l'Etat, garant de la sécurité et de l'ordre publics à l'extérieur des enceintes sportives. L'organisateur, chargé quant à lui d'assurer la sécurité à l'intérieur du stade, n'est toutefois pas en marge, puisque les fédérations et associations sportives ont édicté des règlements dont il est le destinataire. Ces textes prévoient, à sa charge, notamment les mesures suivantes: le prononcé d'interdictions de stade à l'encontre de supporters violents, la fouille accrue des spectateurs, l'engagement d'un service de sécurité privé, l'obligation de désigner un responsable de la sécurité, la séparation des différents groupes de supporters, etc.. Il appartient ainsi aux associations sportives, aux organisateurs, aux chargés de la sécurité au sein des clubs et aux forces de l'ordre public d'appliquer de la meilleure façon que ce soit les mesures proposées et de collaborer afin de combattre les débordements des spectateurs de manière effective. Prévenir et supprimer la violence dans les manifestations sportives exige ainsi la mobilisation et la collaboration de tous les protagonistes concernés.

Probabilistic maximal covering location-allocation models with constrained waiting time or queue length for congested systems

When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

How important are tobacco prices in the propensity to start and quit smoking? An analysis of smoking histories from the Spanish National Health Survey

This paper analyses the effect of tobacco prices on the propensity tostart and quit smoking using a pool of the 1993, 1995 and 1997 editionsof the Spanish National Health Surveys. The estimates for severalparametric models of the hazard rate for starting and quitting suggestthat i) The public health measures applied as of 1992 have had asignificative effect on both reducing the hazard of starting andincreasing the hazard of quitting, ii) Prices have a very weak effect onthe hazard of starting in the male population and no significant effectin the female population, iii) The price floor of cigarrettes, proxiedby the average price of a pack of black cigarrettes, has a significanteffect on the quitting hazard which is robust across specifications andapplies to both men and women. The implied price elasticity of the timeup to quitting is situated around -1.4.

Radial measures of public services deficit for regional allocation of public funds

The goal of this paper is to present an optimal resource allocation model for the regional allocation of public service inputs. Theproposed solution leads to maximise the relative public service availability in regions located below the best availability frontier, subject to exogenous budget restrictions and equality ofaccess for equal need criteria (equity-based notion of regional needs). The construction of non-parametric deficit indicators is proposed for public service availability by a novel application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models, whose results offer advantages for the evaluation and improvement of decentralised public resource allocation systems. The method introduced in this paper has relevance as a resource allocation guide for the majority of services centrally funded by the public sector in a given country, such as health care, basic and higher education, citizen safety, justice, transportation, environmental protection, leisure, culture, housing and city planning, etc.

North-South convergence and the allocation of CO2 emissions

We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South(calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following threedesiderata:(1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilizationof concentrations at 450 ppm.(2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2%per generation) in 2075.(3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year whileSouth s rates of growth are markedly higher.The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North,large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments ineducation in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North s utility growth rate, some output mustbe transferred from South to North during the transition.Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism byproviding prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fairboth across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of humandevelopment.

Hierarchical location-allocation models for congested systems

In this paper we address the issue of locating hierarchical facilities in the presence of congestion. Two hierarchical models are presented, where lower level servers attend requests first, and then, some of the served customers are referred to higher level servers. In the first model, the objective is to find the minimum number of servers and theirlocations that will cover a given region with a distance or time standard. The second model is cast as a Maximal Covering Location formulation. A heuristic procedure is then presented together with computational experience. Finally, some extensions of these models that address other types of spatial configurations are offered.

Effects of hatching asynchrony on sibling negotiation, begging, jostling for position and within-brood food allocation in the barn owl Tyto alba

When siblings differ markedly in their need for food, they may benefit from signalling to each other their willingness to contest the next indivisible food item delivered by the parents. This sib-sib communication system, referred to as 'sibling negotiation', may allow them to adjust optimally to investment in begging. Using barn owl (Two alba) broods. I assessed the role of within-brood age hierarchy on sibling negotiation, and in turn on jostling for position where parents predictably deliver food (i.e. nest-box entrance), begging and within-brood food allocation. More specifically, I examined three predictions derived from a game-theoretical model of sibling negotiation where a senior and a junior sibling compete for food resources (Roulin, 2002a, Johnstone and Roulin, 2003): (1) begging effort invested by the senior sibling should be less sensitive to the junior sibling's negotiation than vice versa; (2) the junior should invest less effort in sibling negotiation than its senior sibling but a similar amount of effort in begging; and (3) within-brood food allocation should be directly related to begging but only indirectly to sibling negotiation. Two-chick broods were created and vocalization in the absence (negotiation signals directed to siblings) and presence (begging signals directed to parents) of parents was recorded. In support of the first prediction, juniors begged at a low cadence after their senior sibling negotiated intensely, probably because negotiation reflects prospective investment in begging and hence willingness to compete. In contrast, the begging of senior siblings was not sensitive to their junior sibling's negotiation. In contrast to the second prediction, juniors negotiated and begged more intensely than their senior sibling apparently because they were hungrier rather than younger. In line with the third prediction, juniors monopolized food delivered by their parents when their senior sibling begged at a low level. The begging cadence of both the junior and senior sibling, the junior's negotiation cadence, the difference in age between the two nest-mates and jostling for position were not associated with the likelihood of monopolizing food. In conclusion, sibling negotiation appears to influence begging behaviour, which, in turn, affects within-brood food allocation. Juniors may negotiate to challenge their senior siblings, and thereby determine whether seniors are less hungry before deciding to beg for food. In contrast, seniors may negotiate to deter juniors from begging.