932 resultados para Transaction costs economy
Resumo:
Urban problems have several features that make them inherently dynamic. Large transaction costs all but guarantee that homeowners will do their best to consider how a neighborhood might change before buying a house. Similarly, stores face large sunk costs when opening, and want to be sure that their investment will pay off in the long run. In line with those concerns, different areas of Economics have made recent advances in modeling those questions within a dynamic framework. This dissertation contributes to those efforts.
Chapter 2 discusses how to model an agent’s location decision when the agent must learn about an exogenous amenity that may be changing over time. The model is applied to estimating the marginal willingness to pay to avoid crime, in which agents are learning about the crime rate in a neighborhood, and the crime rate can change in predictable (Markovian) ways.
Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on location decision problems when there are externalities between decision makers. Chapter 3 focuses on the decision of business owners to open a store, when its demand is a function of other nearby stores, either through competition, or through spillovers on foot traffic. It uses a dynamic model in continuous time to model agents’ decisions. A particular challenge is isolating the contribution of spillovers from the contribution of other unobserved neighborhood attributes that could also lead to agglomeration. A key contribution of this chapter is showing how we can use information on storefront ownership to help separately identify spillovers.
Finally, chapter 4 focuses on a class of models in which families prefer to live
close to similar neighbors. This chapter provides the first simulation of such a model in which agents are forward looking, and shows that this leads to more segregation than it would have been observed with myopic agents, which is the standard in this literature. The chapter also discusses several extensions of the model that can be used to investigate relevant questions such as the arrival of a large contingent high skilled tech workers in San Francisco, the immigration of hispanic families to several southern American cities, large changes in local amenities, such as the construction of magnet schools or metro stations, and the flight of wealthy residents from cities in the Rust belt, such as Detroit.
Resumo:
Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.
The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.
The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.
The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.
Resumo:
The institutional turn in metropolitan governance has been influenced to a considerable degree by a rational choice approach, which views metropolitan governance as essentially created by local actors to reduce the transaction costs of inter-jurisdictional public-service provision. Another influential theoretical route follows a historical approach, which emphasizes the role of the state structure in producing formal institutions to enable governance at the regional level. Both approaches tend to be formalistic, simplistic and deterministic in nature, thus neglecting the dynamic interactions between the actors and their more informal, intangible, yet more basic, legitimate institutions, such as culture. This article examines the dynamic role of culture in metropolitan governance building in the context of decentralizing Indonesia. The analysis focuses on ‘best-practice’ experiences of metropolitan cooperation in greater Yogyakarta, where three neighbouring local governments known as Kartamantul have collaboratively performed cross-border infrastructure development to deal with the consequences of extended urbanization. We draw on sociological institutionalism to argue that building this metropolitan cooperation has its roots in the capacity of the actors to use and mobilize culture as a resource for collaborative action.
Resumo:
The definition of the boundaries of the firms is subject that has occupied the organizational theorists long ago, being the seminal work of Coase (1937) indicated as the trigger for one theoretical evolution, with emphasis on governance structures, which led to a modern theory of incomplete contracts. The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory arise within this evolution, being widely used in studies related to the theme. Empirically, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has established itself as a suitable tool for analysis of efficiency. Although TCE argues that specific assets must be internalized, recent studies outside the mainstream of theory show that, often, firms may decide, for various reasons, hire them on the market. Researches on transaction costs face with the unavailability of information and methodological difficulties in measuring their critical variables. There`s still the need for further methodological deepening. The theoretical framework includes classic works of TCE and Agency Theory, but also more recent works, outside the mainstream of TCE, which warn about the existence of strategies in use of specific assets that aren`t necessarily aligned with the classical ideas of TCE. The Brazilian oil industry is the focus of this thesis, that aimed to evaluate the efficiency of contracts involving high specificity service outsourced by Petrobras. In order to this, we made the categorization of outsourced services in terms of specificity, as well the description of services with higher specificity. Then, we verified the existence of relationship between the specificity of services and a number of variables, being found divergent results than those that are preached by the mainstream of TCE. Then, we designed a DEA model to analyze the efficiency in the use of onshore drilling rigs, identified among the services of highest specificity. The next step was the application of the model to evaluate the performance of drilling rigs contracts. Finally, we verified the existence of relationship between the efficiency of contracts and a number of variables, being found, again, results not consistent with the theory mainstream. Regarding to analyze of efficiency of drilling rigs contracts, the model developed is compatible with what is found in academic productions in efficiency of drilling rigs. The results on efficiency show a wide range of scores, with efficiencies ranging from 31.79% to 100%, being low the sample efficiency average. There is consonance between the model results and the practices adopted by Petrobras. The results strengthen the DEA as an important tool in studies of efficiency with possibility to use for analysis other types of contracts. In terms of theoretical findings, the results reinforce the arguments that there are situations in which the strategies of the organizations, in terms of use of assets and services of high specificity, do not necessarily follow what is recommended by the mainstream of TCE
Resumo:
The current study analyzes the birth and development of two strategic alliances established between shrimp producers in Rio Grande do Norte: the Unipesca and the Coopercam. To achieve this aim, two approaches which, at first sight, could be considered contradictory were used: the Transactional Costs Economy and Embeddedness. The first approach is fundamentally based in the studies of Williamson (1985; 1991; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2002). Embededness, on the other hand, went through the review of a series of authors, such as Burt (1992), Granovetter (1973; 1985), Uzzi (1997), Gulati (1994; 1995; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000), Nielsen (2005), Ring (2002), Ring and Van de Ven (1994), Zafirovski (2002), among others. To analyze the birth and development of the cooperatives in this study, Gulati s work (1998) was used. This study shows the steps to be studied for a better comprehension of an alliance: the decision of starting an alliance and the choice of the partners, the decision about the governance structure, the evolution of the alliance and the development of the companies which established this partnership. To carry this study out, a study case accordingly to Yin s proposal (2001) was adopted. Semi-structured interviews with pre-defined plots were conducted in two phases: in the beginning of 2006 and in the beginning of 2007. The subjects from the research were, in 2006, representative members of the main associations and corporations, besides the shrimp producers from the state, when the context of the activity was set. In the second phase, in 2007, representative members from the two cooperatives that were listed above were interviewed the president from Coopercam and the marketing manager from Unipesca. Besides these two members, directors from two important organizations in each of these cooperatives were also interviewed, giving out the necessary information for the research. Secondary data was also collected from the Brazilian Association of Crab producers website, as well as from news from important newspapers in RN, such as Tribuna do Norte. The primary data was analyzed in terms of quality, accordingly to the documental analysis technique. Thus, through the data that was collected, it can be concluded that the reasons that motivated the companies to cooperate can be explained in terms of the transactional costs economy. However, the choice of partners is more connected to aspects approached by the social embededness. When aspects related to development and evolution were analyzed, it could be seen that both aspects from TCE and Embededness were vital to explain the development of the cooperatives mentioned
Resumo:
The inclusion of local suppliers in production chains has considerable impact on its performance, but most notably in its main actors. The results of this process may be of different kinds and can be analyzed from economic or institutional approaches. This study aimed to verify the existence of different performances of Petrobras due to the inclusion of local suppliers in the oil and gas production chain in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, from the viewpoints of transaction costs and the Institutional Theory. In order to this, were made the characterization of the PROMINP, the description of its actions and results, the mapping of its institutional context of reference, and identification of results obtained by Petrobras in terms of transaction costs and legitimacy. The theoretical framework is based on authors dealing with industrial concentration, as like Marshall, Krugman, Porter and Schmitz, from the sociological perspective of neoinstitucional theory, as like DiMaggio and Powell and Scott and Meyer, and transaction costs, as like Williamson. This is a qualitative research, with data collection done by consulting secondary fonts and semi-structured interviews with nineteen actors of three groups, namely: actors involved in actions of the program, representatives of enterprises and representative of Petrobras. To analyze the content was used the Suchman s model (1995) for categories associated with strategies of legitimation and fourteen variables associated with the three variables assets specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1995, 1989) in the case of transaction costs. The results indicate that PROMINP has achieved its objectives by encouraging the increased participation of local companies in the oil and gas production chain, reflecting in the economic development of the state. The Redepetro/RN, fostered and built upon the interaction of the participants, is presented as a solution of continuity to the participation of enterprises in the chain, after the closure of the actions of the program. PROMINP demands responses to coercive, legislative and regulatory pressures of the organizational field, whose institutional context of reference is wide. From the point of view of legitimacy, through strategies to gain cognitive legitimacy and maintaining pragmatic legitimacy, Petrobras can manipulate the environment, ensuring the compliance of the constituents to their technical and institutional demands. Enterprises, in turn, respond to the demands through compliance with technical demands, mainly through the certification of processes, and cultural changes. There aren t clear gains related to the transaction costs, however, gains in legitimacy can be seen as a cumulative capital that can serve as a competitive differential that generates economic gains. In terms of theoretical findings, it was found that, due to its explanatory power for actions that are difficult to explain only in economic terms, Institutional Theory may be used as theoretical support concurrent with other theories. TCE model has limitations in explaining the program actions. In the case, it s emphasized that Petrobras doesn t seek only economic efficiency, but has in its mission the commitment to social development.
Resumo:
Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06
Resumo:
This dissertation contains four essays that all share a common purpose: developing new methodologies to exploit the potential of high-frequency data for the measurement, modeling and forecasting of financial assets volatility and correlations. The first two chapters provide useful tools for univariate applications while the last two chapters develop multivariate methodologies. In chapter 1, we introduce a new class of univariate volatility models named FloGARCH models. FloGARCH models provide a parsimonious joint model for low frequency returns and realized measures, and are sufficiently flexible to capture long memory as well as asymmetries related to leverage effects. We analyze the performances of the models in a realistic numerical study and on the basis of a data set composed of 65 equities. Using more than 10 years of high-frequency transactions, we document significant statistical gains related to the FloGARCH models in terms of in-sample fit, out-of-sample fit and forecasting accuracy compared to classical and Realized GARCH models. In chapter 2, using 12 years of high-frequency transactions for 55 U.S. stocks, we argue that combining low-frequency exogenous economic indicators with high-frequency financial data improves the ability of conditionally heteroskedastic models to forecast the volatility of returns, their full multi-step ahead conditional distribution and the multi-period Value-at-Risk. Using a refined version of the Realized LGARCH model allowing for time-varying intercept and implemented with realized kernels, we document that nominal corporate profits and term spreads have strong long-run predictive ability and generate accurate risk measures forecasts over long-horizon. The results are based on several loss functions and tests, including the Model Confidence Set. Chapter 3 is a joint work with David Veredas. We study the class of disentangled realized estimators for the integrated covariance matrix of Brownian semimartingales with finite activity jumps. These estimators separate correlations and volatilities. We analyze different combinations of quantile- and median-based realized volatilities, and four estimators of realized correlations with three synchronization schemes. Their finite sample properties are studied under four data generating processes, in presence, or not, of microstructure noise, and under synchronous and asynchronous trading. The main finding is that the pre-averaged version of disentangled estimators based on Gaussian ranks (for the correlations) and median deviations (for the volatilities) provide a precise, computationally efficient, and easy alternative to measure integrated covariances on the basis of noisy and asynchronous prices. Along these lines, a minimum variance portfolio application shows the superiority of this disentangled realized estimator in terms of numerous performance metrics. Chapter 4 is co-authored with Niels S. Hansen, Asger Lunde and Kasper V. Olesen, all affiliated with CREATES at Aarhus University. We propose to use the Realized Beta GARCH model to exploit the potential of high-frequency data in commodity markets. The model produces high quality forecasts of pairwise correlations between commodities which can be used to construct a composite covariance matrix. We evaluate the quality of this matrix in a portfolio context and compare it to models used in the industry. We demonstrate significant economic gains in a realistic setting including short selling constraints and transaction costs.
Resumo:
The purpose of the study was to explore how a public, IT services transferor, organization, comprised of autonomous entities, can effectively develop and organize its data center cost recovery mechanisms in a fair manner. The lack of a well-defined model for charges and a cost recovery scheme could cause various problems. For example one entity may be subsidizing the costs of another entity(s). Transfer pricing is in the best interest of each autonomous entity in a CCA. While transfer pricing plays a pivotal role in the price settings of services and intangible assets, TCE focuses on the arrangement at the boundary between entities. TCE is concerned with the costs, autonomy, and cooperation issues of an organization. The theory is concern with the factors that influence intra-firm transaction costs and attempting to manifest the problems involved in the determination of the charges or prices of the transactions. This study was carried out, as a single case study, in a public organization. The organization intended to transfer the IT services of its own affiliated public entities and was in the process of establishing a municipal-joint data center. Nine semi-structured interviews, including two pilot interviews, were conducted with the experts and managers of the case company and its affiliating entities. The purpose of these interviews was to explore the charging and pricing issues of the intra-firm transactions. In order to process and summarize the findings, this study employed qualitative techniques with the multiple methods of data collection. The study, by reviewing the TCE theory and a sample of transfer pricing literature, created an IT services pricing framework as a conceptual tool for illustrating the structure of transferring costs. Antecedents and consequences of the transfer price based on TCE were developed. An explanatory fair charging model was eventually developed and suggested. The findings of the study suggested that the Chargeback system was inappropriate scheme for an organization with affiliated autonomous entities. The main contribution of the study was the application of TP methodologies in the public sphere with no tax issues consideration.
Resumo:
The definition of the boundaries of the firms is subject that has occupied the organizational theorists long ago, being the seminal work of Coase (1937) indicated as the trigger for one theoretical evolution, with emphasis on governance structures, which led to a modern theory of incomplete contracts. The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory arise within this evolution, being widely used in studies related to the theme. Empirically, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has established itself as a suitable tool for analysis of efficiency. Although TCE argues that specific assets must be internalized, recent studies outside the mainstream of theory show that, often, firms may decide, for various reasons, hire them on the market. Researches on transaction costs face with the unavailability of information and methodological difficulties in measuring their critical variables. There`s still the need for further methodological deepening. The theoretical framework includes classic works of TCE and Agency Theory, but also more recent works, outside the mainstream of TCE, which warn about the existence of strategies in use of specific assets that aren`t necessarily aligned with the classical ideas of TCE. The Brazilian oil industry is the focus of this thesis, that aimed to evaluate the efficiency of contracts involving high specificity service outsourced by Petrobras. In order to this, we made the categorization of outsourced services in terms of specificity, as well the description of services with higher specificity. Then, we verified the existence of relationship between the specificity of services and a number of variables, being found divergent results than those that are preached by the mainstream of TCE. Then, we designed a DEA model to analyze the efficiency in the use of onshore drilling rigs, identified among the services of highest specificity. The next step was the application of the model to evaluate the performance of drilling rigs contracts. Finally, we verified the existence of relationship between the efficiency of contracts and a number of variables, being found, again, results not consistent with the theory mainstream. Regarding to analyze of efficiency of drilling rigs contracts, the model developed is compatible with what is found in academic productions in efficiency of drilling rigs. The results on efficiency show a wide range of scores, with efficiencies ranging from 31.79% to 100%, being low the sample efficiency average. There is consonance between the model results and the practices adopted by Petrobras. The results strengthen the DEA as an important tool in studies of efficiency with possibility to use for analysis other types of contracts. In terms of theoretical findings, the results reinforce the arguments that there are situations in which the strategies of the organizations, in terms of use of assets and services of high specificity, do not necessarily follow what is recommended by the mainstream of TCE
Resumo:
The current study analyzes the birth and development of two strategic alliances established between shrimp producers in Rio Grande do Norte: the Unipesca and the Coopercam. To achieve this aim, two approaches which, at first sight, could be considered contradictory were used: the Transactional Costs Economy and Embeddedness. The first approach is fundamentally based in the studies of Williamson (1985; 1991; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2002). Embededness, on the other hand, went through the review of a series of authors, such as Burt (1992), Granovetter (1973; 1985), Uzzi (1997), Gulati (1994; 1995; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000), Nielsen (2005), Ring (2002), Ring and Van de Ven (1994), Zafirovski (2002), among others. To analyze the birth and development of the cooperatives in this study, Gulati s work (1998) was used. This study shows the steps to be studied for a better comprehension of an alliance: the decision of starting an alliance and the choice of the partners, the decision about the governance structure, the evolution of the alliance and the development of the companies which established this partnership. To carry this study out, a study case accordingly to Yin s proposal (2001) was adopted. Semi-structured interviews with pre-defined plots were conducted in two phases: in the beginning of 2006 and in the beginning of 2007. The subjects from the research were, in 2006, representative members of the main associations and corporations, besides the shrimp producers from the state, when the context of the activity was set. In the second phase, in 2007, representative members from the two cooperatives that were listed above were interviewed the president from Coopercam and the marketing manager from Unipesca. Besides these two members, directors from two important organizations in each of these cooperatives were also interviewed, giving out the necessary information for the research. Secondary data was also collected from the Brazilian Association of Crab producers website, as well as from news from important newspapers in RN, such as Tribuna do Norte. The primary data was analyzed in terms of quality, accordingly to the documental analysis technique. Thus, through the data that was collected, it can be concluded that the reasons that motivated the companies to cooperate can be explained in terms of the transactional costs economy. However, the choice of partners is more connected to aspects approached by the social embededness. When aspects related to development and evolution were analyzed, it could be seen that both aspects from TCE and Embededness were vital to explain the development of the cooperatives mentioned
Resumo:
The inclusion of local suppliers in production chains has considerable impact on its performance, but most notably in its main actors. The results of this process may be of different kinds and can be analyzed from economic or institutional approaches. This study aimed to verify the existence of different performances of Petrobras due to the inclusion of local suppliers in the oil and gas production chain in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, from the viewpoints of transaction costs and the Institutional Theory. In order to this, were made the characterization of the PROMINP, the description of its actions and results, the mapping of its institutional context of reference, and identification of results obtained by Petrobras in terms of transaction costs and legitimacy. The theoretical framework is based on authors dealing with industrial concentration, as like Marshall, Krugman, Porter and Schmitz, from the sociological perspective of neoinstitucional theory, as like DiMaggio and Powell and Scott and Meyer, and transaction costs, as like Williamson. This is a qualitative research, with data collection done by consulting secondary fonts and semi-structured interviews with nineteen actors of three groups, namely: actors involved in actions of the program, representatives of enterprises and representative of Petrobras. To analyze the content was used the Suchman s model (1995) for categories associated with strategies of legitimation and fourteen variables associated with the three variables assets specificity, bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1995, 1989) in the case of transaction costs. The results indicate that PROMINP has achieved its objectives by encouraging the increased participation of local companies in the oil and gas production chain, reflecting in the economic development of the state. The Redepetro/RN, fostered and built upon the interaction of the participants, is presented as a solution of continuity to the participation of enterprises in the chain, after the closure of the actions of the program. PROMINP demands responses to coercive, legislative and regulatory pressures of the organizational field, whose institutional context of reference is wide. From the point of view of legitimacy, through strategies to gain cognitive legitimacy and maintaining pragmatic legitimacy, Petrobras can manipulate the environment, ensuring the compliance of the constituents to their technical and institutional demands. Enterprises, in turn, respond to the demands through compliance with technical demands, mainly through the certification of processes, and cultural changes. There aren t clear gains related to the transaction costs, however, gains in legitimacy can be seen as a cumulative capital that can serve as a competitive differential that generates economic gains. In terms of theoretical findings, it was found that, due to its explanatory power for actions that are difficult to explain only in economic terms, Institutional Theory may be used as theoretical support concurrent with other theories. TCE model has limitations in explaining the program actions. In the case, it s emphasized that Petrobras doesn t seek only economic efficiency, but has in its mission the commitment to social development.
Resumo:
We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms.In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices, while integration occurs at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Second, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can lead to inefficient reorganization and adversely affect consumers. Third, “deep integration” — the liberalization of both product and factor markets — leads to the convergence of organizational design across countries.
Resumo:
Doutoramento em Gestão.
Resumo:
Ph.D. in the Faculty of Business Administration