Ukraine and the European Union: Time for a Re-Think. ACES Working Papers, 2011

There are two reasons for the virtual nature of the West’s dialogue with Ukraine. The first is institutional as the EU has until now only been willing to use ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in ‘enlargement-heavy’ (i.e. full membership) whereas it has only used ‘carrots,’ but never ‘sticks’, in ‘enlargement-light’ (i.e. the DCFTA). European Council Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson argue that the EU should be more willing to use both carrots and sticks; that is integrating its soft and hard power. The second is a disconnection between the West and Kyiv over definitions of democracy. The Ukrainian authorities have until now wanted to have their cake and eat it, too; rolling back democracy in Kyiv while claiming to sign up to ‘European values’ in Brussels.

Time to think about a European Union operated airlift capability? Security Policy Brief No. 62, April 2015

The European Council of June 2015 will assess concrete progress regarding its conclusions of December 2013 and provide further guidance in the most promising areas. This could be the right time to propose innovative solutions to long-lasting issues and shortfalls - strategic airlift being one of them – and increased civil/military synergies. Could the A400M become part of the answer?

What do Eurozone academics think about EMU reform? On broad support and German exceptionalism. Bruges Political Research Papers 41/2015.

This paper is an empirical contribution to the literature on the formation of policy preferences on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform within its Member States. In the aftermath of the euro crisis, many proposals to ‘complete’ EMU have been tabled. However, discord among Member States has led to a piecemeal restructuring of EMU. For this paper, a survey has been conducted among euro area academic experts, gauging preferences on EMU reform. We find that general consensus masks significant discord among academics from different Member States. Our data indicates the existence of conflicting national epistemic communities, bound by shared causal beliefs on macro-economic policy. Academics within the key creditor Member State, Germany, assume an outlier position. Within the sample of German academics, economists are particularly strongly opposed to all moves in the direction of fiscal or social union. As economists are those academic experts most likely to influence the economic policy beliefs dominant among the German policy elite, these results are highly politically salient. We confront these findings with the literature on the exceptionalism of German economics. We contend that our results substantiate the claim that inadequate EMU reform and, more generally, the EU approach to the Eurozone crisis, can be partially explained by the firm grip these economic doctrines hold over the economics profession and policy-making circles in Germany.