831 resultados para Sociodemographic structures
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2006
Resumo:
Coupled Electromechanical Analysis, MEMS Modeling, MEMS, RF MEMS Switches, Defected Ground Structures, Reconfigurable Resonator
Resumo:
Serotonin, dopamine, parental separation, microdialysis, methylphenidate
Resumo:
Complex Microwave Structures Wake Field Computatation PETRA III Generalized Multipole Technique Antenna Antennen Wakefelder Berechnung
Resumo:
feature extraction, feature tracking, vector field visualization
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2009
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Verfahrens- und Systemtechnik, Diss., 2009
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013
Resumo:
Aus: CrystEngComm, Vol. 17.2015, H. 2, S. 331-337
Resumo:
v.39:no.1(1978)
Resumo:
v.33:no.29(1978)
Resumo:
We describe an equivalence of categories between the category of mixed Hodge structures and a category of vector bundles on the toric complex projective plane which verify some semistability condition. We then apply this correspondence to define an invariant which generalises the notion of R-split mixed Hodge structure and compute extensions in the category of mixed Hodge structures in terms of extensions of the corresponding vector bundles. We also give a relative version of this correspondence and apply it to define stratifications of the bases of the variations of mixed Hodge structure.
Resumo:
"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."
Resumo:
Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.
Resumo:
This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game