Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.

On the nucleolus of 2 x 2 assignment games

[spa] En este artículo hallamos fórmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asignación arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignación. Los resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignación de tipo 2 x m o m x 2.

Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.

Simulations in Evolution. III. Randomness as a Generator of Opportunities.

In Neo-Darwinism, variation and natural selection are the two evolutionary mechanisms which propel biological evolution. Our previous reports presented a histogram model to simulate the evolution of populations of individuals classified into bins according to an unspecified, quantifiable phenotypic character, and whose number in each bin changed generation after generation under the influence of fitness, while the total population was maintained constant. The histogram model also allowed Shannon entropy (SE) to be monitored continuously as the information content of the total population decreased or increased. Here, a simple Perl (Practical Extraction and Reporting Language) application was developed to carry out these computations, with the critical feature of an added random factor in the percent of individuals whose offspring moved to a vicinal bin. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the random factor mimicking variation increased considerably the range of values covered by Shannon entropy, especially when the percentage of changed offspring was high. This increase in information content is interpreted as facilitated adaptability of the population.

Hierarchy of interactive functions in father-mother-baby three-way games

In developmental research, the family has mainly been studied through dyadic interaction. Three-way interactions have received less attention, partly because of their complexity. This difficulty may be overcome by distinguishing between four hierarchically embedded functions in three-way interactions: (1) participation (inclusion of all participants), (2) organization (partners keeping to their roles), (3) focalization (sharing a common focus) and (4) affective contact (being in tune). We document this hierarchical model on a sample of 80 families observed in the Lausanne Trilogue Play situation across four different sites. Hierarchy between functions was demonstrated by means of Guttman scalability coefficient. Given the importance of the child's development in a threesome, the pertinence of this model for family assessment is discussed.

Magnetic structure of Li2CuO2: From ab initio calculations to macroscopic simulations

The magnetic structure of the edge-sharing cuprate compound Li2CuO2 has been investigated with highly correlated ab initio electronic structure calculations. The first- and second-neighbor in-chain magnetic interactions are calculated to be 142 and -22 K, respectively. The ratio between the two parameters is smaller than suggested previously in the literature. The interchain interactions are antiferromagnetic in nature and of the order of a few K only. Monte Carlo simulations using the ab initio parameters to define the spin model Hamiltonian result in a Nel temperature in good agreement with experiment. Spin population analysis situates the magnetic moment on the copper and oxygen ions between the completely localized picture derived from experiment and the more delocalized picture based on local-density calculations.

The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

English grammar games in primary education

The purpose of this study was to analyse pupils’ English grammar acquisition from competitive and cooperative approaches. After searching a wide range of authors’ contribution to English language learning, grammar acquisition, classroom environment and language games. A hundred and twenty pupils from three schools; two from Ripoll and one from Campdevànol were enrolled in a specific grammar games intervention. This was imparted in three different phases: first of all, I interviewed the three teachers from the three schools, then I put into practice my competitive and cooperative games which I designed especially for this study (all the sessions were carried, assessed and registered by myself); finally, all pupils answered a questionnaire related to their experiences in my grammar games intervention. Analysis of teaching interventions showed that, in terms of English language acquisition, pupils used different strategies to show up understanding and achieve the objective of the game such as: recalling their background knowledge, expressing sentences influenced by their internal language and their mother tongue. Data collected revealed that most difficulties were founded in team work, even more in competitive games. The results also showed that team work is something which has to be developed step by step in order to achieve language learning and all pupils’ active participation successfully.

Quantitative integration of high-resolution hydrogeophysical data through Monte-Carlo-type conditional simulations

Geophysical techniques can help to bridge the inherent gap with regard to spatial resolution and the range of coverage that plagues classical hydrological methods. This has lead to the emergence of the new and rapidly growing field of hydrogeophysics. Given the differing sensitivities of various geophysical techniques to hydrologically relevant parameters and their inherent trade-off between resolution and range the fundamental usefulness of multi-method hydrogeophysical surveys for reducing uncertainties in data analysis and interpretation is widely accepted. A major challenge arising from such endeavors is the quantitative integration of the resulting vast and diverse database in order to obtain a unified model of the probed subsurface region that is internally consistent with all available data. To address this problem, we have developed a strategy towards hydrogeophysical data integration based on Monte-Carlo-type conditional stochastic simulation that we consider to be particularly suitable for local-scale studies characterized by high-resolution and high-quality datasets. Monte-Carlo-based optimization techniques are flexible and versatile, allow for accounting for a wide variety of data and constraints of differing resolution and hardness and thus have the potential of providing, in a geostatistical sense, highly detailed and realistic models of the pertinent target parameter distributions. Compared to more conventional approaches of this kind, our approach provides significant advancements in the way that the larger-scale deterministic information resolved by the hydrogeophysical data can be accounted for, which represents an inherently problematic, and as of yet unresolved, aspect of Monte-Carlo-type conditional simulation techniques. We present the results of applying our algorithm to the integration of porosity log and tomographic crosshole georadar data to generate stochastic realizations of the local-scale porosity structure. Our procedure is first tested on pertinent synthetic data and then applied to corresponding field data collected at the Boise Hydrogeophysical Research Site near Boise, Idaho, USA.

A framework for hybrid simulations of two-phase flow in porous media

Rough a global coarse problem. Although these techniques are usually employed for problems in which the fine-scale processes are described by Darcy's law, they can also be applied to pore-scale simulations and used as a mathematical framework for hybrid methods that couples a Darcy and pore scales. In this work, we consider a pore-scale description of fine-scale processes. The Navier-Stokes equations are numerically solved in the pore geometry to compute the velocity field and obtain generalized permeabilities. In the case of two-phase flow, the dynamics of the phase interface is described by the volume of fluid method with the continuum surface force model. The MsFV method is employed to construct an algorithm that couples a Darcy macro-scale description with a pore-scale description at the fine scale. The hybrid simulations results presented are in good agreement with the fine-scale reference solutions. As the reconstruction of the fine-scale details can be done adaptively, the presented method offers a flexible framework for hybrid modeling.