Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups

This research rests on the assumption that individual differences approaches to prejudice benefit from all integration of intergroup factors. Following Duckitt (2001), we assumed that two prominent individual differences variables, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO), would differentially predict majority members' levels of ethnic prejudice depending on specific factors of the intergroup context: RWA as all index of motivational concerns about social cohesion, stability and security should drive prejudice against outgroups perceived as socially threatening, and SDO as an index of concerns about ingroup superiority and dominance should predict prejudice against outgroups perceived as potential competitors for power-status. Across two studies (Ns = 82, 176), using between-participants and within-participants experimental designs, the effects of RWA on prejudice were particularly powerful when the outgroup was manipulated to be socially threatening, but the effects of SDO on prejudice appeared not to increase when the outgroup was manipulated to be competitive. In Study 2, presenting the outgroup as having low status also increased the effect of RWA, but not the effect of SDO. These results support the differential prediction assumption for RWA, but not for SDO. Implications for the conceptualisation of RWA and SDO are discussed. Copyright (C) 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

On How to Build a Positive Understanding of the Child’s Right to Freedom of Expression

This article looks at the child’s right to freedom of expression under UN treaties. It defines the legal basis, the scope and the extent of the child’s right and it compares it with the adult’s right to freedom of expression. It argues that freedom of expression has both a developmental and an autonomy aspect, and that Article 12 UNCRC does a better job at encapsulating the child’s right than Article 13. It concludes that the child’s right is very much based on the positive obligations of the state, to the difference of traditional international law on freedom of expression.