943 resultados para Punishment, Symbol, Authority
Resumo:
This paper provides a systematic approach to theproblem of nondata aided symbol-timing estimation for linearmodulations. The study is performed under the unconditionalmaximum likelihood framework where the carrier-frequencyerror is included as a nuisance parameter in the mathematicalderivation. The second-order moments of the received signal arefound to be the sufficient statistics for the problem at hand and theyallow the provision of a robust performance in the presence of acarrier-frequency error uncertainty. We particularly focus on theexploitation of the cyclostationary property of linear modulations.This enables us to derive simple and closed-form symbol-timingestimators which are found to be based on the well-known squaretiming recovery method by Oerder and Meyr. Finally, we generalizethe OM method to the case of linear modulations withoffset formats. In this case, the square-law nonlinearity is foundto provide not only the symbol-timing but also the carrier-phaseerror.
Resumo:
Most corporate codes of conduct and multi-stakeholder sustainability standards guarantee workers' rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, but many authors are sceptical about the concrete impact of codes and standards of this kind. In this paper we use Hancher and Moran's (1998) concept of 'regulatory space' to assess the potential of private transnational regulation to support the growth of trade union membership and collective bargaining relationships, drawing on some preliminary case study results from a project on the impact of the International Finance Corporation's (IFC) social conditionality on worker organization and social dialogue. One of the major effects of neoliberal economic and industrial policy has been the routine exclusion of workers' organizations from regulatory processes on the grounds that they introduce inappropriate 'political' motives into what ought to be technical decision-making processes. This, rather than any direct attack on their capacity to take action, is what seems best to explain the global decline in union influence (Cradden 2004; Howell 2007; Howe 2012). The evidence we present in the paper suggests that private labour regulation may under certain conditions contribute to a reversal of this tendency, re-establishing the legitimacy of workers' organizations within regulatory processes and by extension the legitimacy of their use of economic and social power. We argue that guarantees of freedom of association and bargaining rights within private regulation schemes are effective to the extent that they can be used by workers' organizations in support of a claim for access to the regulatory space within which the terms and conditions of the employment relationship are determined. Our case study evidence shows that certain trade unions in East Africa have indeed been able to use IFC and other private regulation schemes as levers to win recognition from employers and to establish collective bargaining relationships. Although they did not attempt to use formal procedures to make a claim for the enforcement of freedom of association rights on behalf of their members, the unions did use enterprises' adherence to private regulation schemes as a normative point of reference in argument and political exchange about worker representation. For these unions, the regulation was a useful addition to the range of arguments that they could deploy as means to justify their demand for recognition by employers. By contrast, the private regulation that helps workers' organizations to win access to regulatory processes does little to ensure that they are able to participate meaningfully, whether in terms of technical capacity or of their ability to mobilize social power as a counterweight to the economic power of employers. To the extent that our East African unions were able to make an impact on terms and conditions of employment via their participation in regulatory space it was solely on the basis of their own capacities and resources and the application of national labour law.
Resumo:
Tutkimuksessa haluttiin selvittää, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat ravintoon liittyvän suositusmerkin käyttöön kuluttajan ostopäätöksen apuna. Tutkimuksen viitekehyksen pohjaksi valittiin suunnitellun toiminnan teoria, joka on osoittautunut selittämään hyvin useaa ravintoon- ja terveyteen liittyvää käyttäytymistä. Tutkimustoteutettiin kyselytutkimuksella, jonka aineisto kerättiin Internetissä julkaistulla kyselylomakkeella. Tulokset osoittivat, että kuluttajan aikomus käyttää suositusmerkkiä oli mallin vahvin selittäjä. Lisäksi merkin käyttöä selitti kuluttajan kokema sisäinen kontrolli, johon ulkoinen kontrolli vahvasti vaikuttaa. Ostopäätössitoutumisen havaittiin vaikuttavan aikomuksen ja todellisen merkin käytön väliseen yhteyteen. Yleisesti tulokset osoittivat, että kuluttajilla on aikomusta käyttää merkkiä, mutta todellinen käyttö on huomattavasti vähäisempää.
Resumo:
Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been over-interpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists, but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala's review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.
Resumo:
The impact of transnational private regulation on labour standards remains in dispute. While studies have provided some limited evidence of positive effects on 'outcome standards' such as wages or occupational health and safety, the literature gives little reason to believe that there has been any significant effect on 'process rights' relating primarily to collective workers' voice and social dialogue. This paper probes this assumption by bringing local contexts and worker agency more fully into the picture. It outlines an analytical framework that emphasizes workers' potential to act collectively for change in the regulatory space surrounding the employment relationship. It argues that while transnational private regulation on labour standards may marginally improve workers access to regulatory spaces and their capacity to require the inclusion of enterprises in them, it does little to increase union leverage. The findings are based on empirical research work conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Resumo:
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini-ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross-validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts any positive offer; two groups process primarily the objective properties of the allocations (fairness and kindness) and need more time the more properties need to be examined; and a fourth group, which takes more time than the others, appears to take into account what they would have proposed had they been put in the role of the proposer. We discuss implications of this joint decision-response time analysis.
Resumo:
Human social interactions are regulated by moral norms that define individual obligations and rights. These norms are enforced by punishment of transgressors and reward of followers. Yet, the generality and strength of this drive to punish or reward is unclear, especially when people are not personally involved in the situation and when the actual impact of their sanction is only indirect, i.e., when it diminishes or promotes the social status of the punished or rewarded individual. In a real-life study, we investigated if people are inclined to anonymously punish or reward a person for her past deeds in a different social context. Participants from three socio-professional categories voted anonymously for early career violinists in an important violin competition. We found that participants did not punish an immoral violin candidate, nor did they reward another hyper-moral candidate. On the contrary, one socio-professional category sanctioned hyper-morality. Hence, salient moral information about past behavior did not elicit punishment or reward in an impersonal situation where the impact of the sanction was indirect. We conclude that contextual features play an important role in human motivation to enforce moral norms.
Dial M for Murder: A Case of Passion Killing, Criminal Evidence and Sultanic Power in Medieval India
Resumo:
This paper considers the structures and applications of the criminal judicial system in the Islamic Later Middle Period as it developed in India under the sultans of Delhi (1200-1400 CE). A fundamental issue in crime and punishment is the relationship between sultanic power and religious authority. Particularly at stake in this relationship is the question of who can sanction the highest form of punishment, i.e. the death penalty (siyāsa). Contemporary historians and scholars in the study of religion investigating the relationship between sharīʿa and siyāsa to reveal the extent and limits of sultanic power show a system of governance that allowed for the delegation of authority, particularly in the area of the judiciary, from the sultan down to viziers and judges. Some scholars depict the relationship between the ʿulamāʾ and the sultan as a kind of stand off. The actual dynamics of legal jurisdiction were much more complex. This study proposes a new interpretive framework for understanding the relationship between political power and religious authority through a critical analysis of the criminal judicial system, law, and historical narrative. In particular, I consider a murder case described by Shams al-dīn Sirāj ʿAfīf in one of the most significant histories written in the later Delhi Sultanate, the Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī.
Resumo:
We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation
Resumo:
ABSTRACT In this article I explore whether liberal retributive justice should be conceived of either individualistically or holistically. I critically examine the individualistic account of retributive justice and suggest that the question of retribution – i.e., whether and when punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual – must be answered holistically. By resorting to the ideal of sensitive reasons, a model of legitimacy at the basis of our best normative models of democracy, the article argues that in modern liberal democracies, punishment of an offender A for f is compatible with just treatment of A only if punishment of an individual for f can be legitimate in A's and A's fellow citizens' eyes. Only once retributive justice is understood in this holistic fashion the imposition of punishment can be made compatible with just treatment of individuals.