Solution to Darwin's dilemma: Discovery of the missing Precambrian record of life

In 1859, in On the Origin of Species, Darwin broached what he regarded to be the most vexing problem facing his theory of evolution—the lack of a rich fossil record predating the rise of shelly invertebrates that marks the beginning of the Cambrian Period of geologic time (≈550 million years ago), an “inexplicable” absence that could be “truly urged as a valid argument” against his all embracing synthesis. For more than 100 years, the “missing Precambrian history of life” stood out as one of the greatest unsolved mysteries in natural science. But in recent decades, understanding of life's history has changed markedly as the documented fossil record has been extended seven-fold to some 3,500 million years ago, an age more than three-quarters that of the planet itself. This long-sought solution to Darwin's dilemma was set in motion by a small vanguard of workers who blazed the trail in the 1950s and 1960s, just as their course was charted by a few pioneering pathfinders of the previous century, a history of bold pronouncements, dashed dreams, search, and final discovery.

Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.

The Dilemma of Obesity Stigma in Psychotherapy

This paper explores the ways in which the growth of obesity in the United States is likely to impact psychotherapy, particularly in its implications for the management and awareness of obesity stigma in therapists' work with obese clients. Obesity poses a dilemma because no element of an individual's identity should be stigmatized in psychotherapy, and yet obesity impacts the individual's physical health and psychological well-being (Ogden & Clementi, 2010). As stigma specific to obesity is only beginning to be understood, the purpose of this paper is to examine obesity stigma through the lens of Erving Goffman's (1963) theories put forth in his book Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. A case example is offered as a means of understanding the therapeutic issue of weight loss and psychotherapy with an obese client, particularly from the standpoint of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy.

Commitments or prohibition? The EU antitrust dilemma. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/01, 31 January 2014

The issue: Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringements of European Union competition law are resolved with ‘commitment decisions’. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a commitment from the company under investigation to implement measures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition decisions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost, however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judicial review. This reduces the European Commission’s incentive to build a robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law. Policy challenge: The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions. More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas, such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it difficult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition rules. To ensure greater transparency and mitigate some of the drawbacks of commitment decisions, while retaining their main benefits, the full detail of the objections addressed by the European Commission to defendants should be published.

The policy dilemma of the unitary patent. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/13, 27 November 2014

This paper provides new evidence about the budgetary consequences – for patent offices – of the coexistence of the forthcoming Unitary Patent (UP) with the current European Patent (EP). Simulation results illustrate a dilemma between (1) high UP renewal fees to ensure enough financial income for all national patent offices (NPOs) and (2) low UP renewal fees to make the UP system affordable, with very few NPOs losing on financial revenues. The simulations help to understand the positions of several patent offices, and underline an alternative way to proceed with the negotiations while reducing financial risks for the whole system.