The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Els catalans de sentiment nacional espanyol i el seu suport a la sobirania : Condicions i Drets.

L'objecte d'aquest treball final del Màster d'Anàlisi Política de la UOC (2008) és fer una reflexió basada en casos de diversos països de característiques similars a Catalunya, seguida de propostes estratègiques i de decisions a prendre sobre les condicions i seguretats que podrien fer decantar la població catalana de sentiment nacional espanyol cap a un vot favorable a la independència en un referèndum sobiranista.

Managing Climate Insecurity by Ensuring Continuous Capital Accumulation : 'Climate Refugees' and 'Climate Migrants'

Numerous recent reports by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and international organisations have focused on so-called 'climate refugees'. This article examines the turn from a discourse of 'climate refugees', in which organisations perceive migration as a failure of both mitigation and adaptation to climate change, to one of 'climate migration', in which organisations promote migration as a strategy of adaptation. Its focus is the promotion of climate migration management, and it explores the trend of these discourses through two sections. First, it provides an empirical account of the two discourses, emphasising the differentiation between them. It then focuses on the discourse of climate migration, its origins, extent and content, and the associated practices of 'migration management'. The second part argues that the turn to the promotion of 'climate migration' should be understood as a way to manage the insecurity created by climate change. However, international organisations enacts this management within the forms of neoliberal capitalism, including the framework of governance. Therefore, the promotion of 'climate migration' as a strategy of adaptation to climate change is located within the tendencies of neoliberalism and the reconfiguration of southern states' sovereignty through governance.

Spiritual Kinship, Political Mobilization and Social Cooperation: a Swiss Alpine valley in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

In this chapter I will present some observations and results about Ritual Kinship and political mobilization of popular groups in an Alpine valley: the Val de Bagnes, in the Swiss canton of Valais, - a mountain valley, well known today thanks to the tourist station of Verbier - where we can rely on excellent sources about local families. This region presents a particular political situation, because the 11 major villages of the valley form only one commune, which includes the whole valley.¦There are two major reasons to choose the Val de Bagnes for our inquiry on kinship and social networks in a rural society:¦A. The existence of sharp political and social conflicts during the 18th and the 19th centuries;¦B. The existence of almost systematic genealogical data between 1700 and 1900. (Casanova, Gard, Perrenoud 2005-08)¦The 18th century was characterized by the struggle of an important part of the community of Bagnes against the feudal lord, the abbot of St-Maurice. The culminating point was a local upheaval in 1745 in Le Châble, during which the abbot was forced to sign several documents in accordance with the wishes of the rebels (Guzzi-Heeb 2007). In the 19th century feudal lordship was abolished, but now the struggle confronted a liberal-radical faction and the conservative majority in the commune.¦The starting point of my presentation focuses on this question: which role did spiritual kinship play in the political mobilization of popular groups and in the organization of competing factions? This question allows us to shed light on some utilizations and meanings of spiritual kinship in the local society. Was spiritual kinship a significant instrument for economic cooperation? Or was it a channel for privileged social contacts and transactions?