Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

'The power gained, we will never surrender': Russian ruling elite versus the succession and economic crisis. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), October 2009

Even though the economic crisis proved harmful to the Russian economy and people's living standards, it has nonetheless failed to make the elite revise its policy. Despite some problems, the government has managed to sustain economic and political stability, thanks to the reserves it amassed in the times of prosperity, and to the propaganda campaign that protected it, above all Vladimir Putin. The crisis failed to force the elite to implement deeper structural and political reforms. Moreover, it has actually reinforced existing tendencies, such as state control over the economy and its oil-oriented character, the elite's economic expansion at the expense of private businesses, and the preservation of political power. Thus, the crisis has so far failed to dismantle Putinism, indeed quite the reverse - it has in fact contributed to its becoming 'set in stone'.

Designing a Genuine EMU: Which "Unions" for EU and Eurozone? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 34/2014

The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’ for the wider public suggested to design an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking unions as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews. What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union, social union and political union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a ‘political union’ is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, at best, it is a highly elastic notion: it might be thought necessary for reasons of domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis. Taking each one of these arguments separately, a range of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as ‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with a modest common Fund and carefully confined but centralised powers, the author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort function of the ECB. Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought to be pursued. Yet, political legitimacy matters, both with national parliaments and the grassroots. National parliaments will have to play a larger role.

Economic Implications of Enlargement. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 1/2002

The Eastern enlargement is about to be decided by the European Council. As expected, the “end game “ of the negotiations and assessments is heavily biased by a narrow perspective on net transfers, on income compensations to Central European farmers and on the psychological politics of a single “big bang “. None of these three so-called key items of the end game are of much relevance to appreciate the significance of enlargement. Net transfers have little to do with the costs and benefits of club membership for countries which pay, and can lead to addiction and lethargy rather than extra growth if market integration, macro-economic stability and domestic reforms are not taken serious (as the case of Greece before 1997 has demonstrated). Income compensations for Eastern farmers are crucial for this pressure group, and symbolically of some importance in domestic politics because of the perversity that rich farmers get more, but their absence is likely to serve the public interest in candidate countries far better. And being part of the big bang, as against getting in one or three years later, has assumed a dramatic meaning during this end game, far beyond its true proportions. This hectic European theatre tends to obscure what enlargement is mainly about, now that the stability and values have been secured for the peoples from Central Europe. In a guaranteed setting of peace, freedom and security, enlargement is about greater prosperity.

EU Enlargement: external economic implications. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 4/2003

Unlike some previous EU enlargements (e.g. with the UK and with Spain/Portugal) the present EU enlargement to Central Europe has not prompted much, let alone a fierce, debate about the external dimension. This BEEP briefing discusses the main economic aspects of the external dimension, in particular whether there is a threat of (how much) trade diversion. Attention is paid to the three main topics of interest for third countries: industrial trade effects, impact on FDI and agricultural trade effects. Agriculture is arguably the most sensitive of the three, given the very high CAP border protection, and although large-scale trade diversion may eventually occur under certain scenarios (such as an unreformed CAP), these fears are greatly exaggerated in the short to medium term (5-7 years): the time frame considered is therefore all-important. This conclusion becomes less surprising if one takes a closer look at the current sorry state of agriculture in the CEECs. Separate sections treat the somewhat sensitive subject of U.S.-CEEC Bilateral Investment Treaties, as well as the longterm development perspective, which addresses the prospects for catch-up growth by the accession countries. In the end, non-European stakeholders in the accession process will greatly benefit from sustained catch-up growth by the CEECs, which are locking-in deep reforms due to EU accession.

The Financial Crisis and the Future of the Eurozone. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 21/2010

The government debt crisis, erupted in the Eurozone in 2009, nearly led to the collapse of European monetary union. Now that this has been averted, the question is what should be done to make the Eurozone sustainable in the long run. The survival of the Eurozone hinges on the capacity of its leaders to improve the eurozone's governance. With the exception of Greece, the root cause of the government debt crisis has little to do with the poor performance of the SGP, rather, with unsustainable debt accumulation by private actors. Also, the method of convergence implicit in the SGP has not worked well – macroeconomic divergences have stubbornly remained for nearly a decade and several countries experienced boom and bust dynamics. Although strong declines in real interest rates may explain part of the story (but e.g. Italy did not experience boom & bust), self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism which might be called 'animal spirits' and are of mainly national origin, seem a good candidate for explanation. These national animal spirits endogenously trigger credit expansion and contraction. It follows that (national) movements of credit ought to be under much firmer control and this is up to the monetary authorities, including the ECB. Critical recommendations for better governance of the Eurozone should therefore combine credible measures to maintain fiscal discipline over the medium term with such instruments as minimum reserve requirements to control the growth of bank credit as well as minimum reserve requirements in different national banking systems. Finally, the idea of adding more sanctions to the SGP may be ill-conceived since, in future, it might pre-empt national governments to come to the rescue of banks (under credible threats of contagion) and/or prevent a downward spiral in economic activity.

Why Is Sovereign Debt Restructuring a Challenge? The Case of Greece. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 24/2012

The reduction of Greek sovereign debt by €106 billion, agreed in the second bailout package of February 2012, is the largest in history. Nevertheless, immediately after publishing the key terms of the package, doubts arose whether it would achieve its goals: to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to 120.5% in 2020 and to ensure the return of Greece to market financing by 2015. This Briefing gives a timely input to the debate as it develops an analytical framework through which the expected failure of the Greek debt reduction can be assessed. It surveys the economic literature to identify three groups of factors reducing the effectiveness of sovereign debt restructuring: (1) sovereign’s fundamentals, (2) inefficiencies inherent in the restructuring process and (3) costs of restructuring; and applies them to the case of Greece. Based on this analysis, three policy implications are formulated, with relevance to Greece and the wider eurozone. Firstly, the importance of increased policy effort by Greece to enact current structural and growth-enhancing reforms is underlined. Secondly, the introduction of uniform CACs is proposed that will reduce the market participants’ uncertainty, discipline the runs on government debt and address the holdout inefficiency. Finally, sovereign debt restructuring is not recommended as a universal solution for over- indebtedness in the EU, given the direct and reputation costs of sovereign debt restructuring and the self-fulfilling nature of sovereign debt crises.

The Impact of CAP Reforms on Farm Labour Structure. Factor Markets Working Document No. 63, August 2013

The labour force engaged in the agricultural sector is declining over time, and one can observe the reallocation of labour from family members to hired workers. Using farm-level data, this paper analyses the on-farm labour structure in Greece and assesses the factors driving its evolution over the period 1990-2008. The impact of agricultural policies and farm characteristics is examined in a dynamic panel analysis. Family and hired labour are found to be substitutes rather than complements, while agricultural support measures appear to negatively affect demand for both family and hired labour. Decoupled payments and subsidies on crops are found to have a significant impact on both sources of labour, as well as subsidies for rural development that do not favour on-farm labour use. The paper also finds that structural labour adjustments are the result of farm characteristics, such as farm size and location. The results are robust to various estimation techniques and specifications.

A Microsimulation of the Impact of Tax Reforms on Child Poverty: the Case of Italy. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 29/February 2014

Microsimulation models have been used in order to find efficient counteractive instruments to poverty. The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of fiscal policy on poverty, insisting on child poverty rates. Empirical analysis suggests that in fighting poverty, a mix of policies need to be in place, fiscal reforms increasing tax allowances such as child benefit granted to parents with dependent children, are not sufficient to reduce child poverty.

Exporting the Internal Market – Panacea or Nemesis for the European Neighbourhood Policy? Lessons from the Energy Community. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 2, 2014

Over the last decades, a constant feature of the relations between the European Union (EU) and the countries in its neighbourhood has been the export of European law. Achieved through bilateral or multilateral agreements, the export of law has led to the ‘juridification’ of external policy. The energy sector is in the vanguard of this development. European energy law has been made applicable to third countries through the European Economic Area (EEA) and, most important for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Energy Community. Bilateral agreements of relevance for energy include the (draft) Association Agreement with Ukraine which was rejected in November 2013 and came on the agenda again following a revolution in the country. Geopolitics has played and continues to play an eminent role in this respect. What does that mean for the export of European law to neighbouring countries? This paper argues that the export of European (energy) law does not only remain possible but is preferable to purely diplomatic relations between the EU and its neighbours if certain conditions are fulfilled. Based on the experience in the EEA and the Energy Community, multilateral integration agreements can be successful if they offer a well-designed institutional and procedural architecture based on mutual commitments, extend the benefits of the internal market to the participating third countries and create ‘win-win’ situations in satisfying also the participating third countries' vital interests in return for undergoing the hardship of economic reforms.

The Euro blame game and its implications for policy and financial markets. ACES Cases No. 2012.2

The recent financial crisis in some of the eurozone member countries has received a great deal of attention by investors, policy makers and commentators alike. Often these events are interpreted as a failure of the euro and the sustainability of the eurozone is called into question. This paper shows that this analysis and its emphasis are flawed. Fiscal imbalances and financial market imperfections are at the core of the problem, and they need to be addressed directly to prevent future crises.

Political economy of the Agenda 2010 reforms: How Gerhard Schröder overcame the "blocked republic". ACES Cases No. 2008.3

This essay will show that the Schröder-led government managed to break the political gridlock and introduce the Agenda 2010 because key institutional structures of Germany‟s political economy had lost their obstructive powers. In other words, the formerly semi-sovereign state had reclaimed its sovereignty. To understand how this happened, Peter Katzenstein's concept of the semi-sovereign state is first explored as a framework through which to analyze economic policy continuity and change. Within this framework, the causes for constant reform inertia between 1982 and 2002, in spite of varying political constellations and changes in the country‟s economic structure, are then discussed. This analysis will demonstrate that the Agenda 2010 reforms are predominantly a result of underlying incremental change in the political economy and its effect on the political decision-making process. Finally, the findings of this analysis are summarized and discussed with the aim of better understanding the economic policies of the current grand coalition government of the CDU/CSU and the SPD government under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

European Policy Uses of International Comparisons of Academic Achievement. ACES Working Papers, 2012

International large-scale assessments (ILSAs) and the resulting ranking of countries in key academic subjects have become increasingly significant in the development of global performance indicators and national level reforms in education. As one of the largest international surveys, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has had a considerable impact on the world of international comparisons of education. Based on the results of these assessments, claims are often made about the relative success or failure of education systems, and in some cases, such as Germany or Japan, ILSAs have sparked national level reforms (Ertl, 2006; Takayama, 2007, 2009). In this paper, I offer an analysis of how PISA is increasingly used as a key reference both for a regional2 entity like the European Union (EU) and for national level performance targets in the example of Spain (Breakspear, 2012). Specifically, the paper examines the growth of OECD and EU initiatives in defining quality education, and the use of both EU benchmarks and PISA in defining the education indicators used in Spain to measure and set goals for developing quality education. By doing so, this paper points to the role of the OECD and the EU in national education systems. It therefore adds to a body of literature pointing to the complex relationship between international, regional, and national education policy spaces (cf. Dale & Robertson, 2002; Lawn & Grek, 2012; Rizvi & Lingard, 2009).

Re-thinking the EU's development paradigm: views from Morocco and Tunisia. EPC Policy Brief, 12 January 2015

A decade of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the standard model of business as usual remains. Is there a reluctance to take the prevailing development paradigm based on economic growth and question its suitability as a motor for development? Most ENP resources and most tangible results remain within a financial framework, with a concentration on market-driven reforms in relation to economic and social change. On this basis, the current atmosphere represents a historical opportunity for rethinking the EU´s development paradigm fostered in the region. Drawing on extensive field work in Morocco and Tunisia, this policy brief highlights limitations and contradictions of the EU´s socio-economic development policies.