Odour nuisance in Ireland and the potential use of olfactometry for the control of odours

Odour nuisance in other European countries has led to the development of techniques which employ panels of human assessors for the determination of environmental odours. Odour measurement is not widely practised in Ireland, yet local authorities are frequently in receipt of odour derived public complaints. This dissertation examines the fundamentals of odour nuisance in terms of how we perceive odours, common sources of environmental odours, the principles of odour measurement (in particular the Sutch pre-standard on olfactometry) and the extent to which odour nuisance is a problem in Ireland. The intention is to provide a reference document for use by those interested parties in the country who may be variously involved in policy making, legislative development, enforcement of environmental law or any person who has an interest in odours and the public nuisance they can give rise to. In particular the aim was to provide previously undocumented information on the prevalence of odour nuisance in Ireland, the exercision of the available powers to control odours, and the possible value of odour measurement as part of a regulatory process. A questionnaire was circulated to all local authorities in the country and 82% responded with information on their experiences and views on the subject of odours. The results of the survey are presented in summary and detailed form.

The ‘Global Dimension’ of Contemporary Politics. An Argument for Taking ‘Global’ Seriously

Recent years have seen a striking proliferation of the term ‘global’ in public and political discourse. The popularity of the term is a manifestation of the fact that there is a widespread notion that contemporary social reality is ‘global’. The acknowledgment of this notion has important political implications and raises questions about the role played by the idea of the ‘global’ in policy making. These questions, in turn, expose even more fundamental issues about whether the term ‘global’ indicates a difference in kind, even an ontological shift, and, if so, how to approach it. This paper argues that the notion of ‘global’, in other words the ‘global dimension’, is a significant aspect of contemporary politics that needs to be investigated. The paper argues that in the globalization discourse of International Studies ‘global’ is ‘naturalized’, which means that it is taken for granted and assumed to be self-evident. The term ‘global’ is used mainly in a descriptive way and subsumed under the rubric of ‘globalization’. ‘Global’ tends to be equated with transnational and/or world-wide; hence, it addresses quantitative differences in degree but not (alleged) differences in kind. In order to advance our understanding of contemporary politics, ‘global’ needs to be taken seriously. This means, firstly, to understand and to conceptualize ‘global’ as a social category; and, secondly, to uncover ‘global’ as a ‘naturalized’ concept in the Political and International Studies strand of the globalization discourse in order to rescue it for innovative new approaches in the investigation of contemporary politics. In order to do so, the paper suggests adopting a strong linguistic approach starting with the analysis of the word ‘global’. Based on insights from post-structuralism as well as cognitive and general constructivist perspectives it argues that a frame-based corpus linguistic analysis offers the possibility of investigating the collective/social meaning(s) of global in order to operationalize them for the analysis of the ‘global dimension’ of contemporary politics.

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.

Picking the Right Budget Constraint for Scotland

This position paper considers the devolution of further fiscal powers to the Scottish Parliament in the context of the objectives and remit of the Smith Commission. The argument builds on our discussion of fiscal decentralization made in our previous published work on this topic. We ask what sort of budget constraint the Scottish Parliament should operate with. A soft budget constraint (SBC) allows the Scottish Parliament to spend without having to consider all of the tax and, therefore, political consequences, of that spending, which is effectively the position at the moment. The incentives to promote economic growth through fiscal policy – on both the tax and spending sides are weak to non-existent. This is what the Scotland Act, 1998, and the continuing use of the Barnett block grant, gave Scotland. Now other budget constraints are being discussed – those of the Calman Commission (2009) and the Scotland Act (2012), as well as the ones offered in 2014 by the various political parties – Scottish Conservatives, Scottish Greens, Scottish Labour, the Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Government. There is also the budget constraint designed by the Holtham Commission (2010) for Wales that could just as well be used in Scotland. We examine to what extent these offer the hard budget constraint (HBC) that would bring tax policy firmly into the realm of Scottish politics, asking the Scottish electorate and Parliament to consider the costs to them of increasing spending in terms of higher taxes; or the benefits to them of using public spending to grow the tax base and own-sourced taxes? The hardest budget constraint of all is offered by independence but, as is now known, a clear majority of those who voted in the referendum did not vote for this form of budget constraint. Rather they voted for a significant further devolution of fiscal powers while remaining within a political and monetary union with the rest of the UK, with the risk pooling and revenue sharing that this implies. It is not surprising therefore that none of the budget constraints on offer, apart from the SNP’s, come close to the HBC of independence. However, the almost 25% fall in the price of oil since the referendum, a resource stream so central to the SNP’s economic policy making, underscores why there is a need for a trade off between a HBC and risk pooling and revenue sharing. Ranked according to the desirable characteristic of offering something approaching a HBC the least desirable are those of the Calman Commission, the Scotland Act, 2012, and Scottish Labour. In all of these the ‘elasticity’ of the block grant in the face of failure to grow the Scottish tax base is either not defined or is very elastic – meaning that the risk of failure is shuffled off to taxpayers outside of Scotland. The degree of HBC in the Scottish Conservative, Scottish Greens and Scottish Liberal Democrats proposals are much more desirable from an economic growth point of view, the latter even embracing the HBC proposed by the Holtham Commission that combines serious tax policy with welfare support in the long-run. We judge that the budget constraint in the SNP’s proposals is too hard as it does not allow for continuation of the ‘welfare union’ in the UK. We also consider that in the case of a generalized UK economic slow requiring a fiscal stimulus that the Scottish Parliament be allowed increased borrowing to be repaid in the next economic upturn.

Narrating urban entrepreneurship: a matter of imagineering?

The battle between cities with regard to their creative possibilities has evolved into a process of multiplying ever-new images and variegated stories of urban attractiveness and success. Engineering “cool” images and “hot” stories about one’s city is now a central endeavor in the narratives of urban policy-making that center more and more on the idea of the entrepreneurial city. The making of an entrepreneurial image is enacted through various narrative genres that lie somewhere between place making and place marketing, between branding and boosting, between restoration and revanchism, between iconic architecture and mega-spectacle. This “imagineering” is not only part of the way cities try to (re)present themselves as entrepreneurial to various audiences through a real “image inflation” (Zukin, 2008, p. xii) but is 1 Forthcoming in: B. Lange,.A. Kalandides, B. Stoeber, I. Wellmann (Hrsg.) (2009): Governance der Kreativwirtschaft. Diagnosen und Handlungsoptionen. Transcript-Verlag, Bielefeld. 2 also inscribed in the various ways urban creativity and entrepreneurship can be studied, researched and imagined. In this chapter we aim to differentiate the political narratives of the entrepreneurial city as we emphasize the need to understand the politics of narration and make a plea for critical reflexivity in our forms of researching and theorizing. We will thus try to investigate how the politics of narration is intertwined with the narration of political concepts and will argue that the narrating of urban entrepreneurship can raise very different images and discourses of city life beyond those that are currently engineered. We will distinguish between a grand narrative, a counter-narrative, and an assemblage of more ambivalent little narratives, which we call prosaic narration. While the distinction between these three types might be seen as a bit too simple and “straight”, we believe that by juxtaposing these different forms of narration and alternating between them, we can help problematize the engineering of the city as entrepreneurial and imagine alternative views both of city life and of what is understood as its creativity.

Budget constrained expenditure multipliers

We show that standard expenditure multipliers capture economy-wide effects of new government projects only when financing constraints are not binding. In actual policy making, however, new projects usually need financing. Under liquidity constraints, new projects are subject to two opposite effects: an income effect and a set of spending substitution effects. The former is the traditional, unrestricted, multiplier effect; the latter is the result of expenditure reallocation to upheld effective financing constraints. Unrestricted multipliers will therefore be, as a general rule, upward biased and policy designs based upon them should be reassessed in the light of the countervailing substitution effects.

Integración de políticas medio ambientales: Transformaciones institucionales en España

La Integración de la Políticas Ambientales (IPA) consiste en la incorporación de los objetivos ambientales en todos los estadios de elaboración e implementación de las políticas no ambientales (o sectoriales), con un reconocimiento específico de dicho objetivo como principio director de la programación y la puesta en práctica. Se complementa con la previsión de las consecuencias ambientales mediante una evaluación de conjunto de la política con objeto de minimizar las contradicciones entre las políticas ambientales y no ambientales dando prioridad a las primeras. La naturaleza transversal de la IPA no se ajusta a la forma tradicional de gobernanza jerárquica basada en la autoridad del Estado, la diferenciación sectorial, y los instrumentos típicos de dirección y control. Por ello, no es extraño que la IPA se encuentre a menudo asociada a los llamados "nuevos modos de gobernanza". Esta tesis propone analizar empíricamente el estado de la cuestión en España con respecto a la Integración de la política ambiental , tanto a nivel estatal como autonómico (Cataluña, País Vasco), yendo más allá de los compromisos políticos a favor de un mayor grado de integración de los factores ambientales en las demás políticas. En particular, los ámbitos de investigación seleccionados para esta finalidad son el de las políticas de mitigación de las causas y los efectos del cambio climático, y las políticas de desarrollo sostenible. En términos de ‘variable independiente’ La hipótesis que se quiere comprobar es que la acción llevada a cabo por la Unión Europea ha generado profundos cambios en las estructuras de las instituciones mencionadas y en los procesos de elaboración y implementación de determinadas políticas (energía y transporte) así como en las relaciones entre sectores de la administración pública y entre el sector público y el privado.

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.

Annual Report to the Equality Commission 04-05 (PDF 187 KB)

The Department’s Evaluation and Equality Unit provides advice and guidance to colleagues throughout the Department who are planning and undertaking reviews and evaluations of programmes, services and policies, and provides guidance and information to support the policy-making processes. In carrying out this function the Unit has continued to help colleagues to mainstream equality considerations into decision-making, reviews and evaluations from the earliest stages of these processes. åÊ

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

National Council on Ageing and Older People - Annual Report 2008

National Council on Ageing and Older People РAnnual Report 2008 2008 was a year of change for the National Council on Ageing and Older People. In January the Government announced the establishment of the Office for Older People at the Department of Health and Children and that the Office would have a key role in progressing the Government̢?Ts agenda for older people. The decision provided that Council staff would be transferred to the Office and that the Council would be replaced by an Advisory Council. Although a sad day for the Council itself, we regard this as a significant step forward in bringing older people̢?Ts issues right to the centre of Government policy-making. Click here to download PDF 333kb

National Positive Ageing Strategy

The Programme for Government committed to completing and implementing the National Positive Ageing Strategy so that older people are recognised, supported and enabled to live independent full lives. This Strategy, which was published in April 2013, is a new departure in policy making for older people given its focus on the broader determinants of health. It is the blueprint for age related policy and service delivery in Ireland, outlining a vision for positive ageing and older people, the national goals and objectives required to achieve this vision and a suite of priority areas for action that are based on the broader determinants of health. Therefore, a whole of Government and whole of society approach will be required to implement the National Positive Ageing Strategy and to address these priority action areas. Click here to download PDF 2.49MB  

Understanding socio-economic inequalities affecting older people

In 2012, CARDI was asked by The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland to carry out a series of research projects on ageing in Ireland, North and South. This research project, 'Understanding socio-economic inequalities affecting older people’ , was carried out by Paul McGill, CARDI. The research sought to answer the following questions: Are there inequalities that affect older people as a group compared with younger people, or inequalities that exist within the older population? How are these inequalities changing over time? Do these socio-economic inequalities have a detrimental impact on older people or on a substantial number of them? How can any harmful socio-economic inequalities be reduced or eliminated and what are the implications for policy-making? Key Findings*: In RoI the poorest older people had a rise of €32 per week between 2004 and 2011 in total incomes while those with the highest incomes had a rise of €255 (CSO 2013). Total incomes of the poorest pensioner couples in NI did not change between 2003-06 and 2008-11 but the best off had a rise of �37 per week (DSD 2013). Employees aged 60+ earn €10,000 less per year than earners in their peak years in RoI and �2,400 less in NI (CSO Database and NISRA 2012). The richest older people in RoI earn 14 times more from employment than the poorest. In NI it is 36 times more for single pensioners and 44 times more for pensioner couples (CSO 2013; NISRA 2013). The gap in weekly earnings between top and bottom earners aged 60+ in NI rose from �294 to �430 between 2005 and 2012 (NISRA 2012). In the two years 2009-2011 the incomes of the poorest older people in ROI declined by €24 per week (11.4%) (CSO, 2013).