Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

London 2012 and Climate Change. Examining the potential impact of the current economic crisis in the environmental legacy of the Games

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) declares environmental protection to be the third dimension of the Olympic movement. That, in effect, means that nations wishing to host the Games have to present themselves as reliable practitioners of environmental sustainability (ES) in their applications. The greening of sports mega-events, and the hosting of Olympic Games in particular, is now reasonably well established. Yet evidence from the first decade of environmentally-conscious Olympics points to diverging patterns of achievement in the operationalisation of the IOC’s ‘third pillar’. As is now common knowledge, for example, Sydney 2000 was the first ‘Green Olympics’ in the history of the Games; yet four years later, Athens provided a stark contrast, and was the subject of highly critical assessment reports by environmental organisations. Yet Athens has not stopped the Bid Committee for the Beijing 2008 Games claiming that it would ‘leave the greatest Olympic Games environmental legacy ever’ (UNEP 2007: 26), while the London 2012 promotes the concept of the ‘One Planet Olympics’.

In this context and in light of the current global economic crisis, can we claim that London 2012 has the capacity to fulfil its environmental ambitions? This question is adopted in continuity with similar framed questions that have been posed in relation to the most recent Olympics and it is tackled by adopting an investigative model that is placed within discourses of ‘reflexive modernisation’.