212 resultados para PERSUASION
Resumo:
On May 25, 2018, the EU introduced the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that offers EU citizens a shelter for their personal information by requesting companies to explain how people’s information is used clearly. To comply with the new law, European and non-European companies interacting with EU citizens undertook a massive data re-permission-request campaign. However, if on the one side the EU Regulator was particularly specific in defining the conditions to get customers’ data access, on the other side, it did not specify how the communication between firms and consumers should be designed. This has left firms free to develop their re-permission emails as they liked, plausibly coupling the informative nature of these privacy-related communications with other persuasive techniques to maximize data disclosure. Consequently, we took advantage of this colossal wave of simultaneous requests to provide insights into two issues. Firstly, we investigate how companies across industries and countries chose to frame their requests. Secondly, we investigate which are the factors that influenced the selection of alternative re-permission formats. In order to achieve these goals, we examine the content of a sample of 1506 re-permission emails sent by 1396 firms worldwide, and we identify the dominant “themes” characterizing these emails. We then relate these themes to both the expected benefits firms may derive from data usage and the possible risks they may experience from not being completely compliant to the spirit of the law. Our results show that: (1) most firms enriched their re-permission messages with persuasive arguments aiming at increasing consumers’ likelihood of relinquishing their data; (2) the use of persuasion is the outcome of a difficult tradeoff between costs and benefits; (3) most companies acted in their self-interest and “gamed the system”. Our results have important implications for policymakers, managers, and customers of the online sector.
Resumo:
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on nonlinear pricing and rent-seeking. In the first chapter of the thesis, I provide new theoretical insights about non-linear pricing in monopoly and common agency by combining the principal-agent framework with other-regarding preferences. I introduce a new theoretical model that separately characterizes status-seeker and inequity-averse buyers. I show how the buyer’s optimal choice of quality and market inefficiency change when the buyer has other-regarding preferences. In the second chapter, I find the optimal productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts when the prize is endogenous. I show that due to the existence of endogeneity, sabotaging the productive rent-seeking efforts causes sabotaging the endogenous part of the prize, which can affect the rent-seeking efforts. Moreover, I introduce social preferences into my model and characterize symmetric productive rent-seeking and sabotaging efforts. In the last chapter, I propose a new theoretical model regarding information disclosure with Bayesian persuasion in rent-seeking contests when the efforts are productive. I show that under one-sided incomplete information, information disclosure decision depends on both the marginal costs of efforts and the marginal benefit of aggregate exerted effort. I find that since the efforts are productive and add a positive surplus on the fixed rent, my model narrows down the conditions for the information disclosure compared to the exogenous model. Under the two-sided incomplete information case, I observe that there is a non-monotone relationship between optimal effort and posterior beliefs. Thus, it might be difficult to conclude whether a contest organizer should disclose any information to contestants.