939 resultados para Macroeconomics and International Economics
Resumo:
The US labor market witnessed two apparently unrelated secular movements in thelast 30 years: a decline in unemployment between the early 1980s and the early 2000s,and a decline in participation since the early 2000s. Using CPS micro data and a stock-flow accounting framework, we show that a substantial, and hitherto unnoticed, factorbehind both trends is a decline in the share of nonparticipants who are at the margin ofparticipation. A lower share of marginal nonparticipants implies a lower unemploymentrate, because marginal nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through unemployment,while other nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through employment.
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The matching function -a key building block in models of labor market frictions- impliesthat the job finding rate depends only on labor market tightness. We estimate such amatching function and find that the relation, although remarkably stable over 1967-2007,broke down spectacularly after 2007. We argue that labor market heterogeneities are notfully captured by the standard matching function, but that a generalized matching functionthat explicitly takes into account worker heterogeneity and market segmentation is fullyconsistent with the behavior of the job finding rate. The standard matching function canbreak down when, as in the Great Recession, the average characteristics of the unemployedchange too much, or when dispersion in labor market conditions -the extent to which somelabor markets fare worse than others- increases too much.
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As a result of debt enforcement problems, many high-productivity firms in emergingeconomies are unable to pledge enough future profits to their creditors and this constrains thefinancing they can raise. Many have argued that, by relaxing these credit constraints, reformsthat strengthen enforcement institutions would increase capital flows to emerging economies. Thisargument is based on a partial equilibrium intuition though, which does not take into account theorigin of any additional resources that flow to high-productivity firms after the reforms. We showthat some of these resources do not come from abroad, but instead from domestic low-productivityfirms that are driven out of business as a result of the reforms. Indeed, the resources released bythese low-productivity firms could exceed those absorbed by high-productivity ones so that capitalflows to emerging economies might actually decrease following successful reforms. This resultprovides a new perspective on some recent patterns of capital flows in industrial and emergingeconomies.
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I provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financiallyintegrated countries. During an episode of international deleveraging world consumptiondemand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save.If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominalexchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associatedwith debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union thischannel of adjustment is shut off, and therefore the falls in consumption demand and inthe world interest rate are amplified. Hence, monetary unions are especially prone tohit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap duringdeleveraging. In a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union-wide recession, which isparticularly severe in high-debt countries. The model suggests several policy interventionsthat mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions.
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We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.
Resumo:
We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.
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Today, per capita income differences around the globe are large ? varying by as much as a factor of 35 across countries (Hall and Jones 1999). These differentials mostly reflect the "Great Divergence" (Sam Huntingon) ? the fact that Western Europe and former European colonies grew rapidly after 1800, while other countries grew much later or stagnated. What is less well-known is that a "First Divergence" preceded the Great Divergence: Western Europe surged ahead of the rest of the world long before technological growth became rapid. Europe in 1500 was already twice as rich on a per capita basis as Africa, and one-third richer than most of Asia (Maddison 2007). In this essay, we explain how Europe's tumultuous politics and deadly penchant for warfare translated into a sustained advantage in per capita incomes.
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We explore the linkage between equity and commodity markets, focusing in particular on its evolution over time. We document that a country's equity market valuehas significant out-of-sample predictive ability for the future global commodity priceindex for several primary commodity-exporting countries. The out-of-sample predictive ability of the equity market appears around 2000s. The results are robust to usingseveral control variables as well as firm-level equity data. Finally, our results indicatethat exchange rates are a better predictor of commodity prices than equity markets,especially at very short horizons.
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We study the effects of the adoption of new agricultural technologies on structural transformation. To guide empirical work, we present a simple model where the effect of agriculturalproductivity on industrial development depends on the factor bias of technical change. We testthe predictions of the model by studying the introduction of genetically engineered soybeanseeds in Brazil, which had heterogeneous effects on agricultural productivity across areas withdifferent soil and weather characteristics. We find that technical change in soy production wasstrongly labor saving and lead to industrial growth, as predicted by the model.
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We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.
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One approach to urban areas emphasizes the existence of certain immutable relationships, such as Zipf's or Gibrat's Law. An alternative view is that urban changereflects individual responses to changing tastes or technologies. This paper examinesalmost 200 years of regional change in the U.S. and finds that few, if any, growth relationships remain constant, including Gibrat's Law. Education does a reasonable jobof explaining urban resilience in recent decades, but does not seem to predict countygrowth a century ago. After reviewing this evidence, we present and estimate a simple model of regional change, where education increases the level of entrepreneurship.Human capital spillovers occur at the city level because skilled workers produce moreproduct varieties and thereby increase labor demand. We find that skills are associatedwith growth in productivity or entrepreneurship, not with growth in quality of life, atleast outside of the West. We also find that skills seem to have depressed housing supplygrowth in the West, but not in other regions, which supports the view that educatedresidents in that region have fought for tougher land-use controls. We also present evidence that skills have had a disproportionately large impact on unemployment duringthe current recession.
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What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.
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Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.
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This paper uses a database covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregatefluctuations. We set up a simple multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms selling tomultiple markets to motivate a theoretically-founded decomposition of firms' annualsales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific componentcontributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as thecomponents capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country.We then decompose the firm-specific component to provide evidence on two mechanismsthat generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recentliterature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks tolarge firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations; and (ii) aggregate fluctuationscan arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input-output linkages across the economy.Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firmshocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.
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This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of China's trade integration and technological change in a multi-country quantitative Ricardian-Heckscher-Ohlin model.We simulate two alternative growth scenarios: a "balanced" one in which China's productivity grows at the same rate in each sector, and an "unbalanced" one in whichChina's comparative disadvantage sectors catch up disproportionately faster to theworld productivity frontier. Contrary to a well-known conjecture (Samuelson 2004),the large majority of countries experience significantly larger welfare gains whenChina's productivity growth is biased towards its comparative disadvantage sectors.This finding is driven by the inherently multilateral nature of world trade.